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642 and Homel, enabled Lenin to impose what he cynically described as
728 his 'shameful peace' on his colleagues of the Soviets. Clause 6 of the Treaty obliged the Soviet Government 'to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian People's Republic and to recognize the Treaty of Peace between that State and the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance'.

727 The occupation of the Ukraine was organized on the basis of a special agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Germans left about 500,000 men on the whole of the Eastern Front. Of these, apart from the troops which were stationed in Poland and Lithuania to protect lines of communication, there were about 12 Infantry and 2 Cavalry Divisions occupying the Front against Soviet Russia from Narva to Homel (the 8th and 10th Armies). The remaining 15–16 Infantry and 4 Cavalry Divisions were quartered in the Ukraine (with the exception of a few battalions which were sent to Poti for the protection of the new Georgian Republic from Germany's ally Turkey). The troops in the Ukraine constituted the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* and consisted of the 1st and 20th Army Corps, the 27th (Saxon) and the 22nd and 41st Reserve Corps, together with several independent divisions and detachments. These troops had little in common with the magnificent German armies which had invaded Russia in the first years of the war. The *Heeresgruppe Kiev* contained a veritable mosaic of different battalions—the majority of which consisted of elderly men belonging to Landwehr and Landsturm formations. During the whole period of the German occupation of the Ukraine there was a continuous process of transfer of single battalions and even of small detachments to the Western Front—and this became more noticeable after 8 August, the day which may be said to have marked the turning-point in France. Only the Cavalry Divisions and Artillery approached the standards of the German armies which had formerly been held on the Russian Front. Thus the legend that the military occupation of the Ukraine was 'a mistake', in the sense that important forces were engaged there which might have been decisively employed on the Western Front, seems to be without foundation. Out of all the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* it would have been difficult to select three or four fighting infantry divisions, and less could have been found among the miscellaneous collection of elderly and invalid troops which constituted the so-called 8th and 10th Armies.

The Austro-Hungarian forces in the Ukraine amounted nominally to 250,000 men; but their total in reality was far below this and the number of deserters grew every day.

The Germans from the first began to play the leading role in Kiev.

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All authority was vested in the hands of the Commander of *Heeresgruppe Kiev*, Field-Marshal Eichhorn. To Kiev was sent also General Groener, who had a great reputation for his organizing capacity (amongst his collaborators was 'enigmatic' Meissner, who later was to play a certain role in the entourages of President Hindenburg and of the Führer Hitler). The representative of the German Foreign Office was Baron Mumm. Vienna sent as minister Count Forgacs, who, as minister in Belgrad in 1914, had his share of responsibility for the events which immediately preceded the outbreak of war. 727

Dissensions began between the Allies from the very first moment. Hoffmann, who was in Kovno, kept himself well-informed about what was going on in Kiev. He wrote in his diary: 'Endless troubles with the Austrians in Ukraine. They are behaving with their usual meanness when the knife is not at their throat. It is a pity that the Italians do not attack.' Quarrels broke out on account of the delimitation of the respective German and Austrian zones. The role of the Austrians in the advance into the Ukraine had been modest enough, since they arrived too late to take part in any operations with the exception of 'the capture' of Odessa. Nevertheless, their zone of occupation spread over all the south. At the end of March an agreement was at last reached. On the Black Sea the Austrians retained Odessa and Kherson; the Germans Nikolaev and Sevastopol. Three Governments, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, Podolia and the southern strip in Volhynia, were reserved as the Austrian zone. In this wise, the Crimea, which shortly passed into German hands, was separated by the Austrian zone from the rest of the territories in German occupation.

The gradual advance eastward of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* continued. The 22nd Reserve Corps remained in Volhynia: the 27th Reserve (Saxon) Corps was in Kiev: the 41st Reserve Corps, after crossing the Dniepr, occupied the Government of Chernigov, the 20th Army Corps that of Poltava: the 1st Army Corps marched into Kharkov on 20 April. General Groener, who was concerned to collect coal supplies, gave the order in May for the 215th Infantry Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division to march into the south-east into the Donets coal basin as far as the boundaries of the Don Cossack region, where an independent Government had been set up. At the same time the 212th Infantry Division occupied Melitopol and the northern part of the Government of Tauris, while the 15th Landwehr Division was sent to the Crimea and Sevastopol. By the middle of May the occupation had been accomplished.

The Government of the *Rada* had returned to Kiev with the German troops. An interesting light is thrown on the characters of 645

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728 439 Pest. In April the situation somewhat improved, but it was evident that there was no hope of receiving by the end of July any substantial proportion of the goods which had been stipulated under the Peace Treaty. It became clear that the enthusiastic delegates of the 'Popular Republic' had greatly exaggerated the agricultural wealth of their country. They had had in view 'potential possibilities', but they had quite failed to take into account the actual state of affairs in the spring of 1918. During the whole of the preceding year agrarian disorders had been taking place. The peasants had appropriated lands, and the countryside had been swarming with ex-soldiers who had completely lost their morale and who, although they had quitted the front, had no wish whatever to return to peaceful occupations. Under such conditions the harvest of 1917 had not been gathered as it would have been in normal times; and, furthermore, no one knew to whom what had actually been gathered really belonged. The cattle of the landowners had been in great part slaughtered or driven off when the Red Guards made their appearance in the Ukraine during the winter of 1917; the sugar factories were standing idle. At the same time, the well-to-do peasants had quickly learned to hide their grain and other produce, and they were no more willing to deliver to the Germans than they had been to the Bolsheviks.

As a result of all this, during the whole period of the Occupation, the Germans only succeeded in exporting 9293 wagon-loads of grain; 23,195 wagon-loads of fodder, sugar, cattle, eggs and other products; and 4567 wagon-loads of minerals (coal, manganese)—as a whole 37,000 wagons under the auspices of the *Wirtschaftstelle* and 5000 through 'private initiative'. This tonnage amounted to scarcely a fifth part of what had been expected before 31 July 1918. And even the quantities which Germany succeeded in securing were delivered after the Government of the *Rada* had given place to that of Hetman Skoropadsky, and for the most part during the first three months of the latter régime.

[642] 727 The failure of the *Rada* in 'the economic collaboration' with the Germans was the reason for its downfall. When the Germans came into the Ukraine their inspection of stocks of supplies not only revealed the relative scarcity of these stocks but also the chaotic state of Ukrainian economy at that moment. The estates of the landowners had almost completely disappeared, and the peasants had appropriated the land. This action of the agrarian proletariat had, however, received no legal sanction, and the *Rada* had not yet elaborated any land laws. To the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* the practical and not the legal state of affairs was important. Field-Marshal Eichhorn therefore issued an 'Order to the Ukrainian popu-

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lation', calling on them to resume agricultural production 'to the maximum extent'. The harvest was to belong to him who would plough and sow, whether he was the legal owner of the land or the peasant who had taken possession of it. If the peasant proved unable to sow, the landowner was to do it, and the peasant was to put no obstacle in his way. Persons guilty of disobedience to this Order were to be brought to trial and punished, not by the Ukrainian civil courts but by the military tribunals of the Occupation.

Not only was this Order issued without the knowledge of the *Rada*, but the *Rada* heard of it only two weeks later. The German authorities were well aware that Eichhorn's Order would arouse opposition among the peasants and also among numerous groups in the *Rada* itself. Such opposition, however, would afford a suitable pretext to put an end to a Government which had proved its incapacity for 'economic collaboration'.

A month's experience of the country had been enough to indicate to the Occupation authorities the only section of the population which was likely to help them to fulfil General Groener's plan with efficiency and rapidity. It did not require much perspicacity to observe that the stocks of sugar, vegetable oil and spirit on large estates where the landlord had owned the factories were greatly in excess of those accumulated by the peasantry. Furthermore, it always proved much more difficult to extract grain from peasants, who were guiltily conscious of having recently pillaged neighbouring granaries. The liberal Government of the *Rada* had not refused to sanction the formation of a landowners' union when the latter proposed to organize to defend their interests. Of course this union, in accord with the spirit of the times, had to be called a Union of Cornraisers (*Khliboroby*); but it was recruited not only from prosperous peasants who owned 20–30 hectares of land, but also from many middle-class and even aristocratic landowners. The Union maintained an aspect sufficiently 'democratic' to avoid provoking the radical majority of the *Rada*, but it had close connections with Russian conservative circles whose influence was beginning to make itself felt in Kiev.

The terms of the Soviet-Ukrainian 'peace' were still under negotiation, but the armistice imposed by the Germans continued in force, and the situation provided favourable opportunities for the higher classes of Russian society to leave Petrograd and Moscow and make their way to the Ukraine. Furthermore, after the chaotic demobilization of the army, thousands of Russian officers had gathered in Kiev. These officers were certainly in no hurry to go back 'into the hands of the Soviets'. Kiev presented a very strange picture in

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727 April 1918. The capital of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic' had all the appearance of a big Russian town living an animated and even boisterous life owing to the presence of large numbers of Russian and foreign 'guests'. Except for the names of certain shops which were written up in Ukrainian and the picturesque uniforms of the *Rada* regiments, there was no indication of 'the beginning of a new life'. Ukrainian was only spoken in Government offices and during the sittings of the *Rada*. This official language imported from Galicia was not always easily understood by the inhabitants of Russian Ukraine.

In the environment of the Union of *Khliboroby* and of the fashionable fugitives from the north the Command of the *Heeresgruppe Kiev* easily found a convenient person who could be the head of the administration which was to replace the Government of the *Rada*.

General Paul Skoropadsky had the advantage of being a descendant of that amiable and pliable Hetman who had been chosen by Peter the Great to succeed Mazeppa. An officer of the Chevaliers Gardes Regiment, he had distinguished himself during the war, first in command of a Guards Brigade and later of a Guards Division. Of Ukrainian origin and property, he belonged to a wealthy and distinguished family. Furthermore, General Skoropadsky was endowed with the necessary ambition, and had no objection to undertaking an important political role even if it should be a difficult one. He had many connections with the Union of Cornraisers and had established excellent relations with the German Command, which now designated him as their chosen 'Head of the State' when the propitious moment for his elevation should arise.

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That moment arrived when at last the *Rada* learned about the Order issued by Field-Marshal Eichhorn, and peasant riots—provoked by the Order—broke out in the southern parts of the Governments of Kiev and Poltava. The members of the *Rada* were in a state of agitation; not only Petlyura and the extremists were urging opposition to the German measures, but also some of the cabinet ministers—including Lubinsky, that incorrigibly eloquent 'student' of the Congress of Brest-Litovsk. The German Command was well aware of the movement of opinion in the *Rada* and on 24 April they signed a formal agreement with Skoropadsky. Lüdendorff approved the choice of 'a man with whom one can work well' (Lüdendorff, *War Memoirs*, p. 624). On the same day the *Rada* declared the Order of Field-Marshal Eichhorn to be illegal and non-existent. Two days later, during a sitting of the *Rada*, a detachment of German soldiers entered the hall under the command of an officer who gave the abrupt order, 'Hands up!' The outraged deputies were searched for

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arms, after which they were allowed to go home with the exception 727
of a few of their number, including several cabinet ministers, who 642
were arrested on the spot. On the following day, during a meeting of the Union of Cornraisers, Paul Skoropadsky was proclaimed 'Hetman of the Ukraine'.

Skoropadsky remained Hetman for about seven-and-a-half months 727
and resigned when the Germans were evacuating the Ukraine. Those 439
seven months can be divided into two distinct periods: the first until the middle of August and the second until the end of November.

During the first period the Germans found that their manœuvre had been crowned with comparative success. In July, particularly, supplies of grain and coal were delivered at a regular and rapid tempo. The Germans, again, succeeded in securing thousands of horses of which they were badly in need, not so much for the cavalry as for the artillery and transport services. In Berlin and Vienna bread reappeared and meat and sugar was to be had in considerable quantities. Skoropadsky's Government turned out to be much more capable than that of the *Rada*, perhaps for the reason that the Hetman did not bother about any ideology whatever. The Foreign Minister, Doroshenko, was not over-burdened with work, but the energetic Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyakovsky, and the Minister of Commerce, Gutnik, had plenty to do. Berlin and Vienna placed at the disposal of the Government the quantity of Marks necessary to cover the issue of 400,000,000 *karbóvantsi* (about 300,000,000 Marks) issued by the Hetman; and for this reason the *karbóvantsi* enjoyed a greater credit with the people than had the 'paper' of the *Rada*. In the meantime 'a real General', General Ragoza, formerly commanding the 4th Russian Army, undertook the task of organizing the Hetman's army. Not only officers of Ukrainian origin, but officers from all over Russia freely enlisted in it.

The historian of Brest-Litovsk justly remarks that in June 1918 727
'the Ukraine became for a short time a bourgeois Mecca and thither 642
flocked thousands of refugees from Soviet Russia' (Wheeler-Bennett, p. 323). Kiev rapidly lost even that 'shade of Ukrainism' which it had worn in the *Rada* days. Baron Mumm, the German Minister Resident, was depressed by this aspect of affairs when he wrote to Groener: 'I tried to insist with the President of the Council of Ministers Lizohub that the German Government desires his cabinet to have more of *couleur locale*.' Mumm altogether was not particularly pleased with the *coup d'état*, since the military men had not asked his opinion about it and had not even troubled to let him know before it was accomplished. In another report Mumm suspects the Hetman's Government of being 'pro-Russian', but adds that 'this should

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727 642 not be taken too tragically as the Hetman's Government is under my control and that of the German Staff'. The Austrian Command, which did not like the Hetman on account of his 'independent tone in relation to Vienna', accused Skoropadsky himself of being 'pro-Russian'. Compromising documents were produced from somewhere according to which the Hetman had, in July 1914, denied the existence of a Ukrainian nation, while in July 1917 he was supposed to have spoken of Kiev as a centre of Russian and not of Ukrainian culture. He had also been guilty of advocating the union of all Russian lands in a federal state. The position of the Hetman, however, was then very firm, because he had the sympathy of the military Command who had no interest in the ideological side of the Ukrainian Question.

Baron Mumm and the Austrians were of course very near the truth in their views on Skoropadsky's Government. The Hetman and his cabinet, even if they were Ukrainians by origin, were of less than moderate tendencies in relation to separatism. They only 'tolerated' the separation of Ukraine from Russia while Russia remained in the hands of Lenin and Trotsky. At this time Kiev not only looked forward to the early downfall of the Bolsheviks, but was certain that the excellent relations existing between the Hetman and the German Command was the prelude to German support for the restoration of the Russian Monarchy.

At this time the Ukrainian and Russian conservatives in Kiev were not the only elements who were anticipating a German march on Moscow. The success of the German offensive in France in the spring of 1918 had convinced the Russian factions of the invincibility of the German power. Even Paul Milyukov, the protagonist of the Triple Entente, got into touch with the German Command in Kiev through the Ukrainian Premier Lizohub, who had been a member of the Cadet Party. But the Germans continued to stand where they were, and even the murder of the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Mirbach, did not induce them to expel from Berlin the Soviet representative Joffe, whose staff was at this time propagating
727 Communism in Germany with relative immunity.

Meantime a curious situation had been created on the Don, where the Germans had recognized the Don Cossack *ataman* General Krasnov as head of a separate state. In the north the *ataman* was fighting the Bolsheviks, while on the south he was collaborating with the Volunteer Army in process of formation by General Denikin, who was the favoured protégé of the Entente Powers as the allies of Imperial Russia. Skoropadsky, notwithstanding his dependence on the Germans and the German anxiety to conciliate the Soviet

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Government, managed, with the connivance of German officers, to 727
send some support in men and supplies to Krasnov and, through him, to Denikin.

As the summer advanced a serious deterioration took place in conditions in the Ukraine. The German and Austrian troops, weary of the war and in continuous contact with the anarchic and revolutionary incidents of the countryside, were becoming demoralized. After the German disasters on the Western Front at the beginning of August, their mood became mutinous, although it was not until October that open disorders broke out among the German troops in Kharkov, when certain battalions refused transfer to the Western Front.

The German official source (*Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*), published in 1936 with a Preface by Generals Blomberg and von Beck, describes the gradual demoralization of the Occupation troops in the Ukraine. The police functions which fell to the lot of the German troops undermined their morale in the existing situation. Too great temptations existed for soldiers employed in the collection of supplies. 'Illegal commerce and speculation flourished, and it was exceedingly difficult for the military authorities to prevent this on account of the troops being scattered over a vast territory and on account of the necessity of maintaining innumerable small posts. The conduct of isolated German detachments destroyed the prestige of the Occupation troops in the eyes of the local population. Even the authorized trading, the object of which was the despatch of parcels of food to their homes, brought the soldiers into undesirable contact with the population—especially with Jews who had most of this commerce in their hands. Jews were frequently the transmitters of Bolshevik propaganda' (*Rückführung*, pp. 5–6).

The same source gives a gloomy description of the Hetman's 642
Government: 'Unfortunately Hetman Skoropadsky ruled in the Ukraine only with the support of German bayonets. His Government had neither the required authority nor the energy to take drastic measures for restoring law and order in the country. The majority of the population distrusted him on account of his monarchical and pro-Russian tendencies and on account of his support of important landowners. That population stood either for a Republic and friendship with the Entente or simply for the Bolsheviks. The peasants were clamouring most of all for a solution of the agrarian problem, the decision of which the Hetman's Government could not take upon itself. To judge by the beginning made, it was scarcely possible to form a Hetman's army. There were too many officers and too few soldiers—especially too few of those soldiers who later turned out trustworthy' (*ibid.* pp. 8–9).

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642 Already in the month of April, before the *Rada* fell, peasant risings
● 727 had flared up in the Governments of Kiev and Poltava in answer to German expeditions in search of supplies. Under Skoropadsky the execution of Eichhorn's Order was carried through in a firmer fashion—with the aid of German detachments; but it was accompanied with extremely dangerous moral consequences, not only for the Occupation troops but also for the Ukrainian Government. In many cases landowners applied to the Hetman for the re-establishment of their rights of property or for the restoration of order in their localities, but the Hetman, who had no trusty police force nor army of his own, had to ask the Occupation authorities for the aid of their troops. This was not refused, since the interest of the landowners coincided with that of the German Command. Among the peasants were many ex-soldiers who had left the Front, but who had taken their rifles with them. Shots were fired sometimes, and heavy reprisals followed on the spot, or at least arrests and military tribunals. There is nothing more perilous for any Government than 'to enforce order' with the aid of foreign soldiers. After two or three months the rural population, including the more prosperous peasants, were unanimous in their hatred of the Hetman and the Germans. Attacks on small German posts guarding railway stations, bridges and depots became more frequent. German soldiers disappeared through shots fired round a corner or the sudden thrust of a knife. These incidents caused fear and anger among the German soldiers—not so much against the local inhabitants as against their own commanders. The Hetman's Government contributed to the 'revolutionizing' of the Ukraine and, indirectly, to that of the Army of Occupation. (6)

727 Eichhorn and Skoropadsky were criticized in some Austro-German circles. The Austrians were displeased in part that a Russian general and not an Austrian Archduke should have been put at the head of the Ukrainian realm. They were also suspicious of ultimate German designs on the Ukraine, since they considered that this territory should properly be regarded as within the sphere of Habsburg policy. On 13 June General Waldstetter wrote in a secret report to Vienna that 'Germany pursues in the Ukraine definite economic and political objectives. She wants to keep for ever a safe way open to Mesopotamia and Arabia through Baku and Persia. The way to the East goes through Kiev, Ekaterinoslav and Sevastopol and from there by sea to Batum and Trebizond.' Somewhat later the Commander-in-Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Occupation troops, General Kraus, reported to his Government: 'On the one hand the German Command is consciously upholding the Mon-

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archical movement, and on the other hand the German Mi[illegible]er Resident Mumm is doing all he can to democratize the Ukraine. [illegible] the whole they want to isolate from us both the conservative and le[illegible] elements and enforce their own influence.' In his turn Mumm complained of the Austrians to Berlin: 'They are trying to secure the complete independence from the Kiev Government of that part of the Ukraine which is occupied by Austro-Hungarian troops.'

It is difficult to ascertain what in reality were the German plans for the future of the Ukraine during the summer of 1918. The High Command did not look very far ahead and believed with justice that the future of the Ukraine was being decided on the battlefields of France. When, in August, Lüdendorff ceased to believe in ultimate victory, he lost all interest in the Ukraine. Of course in those circles whose function it was to study the political and economic problems of the war (typical of which was the noted economist Dr Rohrbach who had been in Kiev) were discussed those theories which linked the destinies of the Ukraine 'for ever' with Germany. The Emperor William, in his missive to the *ataman* of the Don Cossacks, General Krasnov, expressed his own views on the future of Russia, which was to be divided into four independent states—'the Ukraine', 'the South-Eastern Union', 'Central Russia' and 'Siberia'. These views, by the way, were very far from what the patriotic advocates of a 'Russia one and indivisible' were at that time hoping for from the German Emperor.

In September the Emperor received the Hetman at his Headquarters in Spa with all the honours due to 'the head of an independent state'. The visit, however, did not contribute to raise the prestige of Skoropadsky.

Eichhorn, Skoropadsky and Mumm were also criticized by General Hoffmann and Dr Rohrbach. In their opinion, the policy of Eichhorn, supported by Lüdendorff, was pushing the Ukraine back into the arms of Russia. These critics, however, failed to take notice of the more evident danger of the presence in Kiev of a Soviet delegation, with Rakovski or Manuilsky at its head, which had appeared on the pretext of concluding the peace negotiations between the Soviets and the Hetman's Government. Professor Mohilansky writes in his memoirs (*Archives of the Russian Revolution*, vol. XI) that the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior 'possessed numerous documents which testified with absolute certainty that the Bolshevik delegation in Kiev was spreading Bolshevik propaganda in the Ukraine and spent millions in organizing railway strikes and armed revolts. At the beginning of September the Minister of the Interior made a report to the Council of Ministers to the effect that

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727 the Germans put obstacles in his way when the question came to arresting Bolsheviks well known for their activities and even demanded that he should set at liberty those who were under arrest.'

The assassination of Field-Marshal Eichhorn by a Ukrainian terrorist on 30 July failed to sting the Germans into modifying the cautious and even conciliatory policy which they had adopted towards the Soviets. At the same time the Field-Marshal's successor, General Kirchbach, lacked his personal influence and had not the prestige necessary to counter the doubtful intrigues of Baron Mumm. The latter continued to have relations (directly or through the German Consulate) with the representatives of the *Rada*. He insisted that the Hetman's Government should set at liberty Simon Petlyura and other politicians who had been arrested. (7)

727 668 Intently watching and stimulating the growing unpopularity of the Hetman among the peasantry, the representatives of the Ukrainian Socialist parties organized themselves in the 'National Union', to the head of which Vinnichenko was elected. When this had been done, the Union, acting through the German authorities, began to try to secure the admission of some of their members to participation in the Government. Baron Mumm evidently very much doubted the solidity of Skoropadsky's position. At last the German Foreign Office, convinced by his reports, sent Mumm, on 10 October, categorical instructions to support 'the National Ukrainian Movement' and to 'ukrainize' the Government.

727 668 In October, however, it was plainly evident that the Austro-German Occupation could not endure for many weeks. In that month tempestuous national risings broke out in different parts of the Habsburg Monarchy and the ancient Danubian Empire appeared to be on the verge of dissolution. When the news reached the Austro-Hungarian troops in the Ukraine an irresistible movement swept the ranks for immediate return to their own country. The official German source describes how at the beginning of November disorderly crowds of Austrian soldiers in trains and on foot were going west selling their arms and munitions to the local population. 'A regiment consisting of Italians arrested the Commander and Staff of its Army Corps and declared them to be prisoners of war.' The Germans hastily sent the 7th Landwehr (Württemberg) Division to Odessa in order to clear the town of mutinous Austrian soldiers.

But the officers of the German Army of Occupation did not have to wait long to drain their own cup of bitterness. On 9 November came the news by radio that the Emperor William had abdicated; on the next day that Ebert had formed a Government and that the soldiers were electing Soviets; and on the 11th that an armistice had been signed on the Western Front. 727 ● 668

The question of the evacuation of the German troops immediately arose and it was clear that this would present enormous difficulties. Lvov was seized by Galician Ukrainians; Lublin and Warsaw by the Poles: neither were willing to let troop trains through. From Kiev only one line of railway remained: Kovel-Brest-Litovsk-Belostok.

The news of the crash of the German Front in the West and of the impending evacuation of the Ukraine by the Germans was naturally the signal for a Ukrainian movement directed against the Hetman's Government. On 20 November, during street riots in Kiev, twenty people were killed. A whole Ukrainian Division declared itself against the Hetman and began to march from Konotop on Kiev; it was stopped by German troops. Large bands of 'Reds' appeared near Kharkov. New Russia was swarming with brigands who had armed themselves with what the Austrians had left behind. This was only the beginning.

The principal politicians of the 'National Union' were also on the alert and each of them acted according to his disposition. Vinnichenko formed a 'Directoria' of five members from the different Ukrainian Socialist parties, while Petlyura hastened to Belaya Tserkov, where he easily raised a mutiny against the Hetman in the crack regiment which had been christened with the romantic name of 'The Zaporogian Sech Rifles' and which had been recruited largely out of the Russian war prisoners from Rastatt who had been given the 'special education in the Ukrainian spirit'.

§ 4. *DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES*

Between Petlyura and Vinnichenko dissensions immediately arose not only on questions of principle: they were personal enemies. Vinnichenko wanted the Ukraine to be proclaimed a 'State of Workers and Peasants', but not subject to Moscow. Petlyura turned out to be a politician of a more practical turn of mind: he understood well enough that it would not be long before the Moscow Soviets would swallow up Vinnichenko's Ukraine. He also understood that it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to conciliate the sympathy and interest of the Entente powers if the Ukrainian nationalists were to gain sufficient time to establish any sort of stable régime. Petlyura was not a bad organizer and his firmness made him popular with the soldiers. Therefore he was the master of the situation. 642

Partly in consequence of Petlyura's 'Universal' and partly in response to Vinnichenko's proclamations which were plastered all over 669 which had been set up in Kiev and which openly sympathized with the Bolsheviks. Finally, on 28 November 1918, Skoropadsky, gambling on Hainnot's promises and on the understanding between the Entente and the Volunteer Army, issued a proclamation in which he declared the Ukraine to be a part of 'the great Russian realm'. He was too late to save either himself or the conservative interest in Kiev. 642

Ukrainian detachments were approaching Kiev from all sides. 669 As early as 15–20 November all sorts of *atamans* and 'colonels' had 727 occupied Kharkov and Poltava and even Rovno to the west of Kiev. On 19 November remnants of the army which remained loyal to the Hetman were defeated at Vasilkov by the 'Petlyurians'. Kiev would have been taken if the Germans had not been ready to defend it.

Notwithstanding the almost complete collapse of discipline among the troops of the German Occupation, some grounds for collaboration had been found between the Soldiers' Soviets and the Command. 'Only one impulse reigned among the troops, every soldier had only one thought: "Home! Home! Home!—at any price!"' (*Rückführung*, p. 40). The winter had set in, snow had fallen and the horrors of Napoleon's retreat haunted the minds of the Germans. The officers had little difficulty in persuading the men that it was necessary to hold Kiev for the time being as a centre from which the evacuation could be organized.

But the defence of Kiev and other large towns and important railway junctions by the Germans was interpreted by the population as a continued support of the Hetman. By spreading its propaganda against Skoropadsky the 'Directoria' was exciting the people against the Germans; in fact the association and exploitation of the two hatreds secured the maximum number of adherents for Petlyura. The peasants had many accounts to settle with the Germans, while considerations of a material order were eloquent enough. The rumour circulated that the Germans who were leaving the Ukraine were taking away with them a lot of money and great quantities of goods. There was an overwhelming desire not to allow them to do this and to take away from them all that they had appropriated. A logical development of this train of thought was the decision to deprive the Germans of their weapons and munitions: their artillery and machine-guns, rifles, lorries, carts, horses—and finally even their warm clothing and their money.

Attacks on railway stations began in many districts with the object of preventing the evacuation of the German troops. The German Command soon realized that under such conditions it had become an utter impossibility to organize the evacuation even along the lines

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669 •727 which were still available after the events in Poland: Kiev-Kovel-Brest-Litovsk (for the 20th Army Corps and the 22nd and 27th Reserve Corps); and Bakhmach-Pinsk-Brest-Litovsk (for the 1st Army Corps and the 41st Reserve Corps). It became an absolute necessity to come to an agreement with Petlyura, and such an agreement was concluded on 2 December in Kiev. An 'armistice' was arranged during the duration of which the 'Directoria' undertook to make itself responsible for the organization of transport facilities. But with all the goodwill in the world Petlyura and the members of the 'Directoria' were able to give little real assistance in that direction —and that little only in the immediate neighbourhood of Kiev. In other parts of the Ukraine the struggle against the retreating Germans continued to assume more and more violent forms. In Kharkov *ataman* Barbashev and his staff had to be arrested before the Germans could board the promised train. At the important junctions of Bakhmach and Kasatin, the gangs in control continued to refuse to allow trains to pass through *en route* for Kovel and Homel. 'It was simply by a miracle that, up to 12 December, we succeeded in despatching 126 trains' (*Rückführung*). By this time skirmishes between German detachments and the local population had spread all over the Ukraine.

The numerous Ukrainian bands in Volhynia became a real danger to the Germans. Fighting took place 'with changing luck' in Berdichev, where a Bavarian Brigade beat back successive attacks by strong 'Petlyurian' forces. At the station of Zhmerinka the 'Petlyurians' defeated two Landwehr cavalry regiments with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. The disorganized Germans were disarmed and driven away from the railway line in the direction of the Galician frontier. On 7–8 December hot encounters took place for the stations of Sarny, Iskorost and Birzula. The Germans took several thousands of prisoners, but it was difficult to know what to do with them for, if set free, they would join new bands and reappear in a few days.

On 6 December *pourparlers* with Petlyura were renewed, and on the 11th, at the station of Kasatin, a definite agreement was concluded. Petlyura insisted with some reason that if his troops were to obey him it was necessary for the 'Directoria' to return to its capital —Kiev. A peaceful continuation of the German evacuation could only be procured by the immediate surrender of Kiev to the Ukrainians.

642 The first consequence of the Kasatin Agreement was the resignation of the Hetman and his Government. On 14 December, after a short affair with the remaining troops of the Hetman, the ragged

bands of the 'Directoria' under the command of Colonel Konovalets 642
entered Kiev. In their wake, on the 19th, arrived the 'Directoria' with Petlyura and Vinnichenko at its head.

During the Kasatin *pourparlers* the German Command had con- 669
sidered it a question of honour to stipulate that the Russian officers 727
and men who were serving the Hetman should be allowed to go free ●
after surrendering their arms. This condition was only partly kept. Some officers, among them General Count Keller, who had tried to organize resistance in the town itself, were shot on the spot. Another five hundred officers were arrested and kept prisoners in the Kiev Museum. Later they were divided into groups and distributed among different prisons; a number of them, under pretext that they had tried to escape, faced firing squads; after 29 December those who remained alive were sent off to Germany (*Rückführung*, p. 52).

The surrender of Kiev resulted in a change for the better in the conditions of the German evacuation. The Germans had to accept certain limitations on the disposal of military stores: the troops were allowed to take with them only machine-guns for one company in every regiment; guns for three batteries in every artillery regiment, etc. The balance had to be 'delivered to the Ukrainian Army'.

By the end of December the Command of the former *Heeresgruppe Kiev* had migrated first to Kovel and then to Brest-Litovsk. The evacuation was proceeding almost normally, although in some localities the troop trains were attacked and disarmed, and often the Germans could only secure uninterrupted passage by the payment of large sums of money. By the middle of January the bulk of the Army of Occupation had quitted the territory of the Ukraine, and was concentrated in the railway triangle: Brest-Litovsk-Pinsk-Kovel. But troops in left-bank Ukraine were still having a difficult time because the Bolsheviks had appeared there as rivals to the 'Directoria'.

On 9 November, when the first news arrived of the German Revolution, Lenin had denounced the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result, both the Ukraine of the Hetman and the Ukraine of the 'Directoria' found themselves in a state of war with the Soviets. The Bolsheviks had adherents enough in left-bank Ukraine and the industrial centres of New Russia: already in November they tried to take Poltava; at Ekaterinoslav, after the Austrians left, the Red Republic was proclaimed; and Soviets were set up in the mining towns of the Donets upon the departure of the Germans. At Kharkov the Staff of the 1st Army Corps and a certain number of German troops remained, but these could not protect the officials of the 'Directoria' when, on 3 January 1919, 8000 armed 'Reds' entered the city. The Germans in Kharkov found themselves in a parlous

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669 727 position, since they could no longer move westward owing to the state of war between the Soviets and the Ukrainians which existed all along the railway lines. There was talk about taking a south-easterly direction and going to the Don Cossacks. At last the Soviets gave permission for the Germans to go by a round-about way passing through Kursk, Orel, Polotsk. The Soviet authorities and the population of the 'Red' towns through which the Germans passed inundated the homing soldiers with propaganda and plagued them with organized 'fraternizing'. The morale of these men suffered far more than had that of their fellows from the anarchic attacks of the 'Petlyurians', and the dissolution of discipline and general demoralization reached a pitch unknown among the troops who had had to fight their way out through hundreds of miles of hostile country.

§ 5. ANARCHY IN THE UKRAINE: SIMON PETLYURA AND 'BATKO' MAKHNO

Having entered Kiev on 19 December, the 'Directoria' did not enjoy its triumph for long. Just as a year before in the anxious but not unprofitable days of Brest-Litovsk, 'Red' forces were moving on the Ukrainian capital. They were converging from three directions: through Konotop, through Poltava, and along the right bank of the Dniepr. At the same time the Poles—the most ancient enemies of Ukrainian nationality—with their own independence scarcely two months old were threatening all the western provinces.

Early in December an armed conflict had broken out between the Galician Ukrainians who wished to exercise the widely proclaimed right of self-determination and the Poles who looked upon Galicia as 'historically a Polish province'. The Poles had possessed themselves of the district of Kholm, promised once upon a time at Brest-Litovsk to the Ukrainians, and they were taking advantage of the opportunity of broadening its boundaries by infringing on the territory of the former Russian Government of Volhynia. Polish detachments had encounters, towards the middle of January, in the neighbourhood of Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynsk with 'Petlyurian' bands who until then had been more agreeably employed in holding up returning German troop-trains.

During the same weeks the 'Western Ukrainian Republic', proclaimed two months earlier in Lvov, got into a very critical position. The relatively weak Polish forces, collected in former Russian Poland after the Armistice, had now been reinforced by the highly trained and excellently disciplined army of General Haller

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formed in France out of prisoners of war who had been captured or 669 who had deserted from the German and Austrian Armies. The 727 armed forces at the disposal of the Polish Government now amounted to some 80,000 men. The whole of Galicia was occupied without much resistance, and after some street fighting the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' was driven out of Lvov.

The fugitive Government of this 'Republic' sought the aid of the Ukrainian 'Popular Republic', and on 23 January the 'Directoria' proclaimed in solemn session 'the union' of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' with the Ukraine. But on the evening of the same day the first mounted patrols of Antonov-Ovseenko entered Kiev. The 'Directoria' surrendered its capital without a struggle and fled to Vinnitsa. This body, on which so much eloquence had been expended and which had shown always such little capacity, now went completely to pieces. When it left Vinnitsa and established itself in Rovno until the arrival of the Bolsheviks there in April, Vinnichenko used to say jokingly: 'The Directoria is a railway carriage and under that carriage is all its territory!' Petlyura, however, went to Kamenets-Podolsk, and at this point on the former Russian frontier the remnants of the Galician troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' concentrated after their expulsion from Lvov.

The commanders of the Bolshevik forces did not take much interest in them, since at that time they were occupied in trying to gain possession of the ports along the Black Sea coast.

An extraordinary medley of events had been taking place in Odessa. The 7th German Landwehr Division, sent there in November to take over from the absconding Austrians, was duly cut off from Kiev and found that it could not fight its way through the swarms of 'Petlyurians' who were occupying the station of Birzula. Marching was out of the question owing to the snow-storms and the horrible state of the roads. British and French warships appeared in the harbour rather later in the month, but without disembarking any troops. Encouraged by their presence, the numerous Russian and Polish ex-officers in the city formed national detachments; but on 11 December important Ukrainian forces appeared in the suburbs. The Russian and Polish detachments took refuge in the port under the protection of the Allied naval guns. A week later transports arrived and landed a corps of French troops under General Borius. Hot street fighting began, and the French, with the Russians and Poles, drove the 'Petlyurians' out of the city.

Meantime the Germans were trying to remain strictly neutral. During the previous week the bulk of the Landwehr Division had

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669 succeeded in getting away, but there still remained in Odessa
727 about 1600 German troops and a battery of field artillery. The 15th Landwehr Division in Nikolaev was in the same position: it too was cut off from communication with the German Command in Kiev.

French troops were now quartered in Odessa as well as all sorts of national volunteer formations—Russian, Polish and even Roumanian. Greek troops had disembarked at Kherson. The command was vested in the French General d'Anselm, who proceeded to entrust the 15th German Landwehr Division with the maintenance of law and order in Nikolaev.

'Petlyurian' troops and all sorts of *atamans'* detachments and brigand bands had cut off the cities of the coast from the rest of the Ukraine. After the flight of the 'Directoria' from Kiev, the 'Petlyurian' Colonel Grigoriev, who had gone over to the Bolsheviks, became for a time the dominant figure in that strange hinterland of anarchy. In the second half of February all the attempts of the French and the Volunteers to drive away Grigoriev's men from the immediate vicinity of Odessa and to enlarge the zone of occupation ended in failure. During the fighting at Berezovka the French soldiers of the 156th Division showed very little taste for a conflict which they did not understand. Seven tanks which had got stuck in the New Russian mud were left on the battlefield.

This event lent courage to Grigoriev's Bolsheviks, who on 3–5 March made an attempt to attack Nikolaev and Kherson, but were beaten back by a German armoured train. On 9 March Kherson was again attacked by 'Red' forces; the Greek troops in occupation hastened to evacuate the town and embark in their ships and Kherson fell to the Soviets. On 10 March began the evacuation by sea of the 7th Landwehr Division from Odessa and of the 15th Landwehr Division from Nikolaev. In the latter city the bands of Grigoriev entered the burning suburbs while the Germans were still embarking. No one knew what fate would befall Odessa, but on 2 April General d'Anselm received orders from Paris to evacuate. *Ataman* Grigoriev then 'took Odessa'. His troops did not amount to more than 2000 men. An enormous booty of military stores fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

669 These easy triumphs in the ports of the Black Sea did not consolidate the position of the Soviets, which was becoming really critical during the months of May and June 1919. It is true that beyond the Volga the imprudent advance during the spring of Admiral Kolchak's Siberian troops had ended in the defeat of the 'White' forces; at the same time, however, the Volunteer Army

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with the period March–November 1917. A series of interesting articles on the subject from the pen of Milyukov has been published recently in the Parisian Russian daily newspaper *Posledniya Novosti* (The Latest News), 19 March–1 April 1939. For the Ukrainian point of view see D. Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy* (1917–23), Uzhhorod, 1935; Vinnichenko, *Vozrozhdenie Natsii* (The Resurrection of a Nation), vols. I–III, Vienna, 1925.

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(4) *The Ukrainians at Brest-Litovsk*

A vivid description of the course of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and of the part played by the delegates of the *Rada* is given in the scholarly work of J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, London, 1938. An Appendix gives the text of the Peace Treaty with the Ukraine, and a valuable Bibliography is included.

The reminiscences of the leading personalities at Brest-Litovsk have been published in English translations: Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, London, 1929; Czernin, *In the World War*, London, 1919; Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution to Brest-Litovsk*, London, 1919; *My Life*, London, 1935.

(5) *The First 'Siege' of Kiev by the Bolsheviks*

This 'siege' continued for about ten days—from 30 January to 8 February 1918. The first Bolshevik detachments approached the city from the left bank of the Dniepr. The city is situated on the high right bank and presented a perfect target for the Red artillery. Most of the damage was done by an armoured train mounting naval guns, which destroyed, among other architectural features, the block of flats built by Professor Hrushevsky when he decided to settle in the city. When other Bolshevik detachments and the 'Ukrainian regiments' which had gone over to them appeared on the right bank, further resistance became impossible. The brunt of the defence was borne, not by the supporters of Holubovich and Vinnichenko, but by volunteer detachments consisting of officers, students and even schoolboys; many young lives were lost.

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(6) *The Austro-German Occupation of the Ukraine and the Régime of Skoropadsky*

Most interesting material is revealed in the documents published by the Soviets in an anonymous book entitled *Krakh Nemetskoy Okkupatsii na Ukraine: Sbornik Dokumentov izdannykh Gosizdatom* (The Crash of the German Occupation in the Ukraine: Collection of Documents published by the State Publishing Organization), Moscow, 1936. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents which fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks after they occupied Kiev (some of the documents are reproduced in facsimile). It will be difficult, however, for the reader to agree with the deductions made by the Soviet editor. He affirms, for instance, that the Occupation troops were unable to deal with the resistance of 'the great popular masses', and that whole German divisions were employed in putting down workmen's strikes and peasant risings. These assertions are not confirmed by any document. In the documents reference is only made to the assassination of

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727 isolated landowners and to the sending of punitive detachments to certain districts.

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113 The principal reason for the downfall of the German occupation of the Ukraine was, of course, the defeat of the German Armies on the Western Front. The 8th of August is the date which marks a break in the frame of mind of the German Command in Kiev. This can be noted in the documents published in Germany: *Die Rückführung des Ostheeres*, Berlin, 1936.

Wheeler-Bennett describes the situation in the Ukraine in these terms: 'The early months of the Skoropadsky regime were marked by a substantial economic revival; the landowners, industrialists and bourgeois being anxious to co-operate with the new government and the agencies of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.... Passive resistance in certain districts was coupled with acts of sabotage in others. In Odessa an aeroplane factory was set on fire, numerous munition dumps were exploded and trains wrecked.'

See also on the same subject: Pierre Brégy and Prince Serge Obolensky, *L'Ukraine—Terre Russe*, Paris, 1939, pp. 207–8. (Eng. translation, London, 1940.)

(7) *Activities of the Bolshevik 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev*

727 The German authorities were well informed of the subversive activities of the Soviet 'Peace Delegation' in Kiev, but they ignored them—as they ignored the assassination of their Ambassador, Count Mirbach in Moscow, and of their Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal Eichhorn in Kiev, in order to avoid the precipitation of a further conflict with the Soviet Government at the moment of crisis on the Western Front. In order to produce incontrovertible proof of the Soviet activities, the Hetman's Minister of the Interior, Igor Kistyanovsky, had recourse to a very original mode of action. With the aid of the Ukrainian police, he arranged 'a brigands' attack on the train in which Rakovski and Manuilsky were returning to Moscow. In order to give reality to the attack 'the brigands' confiscated all the valuables and personal possessions of the two delegates, together with the mass of compromising documents which Kistyanovsky desired to lay hands on and which he afterwards presented to Baron Mumm for perusal. The revelations failed, however, to change the German attitude.

(8) *Revolution and Civil War in the Ukraine*, 1919–20

113 Ukrainian historians of the Revolution and Civil War are often exceedingly biased in their accounts of military operations; see, for instance, Doroshenko, *Istoriya Ukrainy*, quoted above. General Denikin, also, cannot set aside his prejudices in writing of the 'Petlyurians' who not infrequently fought on his side against the Soviet forces; see General A. Denikin, *Ocherki Russkoy Smuty* (Sketches of the Russian Trouble), vols. I–V, Berlin, 1925–9.

Much interesting material concerning the Volunteer Army is to be found in the almanack published in Berlin: *Beloe Delo* (The White Cause), vols. I–VI, 1924–7. In the Soviet periodical, *Voyna i Revolutsia* (War and Revolution), 1932–5, many episodes of the fighting against the 'Whites', the 'Petlyurians' and the Poles are described.

For the Anglo-French intervention see James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia*, 1918, Baltimore, 1936.

On August 1, the Germans made a new division of the country 648
and assigned the whole of Galicia to the Polish Government General. 737
At the same time they returned Bukovyna and Bessarabia to Rumania and then set up a new section around Odesa under the name of Transdnistria which they likewise placed under Rumania. It was in vain that the Ukrainians who tried to organize their own national rada in Kiev protested against such actions, for their protests were not received and the Nazis went on with their policy of ignoring all the wishes of the population.

Later in the month, the Germans established the Reichskom- 727
missariat of Ukraine and placed it under the control of a fanatical 661
Nazi, Erich Koch, who set himself during the next years to crush anything and everything that was done to aid the Ukrainians and to win for himself the detested title of the butcher of Ukraine.

In the early months of the German occupation and especially [727]
during the period of rapid military movements, much was done for the rebuilding of the country after the ravages of the Bolsheviks. Nearly 115 Ukrainian newspapers were established, plans were made for the opening of schools and during the transition from the military rule to the rule of Koch, the Ukrainian agents were in the front ranks of the German army, spreading their propaganda and trying to rouse the population against the Bolsheviks.

Yet this work did not please the Germans. Everywhere in eastern Europe the old governments that had been suppressed by the Bolsheviks tried to recreate themselves but everywhere there came the arrests of these leaders and their deportation, so that it was not many months before the sober thought of the liberated peoples turned against the new occupants and the people realized that their hopes were going to be in vain. By the end of 1941, it had been made clear to them that there would be no relaxation of the pressure exerted upon them.

In the Reichskommissariat which, in fact, represented little more than the right bank of the Dnieper area, for the army retained the control over the regions to the east of the river, it speedily became impossible for the Ukrainians to improve their own condition. The Germans were guided by a strictly logical program.

727 661 [241] Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] [466] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 725 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

668 tried to break this up but they were unsuccessful and the police
725 battalion which was assigned to the operation was destroyed. Out of this Conference developed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations which adopted as its program, "Freedom to peoples, freedom to the individual."

[701] It would take too long to describe the actual nature of the military operations which the U. P. A. carried on. At the height of its power it controlled more than 200,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory and numbered some 220,000 soldiers divided into four main bands: the U. P. A. North, operating in Polissya and northern Volynia; the U. P. A.—West in Eastern Galicia and Kholmshchyna; the U. P. A. —South in northern Bukovyna and the provinces of Kamyanets Podilsky and Vinnytsya; and the U. P. A.—East north of Kiev and Zhytomyr. There were separate detachments in most of the cities and important towns.

[661] To oppose its operations, the Germans resorted to mass executions and on more than one occasion detached forces of one or two divisions to try to destroy its centres. These attempts failed and the U. P. A. by its constant efforts played an important part in isolating the German forces, upsetting their communications and sapping their strength. All this was very costly, for after every major blow the Germans executed large numbers of innocent Ukrainians as their one weapon against the movement.

At first there was relative peace in Galicia, but in the summer of 1943 a Soviet partisan detachment entered the province. The Germans took little action and the U. P. A. came to the support of the population and soon had established strong centres in the Carpathian Mountains, where the difficult terrain facilitated their maintenance of strong positions.

● [127] The Germans in the beginning did not want to admit that their policy toward the Ukrainians had evoked such a strong response. Koch and his associates were only too willing to believe that the Ukrainians were an inferior race, undeserving of education or of consideration and they went out of their way to label the U. P. A. the product of Communist intrigue and a movement of support for the Jews, etc.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Ukraine After World War II

At the conclusion of World War II, Stalin and the officials 000
of the USSR were ready for the next step. They had satisfactorily fooled the Western powers, they had entered the UkSSR and the Byelorussian SSR in the United Nations and they had secured from the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the British Commonwealth of Nations the right to return (by force, if necessary) persons with USSR citizenship. They had decorated the Allied leaders with medals commemorating the Russian conquerors of the past and they were ready to move ahead. They were sure that no one would care to ask about the fate of the unfortunate victims of the German slave camps because every American and Western civil or military authority of high rank had become convinced of the humaneness of Stalin and his group.

The Ukraine had been thoroughly devastated, as we have seen. 433
Its factories and its fields had been laid waste. That part of its 642
machinery which had not been wantonly destroyed by one of the 727
two contesting invaders had been carted to work outside of the UkSSR. But even so, Ukraine was not quiet.

The population, even that part which had been more favorably disposed to the Soviets because of the persecution by the Nazis, had hoped that with the return of peace and the Soviet victory there might be an improvement in living conditions, an increase of consumer goods, a relaxation of some of the austerity that had marked the years before 1941. They were almost at once to be disillusioned, for they very soon found that out of the scanty stores of food which they had preserved from the greedy Nazis they were supposed to make generous gifts for the benefit of Stalin and the elder

433 brothers, the Great Russians, the one people that were loyal through
642 thick and thin to the authorities of the Soviet Union.

● 727 Yet instead of bringing in an era of peace and harmony, Stalin and his associates, emboldened by their successes in central Europe, immediately began a new campaign against the American "warmongers" and "imperialists" to prepare the people for still more rigid controls. It became clear almost at once that the return of the Soviet authorities was to usher in not a relaxation but a tightening of the old controls.

[668] These were bitterly resented. In Odesa and Kharkiv there were serious disturbances and while there may be some question as to whether these were directly inspired and organized by detachments of the U. P. A., it seems perfectly clear that they were suppressed not only by the forces of the MVD but by the Red Army.

631 On the other hand, as early as 1944 when the Nazi tide began
648 to ebb and the Western Sovietophile feeling was at its height, the Union Council of Commissars in Moscow passed a resolution authorizing the various Soviet Republics to enter into relations with foreign countries by having their own Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and their own national armies. Such devices completely fooled the Allied leaders. They did not notice or want to notice that the Ukrainian Commissar for Foreign Affairs, D. Z. Manuilsky, had long played a role as a Russian Soviet representa-
[701] tive in the Ukraine. Furthermore, the new Ukrainian and Byelorussian armies did not adopt the language of the country for which they were fighting. In theory after 1944 they were the only Soviet troops engaged against the Germans but even Stalin and the central authority did not pretend that there were no Great Russians in these armies. On the contrary, they boasted of this fact, whenever it was not necessary to hold before the world the shadow of Ukrainian and Byelorussian independence. The ruse worked and both Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted to the United Nations, but both countries have declined to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign country and have chosen, as was natural, to carry on all their negotiations through Moscow. Still later, in 1951, to carry this pretense of independence still further and deceive the

Western world, the Soviet Union conferred upon the Ukrainian 631
Soviet Republic the right to have its own anthem and its own 648
national flag.

These actions were not to be interpreted as a concession from Moscow, although they were presented in that guise. They were rather intended to strengthen the Soviet position in international affairs and by an appearance of generosity to facilitate the reduction of the satellite states to the same position as that held by the Union Republics. In this sense they were a response to the centralizing tendencies which were now to be expressed in a still stronger form.

As soon as hostilities ended and even before the Soviets were 665
assured of all their hopes, they began to purge again the Ukrainian 661
Communist Party and within a few months some 38% of the high officials were removed on the ground of bourgeois nationalism. All those who had not retreated to the east or could not show that they were working throughout the war as zealous Soviet partisans were summarily exiled as bourgeois nationalists. In the same way, when the enforced return of displaced persons began under the Yalta Agreement, very few were allowed to return to their homes. The vast majority were either executed for surrendering to the Germans or were sent to the labor camps in the far north and east for reeducation.

The Fourth Five Year Plan which was commenced in 1946 727
was very definitely devoted to the restoration of the country after the ravages of the war and to the increase of the Soviet capacity for defense. It was only in Ukraine and Byelorussia that the restoration had to absorb the energies of a considerable majority of the population, for while there were areas in the neighborhood of Leningrad and Stalingrad which had been badly devastated, the situation in the Ukraine was far worse. The cities and factories had been destroyed, the mines had been flooded and the population were living as best they might among the ruins which had been left by the two invading armies.

At the same time the work of restoration went very slowly. [316]
Less than one third of the miners of the Donbas had returned to

727 their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists
316 received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were
[466] taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

727 With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

[496] The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

474 The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In
241 that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

795 to recognize the Moscow organization, which was coming into favor with Stalin because of its increasing subservience to the Soviet regime. On the other hand, Metropolitan Dionysy, who had been in that part of Ukraine that was included in the Polish Government General, now threw off any attempt at concealment and revived the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, which this time was provided with canonical orders in all grades. He consecrated two new Ukrainian bishops, Ilarion (O. Ohienko) for Kholm and Podlyasie and Palady (Vedybida-Rudemko) for Krakow and Lemkivshchyna.

This marked a new period and when the Germans attacked the USSR in 1941 and occupied it, Polykarp joined them, while Oleksy set up still another group, the Ukrainian Autonomous Church, for he refused to break his connections with Moscow.

795 The German permission for the formation in 1942 of a central
659 organization was frankly ambiguous. On the one hand, they were
glad of any movement that would rouse the people against Moscow.
● [727] On the other, in religion as in politics, they were opposed to any
movement which would prevent them from carrying out their
policy of treating the Ukrainians as a subject and inferior race. As
a result, they put every obstacle in the way of a reconciliation
between the Autocephalous and the Autonomous groups and
threw their support to whichever was the weaker in any given area.

The open support of the Soviet government by Sergy and his associates now under the pressure of war paid off. His protestations of sympathy for Stalin and the Russians were rewarded with medals and other honors. Then, in the autumn of 1943, as the final step in the process, Stalin gave permission for the restoration of the Patriarchate in Moscow and Sergy was duly installed. On his death in 1944, he was succeeded by Aleksey, the former Archbishop of Leningrad, the present Patriarch, and under his leadership the Russian Orthodox Church has embarked upon a policy of securing control for the Soviets of all other Orthodox Churches.

795 In the meanwhile, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church during the war displayed great activity in the occupied Ukraine. It speedily won the support of most of the clergy who were not in

p.3

I. THE EMERGENCE OF NATIONALISM

●727 DURING the summer and autumn of 1941 the German armies
rolled across the plains of the Ukraine; by November the entire
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was in their hands. Observers
everywhere were aware of the significance of the conquest of
[241] this huge area with its thirty-five million inhabitants. The agricultural
wealth of the Ukraine, famous as the "granary of the
USSR," the gigantic industrial complex of the Donets basin, and
the rich mineral deposits were weighed in appraising the loss of
the Soviet Union and the gain of Germany. While the political
effects of the conquest received less attention at the time, in some
ways they were even more important than the economic effects.

186 While there is a tradition of separate political development in
the Ukraine,[1] modern nationalism—the doctrine that persons
of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent state—
came late to the area. To a close observer, the first stirrings of
nationalism among educated groups in the Ukraine would have
been apparent early in the nineteenth century, and by the middle
[538] of that century Taras Shevchenko, the greatest name in Ukrainian
literature, was giving poetic expression to nationalist aspirations.
It was considerably later, however, that definitely political
[668*] organizations were formed to establish the claim of the Ukraine
to nationhood.[2] For the student of contemporary politics, it is
precisely this late emergence of Ukrainian nationalism which

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[1] The term "Ukraine" is used throughout this study (except in cases when another meaning is clearly implied) to refer to the territory comprised in the Ukrainian SSR in 1945. Essentially the same area (with the exception of the Carpatho-Ukraine, which is discussed briefly at several points in this study) was included in the Ukrainian SSR in 1941. This territory corresponds fairly closely—except, as noted in Chapter XI, in the east—to the Ukrainian "ethnographical" territory, the area in which the indigenous population speaks Ukrainian.

[2] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 12.

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V. REPRESSION AND REICHSKOMMISSARIAT

THE DRASTIC MEASURES taken by the Germans against the Bandera 668* forces seemingly had cleared the field for the activity of the OUN-M. Like the apparent advantage gained by Bandera's group in the early summer, this opportunity soon proved to be an illusion. For some two months, however, Mel'nyk's adherents were able to carry on far-reaching activities in the central Ukraine. Since the beginning of this period coincided with the capture of Kiev by German troops, and the Ukraine's second city, Kharkov, fell before it ended, the interlude was of great importance in enabling the OUN-M to spread the doctrine of Nationalism in the former Soviet area.

On September 19, 1941, the Germans occupied Kiev. Two or 727 ● three days later, the first groups of Mel'nyk adherents arrived 668* from the base in Zhitomir, and rapidly set about organizing national life in the city.[1] This was a difficult task at best because the Soviet forces had inflicted severe injuries on the city before leaving. A large part of this damage consisted of physical destruction, especially of industrial facilities and means of communication.[2] Even more serious from the point of view of rebuilding an anti- 167 Communist, national civil life was the wholesale deportation of intelligentsia. For example, only five of the members of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences were left, the others having been evacuated to what the Communist government called the "new cultural capital" of the Ukraine, Ufa, in the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[3]

[1] Interview 65.

[2] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), pp. 21–23.

[3] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 16, 1941, p. 2, and February 25, 1942, p. 4; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 1, 1941, p. 1.

● 227 In addition to difficulties presented by the great gaps in material and human resources, there was a continued danger from the "booby traps" of hidden explosive mines and camouflaged Communist agents. The latter were not discovered for some time, but on the fifth day after the German occupation, a large number of mines blew up a considerable section of the center of the city, thoroughly disrupting the work of the Germans and Ukrainians in reestablishing an ordered pattern of life.[4]

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727 Immediately after arriving in Kiev, a council of the Mel'nyk leaders—Konyk and Captain Soretits'kyi, who came in the Wehrmacht service, and Iaroslav Haivaz and Roman Bidar, who apparently came without official authorization—decided to install a *Hilfsbürgermeister,* or chief of the municipal administrative apparatus. They chose Alexander Ohloblyn, a well-known historian of the Soviet period. The Wehrmacht authorities readily accepted the council's nomination,[5] an indication of the close cooperation of the OUN-M with the army authorities in the East Ukraine at that time.

Ohloblyn's authority, however, was soon to prove illusory. Volodymyr Bahazii, an instructor from the pedagogical institute, had been appointed as his deputy. Unlike Ohloblyn, Bahazii had greeted the Nationalist leaders and immediately sought to identify himself with them. They soon learned that he was highly ambitious and that he did not stop at attacking his nominal superior, whom he accused of Russophile tendencies.[6] Apparently Bahazii's loyalty to the OUN and his energy in carrying out the reorganization of city life made him indispensable. At any rate, Professor Ohloblyn was soon pushed into the background,[7] and at the end of October, after a disagreement with the German authorities concerning measures to be taken to enhance the welfare of Kiev's citizens, he resigned.[8] Bahazii then became the

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[4] Forostivs'kyi, p. 24; PS 053.

[5] Interviews 56, 65.

[6] Interviews 56, 65.

[7] This is evident even in contemporary published accounts. Cf. *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3–5, containing an article written by Petro (Peter) Oliïnyk earlier in Kiev, in which Bahazii is described as the "business manager." *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* October 26, 1941, p. 6, describes a meeting of the department heads of the city administration which Ohloblyn opened, but over which Bahazii presided.

[8] Interview 56.

chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the 727
organization which had assisted him by using his influence to 633
secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city 668*
government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces 208
took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda 625
and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was 727
brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on 668*
to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers 727
who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

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[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup,* December 20, 1941, p. 2).

[10] Interviews 53, 65.

[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.

[12] See Chapter X.

668* considerable time this aim was not fully achieved. Moreover, 727 there were numerous Het'manites and followers of the UNR. Among the latter, for example, was Peter Sahaidachnyi, who had charge of the initial operation of the most important Ukrainian newspapers.[13] Others were Russian émigrés, and many were Baltic Germans who had a command of the Russian language. The aim of the Wehrmacht was to establish a peaceful, orderly area behind the front as quickly as possible; employment of qualified persons, regardless of their political orientation, was necessary in order to do this. It is of course true that certain individual officers favored the Ukrainians,[14] but the ascendancy of the Mel'nyk group in this period was primarily due to its ability to profit from the absence of any other organized party with regular contact with the local population.

727 The real fate of Nationalist activity in the Ukraine, however, was being decided in Berlin, in quarters remote from the Wehrmacht officers who pursued the policy just described. Months before the outbreak of war, Hitler had decided to form a special agency for the affairs of the territories to be conquered from the Soviet Union. This department was called the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete (Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories); it was placed under the direction of Alfred Rosenberg. Rosenberg, a Balt by origin, and the principal theoretician of the National Socialist Party, had long been interested in the peoples of the Soviet Union. He was a strong believer in the policy of weakening Russia, whether it remained Communist or not. Consequently, he regarded with favor Ukrainian nationalist efforts to separate from Russia, so long as the groups involved did not threaten other German aims.

At the same time that the Ostministerium, as the new department was often called, was initiated, Hitler decided to create a number of huge satrapies in the eastern area; chief among them was the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. This region was to be under the supervision of an official with a large measure of authority, but subject to Rosenberg in matters of broad policy.[15] Rosenberg 727 realized that this vague directive would mean little unless he could count on the cooperation of the man chosen to head the Reichskommissariat. Consequently, he voiced an alarmed protest when Erich Koch, Gauleiter of East Prussia, and already widely known for his stubbornness and brutality, was suggested for the post. Since Hitler, evidently regarding Rosenberg as an impractical dreamer, wanted a determined and ruthless man in the Ukraine, Koch was nevertheless appointed.[16]

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[13] Interview 79.

[14] Notably Dr. Hans Koch and his collaberator in the Abwehr, Professor Oberländer.

This appointment was the harbinger of worse defeats for Rosenberg's "mild" policy toward the Ukrainians. 727 631 Another aspect of Nazi policy, however, aroused immediate indignation among the Ukrainian nationalists. This was a decision to keep east Galicia in the "German settlement area," i.e., to attach it to the Generalgouvernement rather than to the future Reichskommissariat. The immediate ground for this partition of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory was the desire to maintain a direct connection between the Greater Reich and Rumania, about whose continued loyalties the Nazi leaders harbored strong doubts.[17] However, a few weeks later the "unreliable" Danubian kingdom was permitted to administer all of the Ukrainian territory between the Dniester and the Southern Bug.[18] The Rumanians obviously intended eventually to incorporate the area, which they called Transnistria, into their state. Since most Ukrainian nationalist circles already hated Rumania, it is understandable that this second amputation of Ukrainian ethnographic territory was especially painful, even though the region was near the bottom of the scale of definitely Ukrainian areas in cultural development and national consciousness.[19]

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[15] Chancellery Director Lammers to Rosenberg, July 18, 1941, transmitting Führerbefehl of July 17, 1941, NG 1280 (hereafter referred to as NG 1280).

[16] Memorandum, Führerhauptquartier, July 16, 1941, PS 1221 (hereafter referred to as PS 1221).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] PS 197. At the conference of July 16 (*ibid.*) it had been tentatively decided to give Rumania only a slight territorial increase east of the pre-1939 border of the Dniester River; the decision was altered sometime within the next six weeks.

[19] On August 31, *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* had the temerity to attack the decision openly, raising the question, "Is it possible that Ukrainian land beyond the Dniester, soaked with Cossack blood, can be transferred to Rumanian administration?" On the same page the UNO organ criticized the annexation of Galicia to

727 While Ukrainian territory was being partitioned, a still more serious danger for the nationalist cause was shaping up. An exception to the authority of the Ostministerium in the occupied areas was the police power, which was lodged in Heinrich Himmler's hands. From the beginning of the campaign the Reichsführer SS had been charged with "establishing order" in the conquered areas in the east. The instruments employed for this task were *Einsatzgruppen,* task forces consisting of specially selected, ruthless police officials, headed by SS officers from Himmler's inner circle. During the stabilization period, these commanders were given powers within the broad range of "pacifying activities" in the rear areas, superseding those of all military commanders. These activities included especially the extermination of the Jewish population and the liquidation of all Communist organizations; "kommissars" and NKVD officials were to be shot outright.

661 668* The causes for conflict between the *Einsatzgruppen* and the Ukrainian nationalists have been suggested in the preceding chapter. At first the Mel'nyk group was spared because it was thought to be politically impotent.[20] During the summer the SP claimed that "the splinter group under Colonel Andrew Mel'nyk, predominantly émigrés, no longer has any political significance," and regarded the OUN-M as a useful counterweight to Bandera's organization. By early November, 1941, however, SP reports were warning that Mel'nyk's group could become dangerous if it was left entirely unwatched because of the struggle against the Bandera party.[21] As soon as the OUN-M revealed ability to build an organization in the East Ukraine, it too was crushed.

668* 661 186 The first major incident of repression against the Mel'nyk forces occurred on November 21, an important anniversary for Ukrainian nationalists. On that date, in 1921, Tiutiunnyk's band,

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the Generalgouvernement, as not corresponding to "the principle of nationality" (*Ukrains'kyi Visnyk,* August 31, 1941, p. 3). Within the next week, several branches of the UNO in Germany sent petitions directly to Hitler, protesting the transfers of Ukrainian territory; for petitions from the groups in Pilsen, Berlin and Luxemburg, see Occ E-4 (8), in Yiddish Scientific Institute (hereafter referred to as Occ E-4 [8]).

[20] NO 2650.

[21] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report of Events in the USSR, No. 133, November 14, 1941, p. 31, NO 2825 (hereafter referred to as NO 2825).

204 tor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature arti-
626 cles composed by the German propaganda section, although Ger-
668* man records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized
Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.[85]

The nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.[86] However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason.

727 ● During the late autumn, while the *Einsatzgruppen* were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[87] In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of *raions* in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel.[88]

By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western

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[85] CXLVa 78.

[86] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 9-10 of the OUN-B (late 1942), pp. 14-15. This clandestine publication was furnished me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[87] Memorandum, Die neuen Ostgebiete, June 16, 1941, PS 1033 (hereafter referred to as PS 1033); Rosenberg to Alfred Meyer, October 20, 1941, PS 1057 (hereafter referred to as PS 1057).

[88] PS 1057; Memorandum, Die Zivilverwaltung im besetzten Osten, Part II, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, PS 702 (hereafter referred to as PS 702).

part of this vast area had gone so far that a conference between 727
Koch's and Rosenberg's officials on the one hand, and representatives of the army on the other, could plan the transfer to the Reichskommissariat.[39] This was accomplished gradually in the next three months.[40]

The introduction of the Reichskommissariat did not change the 727
general basis of the provisional organization established by the 631
Wehrmacht.[41] However, it introduced an entirely new spirit. It brought under strict control many aspects of Ukrainian life in which the Wehrmacht had left a relatively free hand to the inhabitants. The entire "Right Bank" was divided into five *Generalbezirke* with headquarters in Rovno, Zhitomir, Kiev, Nikolaev, and Dniepropetrovsk.[42] Under each *Generalkommissar* were about twenty *Gebietskommissare,* each of whom governed a *Kreisgebiet,* comprising an average of four *raions.* The Ukrainian administration operated in general only at this lowest level.[43] There were elders or *starostas* in charge of each village and a Ukrainian chief of the *raion* administration. While there were Ukrainians above this level in consultative or specialist posts,[44]

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[39] PS 197.

[40] Former Polish Volhynia was transferred as early as the end of August (*Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* January 24, 1942, p. 3).

[41] There had already been set up an army administration composed of *Ortskommandanturen* (local commands) and *Feldkommandanturen* (regional commands). These military government offices had established order and begun the work of rebuilding economic and social life. Alongside them had already been installed police groups, recruited and directed by the Wehrmacht Abwehr but composed primarily of Ukrainians, as previously described. These, however, were being brought under the control of the SS police agencies. Moreover, the Wirtschaftstab-Ost had installed a Wirtschafts-Inspektion Süd, with a network of economic officers including especially the *Landwirtschaftsführer* (*La-Führer,* agricultural director) in each *raion,* who were charged with directing the economy in accordance with German needs. Cf. PS 053.

[42] PS 702. The initial organization of areas west of the Dnieper included the Soviet *oblasts* of Rovno, Volhynia, Kamenets-Podolsk, Zhitomir, Vinnitsa, Kiev, Kirovograd, and parts of Nikolaev, Dniepropretrovsk, Poltava, Zaporozh'e, Pinsk, and Brest. On September 1, 1942, the remaining parts of the Dniepropetrovsk, Poltava, and Zaporozh'e *oblasts* east of the Dnieper were transferred to the Reichskommissariat. Somewhat earlier a sixth *Generalbezirk,* Taurien, had been formed, to include the southern parts of the Zaporozh'e and Nikolaev *oblasts* (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 2, 1943, p. 3).

[43] There was, however, an advisory council at the *Generalbezirk* level in at least one instance—Zhitomir (cf. *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* February 25, 1942, p. 2).

[44] The adjective "Ukrainian" is used by the Germans to describe these officials, but it refers merely to persons resident within the territorial limits of the Ukraine. Actually, many were Russian, and a special effort was made by the

727 there was no unified framework of native administration, with the 631 exception of the towns where there was a Ukrainian chief of administration, regardless of the size of the place involved. In the larger cities, which were not included in *Kreisgebiete*, the Ukrainian "mayors," however, were closely subjected to German *Stadtkommissare*.

727 Just as important as his administrative structure, was Koch's 668 personal attitude toward the Ukrainians he was to govern. To him, they were simply an inferior race, a colonial people to be 661 exploited for Germany's interests. "They are too inferior to be compared with Germans,"[45] and "the least German worker is worth a thousand times more than the population there"[46] are typical expressions of his attitude. Consequently, this former petty railway official felt highly offended when the Ukrainian intelligentsia endeavored to organize a national life of its own. The whole tone of his administration implied that the Ukrainians were a sort of child-people, which could not achieve any degree of culture worthy of consideration; those who endeavored to do so were simply half-educated émigré agitators who must be dealt with severely, so that the simple but useful "peasants" (i.e., all non-agitators) would not be disturbed in their task of producing for the Germans.

One of the first results of Koch's determination to crush all centers of autonomous life was the destruction of the Nationalist forces remaining "above ground" in Kiev. After the suppression of the West Ukrainian force, there was still a large group of East Ukrainian supporters of the Mel'nyk organization who openly

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Wehrmacht to recruit ethnic Germans (PS 197; Extracts from the Situation Report of the commander of Heeresgebiet B, Abteilung VII, October 10, 1942, PS 051; hereafter referred to as PS 051), although the latter turned out frequently to be Communist spies deliberately left behind by the Soviet regime (Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte, December 15, 1941, PS 1682; (hereafter referred to as PS 1682). Even when the *Volksdeutsche* were anti-Communist, they were frequently disliked by the Ukrainian Nationalists as Russophiles.

[45] Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS 192 (hereafter referred to as PS 192).

[46] Report of Oberkommando der Heeresgruppe B to Oberkommando des Heeres, Generalstab des Heeres, Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, April 1, 1943, PS 1130 (hereafter referred to as PS 1130), is based on an oral report of Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Classen who was present at the Nazi Party meeting in Kiev (March 5, 1943) in which Koch made the remark.

carried on a limited activity. Its chief, Bahazii, was just as nationalist as the arrested West Ukrainians. A characteristic instance of his enthusiastic lack of caution occurred about the time that he became mayor. A group of foreign journalists, including several Germans, visited Kiev. In their presence, he expressed his loyalty to the OUN, praising Konovalets' and Mel'nyk as totalitarians, and saying, "The eyes of all Ukrainians are turned toward Mel'nyk." A German officer who was present begged the journalists not to report this remark, knowing it would inflame the Nazi chieftains.[47]

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Although Erich Koch and his assistants were in many respects ridiculously ignorant of the true nature of Ukrainian life in Kiev, in view of Bahazii's frankness it was inevitable that they should come to see that he was working for Ukrainian ends, rather than docilely following German orders. Very probably the anti-Nationalist forces on the staff of *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* played a part in stirring up antagonism to the city administration. For example, the paper printed an article by an employee of a municipal office criticizing the émigrés who had returned to Kiev. He complained that thirteen out of forty employees in his section were émigrés who were paid higher salaries than the local officials, although the former were no better qualified and had smaller families.[48] In view of Koch's and his minions' bitter hostility toward émigrés, such remarks must have encouraged them to feel that the Germans would lose no popularity by extinguishing the remaining outside influence in Kiev life.

They were, however, scarcely the real motives behind Bahazii's arrest in early February, 1942. Apparently the German official responsible for the Ukrainian leader's downfall was Generalkommissar Magunia, one of Koch's closest collaborators among the officials of the Reichskommissariat. He worked, of course, in close coordination with the *Sicherheitspolizei;* the charges against Ba-

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[47] Whether they ever actually saw the report is questionable since it was apparently printed only in an Italian paper and by the Ukrainian press (*Nastup,* December 6, 1941, p. 1, quoting *La Stampa* [Milan], November 1, 1941).

[48] *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* January 3, 1942 (reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiisnist',* February 1, 1942, p. 2). A major charge against Bahazii was that he maintained too large a staff in the city administration and paid them too much (PS 192).

661 hazii in the police report revolve entirely around his nationalist activities.[49] For example, the head of the section on Religious
● 727 Confessions is alleged to have threatened the Russophile bishop
668* of Kiev, Panteleimon. Another charge concerned Bahazii's "misappropriation of German property," but the specific act seems to have been his sale of petroleum products (probably of Soviet origin, confiscated by the Germans) to aid the nationalist cause. He was charged, correctly, with being a leader of the underground OUN-M, and a number of organizations controlled by the Nationalists were declared, also with apparent accuracy, to be working under his direction. Probably the charge which carried the greatest weight in the minds of the German officials, however, was that he had endeavored to secure control of the Ukrainian police. As has been previously indicated, the OUN-M did indeed control most of the Ukrainian police in Kiev, but Bahazii was scarcely responsible personally for this. Altogether, the motives behind the overthrow of Bahazii were those which prevailed everywhere in the destruction of Nationalist groups in the Reichskommissariat. The action suited Erich Koch's policy completely; he defended it vigorously against Rosenberg's criticism, displaying his own arrogant stupidity by adding a few incredible charges of his own to the grounds presented in the SP report.[50]

The repression of Nationalist forces in Kiev extended far beyond the person of Bahazii. The arrests were concentrated in two groups: the surviving literary leaders of the OUN-M League of Ukrainian Writers, headed by Olena Teliha and a young Carpatho-Ukrainian writer, John Irliavs'kyi; and the Sich, headed by a young East Ukrainian journalist, John Koshyk, also an OUN-M member.[51] Altogether, the executions (which followed quickly after the arrests in most cases) accounted for about forty persons,[52] a large number of whom were medical students organized in the

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[49] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 191, April 10, 1942, NO 3256 (hereafter referred to as NO 3256).

[50] PS 192.

[51] *OUN u Viini*, p. 74; T. Iak, *Hryb* (The Mushroom), p. 43, a clandestine OUN-M brochure, probably published at the end of German occupation in the East Ukraine.

[52] Iak, p. 43.

Sich.[53] In addition, several of the principal agencies of national 661
life in Kiev were forced to cease operation, including the Ukrain- 727●
ian National Council. Even Prosvita was suspect and was closed 668*
for a while.[54]

These arrests did not completely stamp out the efforts to develop nationalism in Kiev. The underground OUN-M (as well as remnants of an OUN-B conspiratorial group) did what they could to stimulate nationalist feeling. Likewise, the city administration was by no means so drastically altered as had been the editorial staff of the newspaper. The Germans were probably not anxious to destroy all outlets for Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Rosenberg, in spite of his minor influence, exercised some restraint in this respect, and Koch himself denied being anti-Ukrainian.[55] Undoubtedly his contempt for all Slavs led him to place the Ukrainians and the Russians on an even plane; his favoring of the Russophile element in the journalistic field had very possibly been accidental, or at least merely an effort to establish between the groups a balance which could be manipulated by the Germans.

The drop in prestige of the OUN-M was both sharp and sus- 668*
tained, however, since repression of its groups continued throughout the Reichskommissariat. Moreover, as will be discussed at length later, strong Ukrainian nationalist groups opposed to the OUN ideology appeared in several places; these forces kept up the fight for development of nationalism, thus inhibiting a growth in influence by the OUN. In other areas, news of the suppression of the Kiev group—the dissolution of the National Council appears to have been especially important—caused the cautious to refrain from endeavoring to build up nationalist organizations. Consequently, after February, 1942, the work of the two OUNs was only a relatively small part of the total stream of nationalist and antinationalist forces which must be studied in their geographical, social, and ideological context rather than as parts of a developing narrative.

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[53] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi, 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev, 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 19.

[54] PS 192.

[55] *Ibid.*

727 In order to understand the development of nationalism during the remaining twenty months of German occupation of the East Ukraine, it is necessary to give some attention to the effects of German policy on aspects of life not directly connected with nationalist feeling. A number of volumes of extremely unpleasant reading could be devoted to the misery which the blind actions of the German rulers inflicted on the long-suffering peoples of the Soviet Union. Here only an extremely brief description of four ill-conceived policies which did most to disrupt the lives of the people of the area, and in particular to affect indirectly the character of the nationalist movements, can be attempted.

727 197 The first, and in many respects the most horrible failure of German policy, resulted in the death of innumerable Soviet prisoners of war. In the summer and fall of 1941, hundreds of thousands of Red army soldiers fell into German hands. Most captures took place because of the swift German advance and the great ascendancy of German arms; but at least in part they resulted from a lack of will to fight for the Communist system and the hope that German imprisonment would soon be followed by a freer life for the Soviet peoples. The German army was quite unprepared for the extent of the surrenders. However, no amount of difficulty in caring for the prisoners can excuse the horrible consequences of their neglect which, unlike most other atrocities committed in the east, was primarily the fault of the Wehrmacht. Inefficiency or brutality of subordinate *Etappentruppen* [rear area troops] was partly to blame, but the basic ruthlessness of many higher officers also played a major role, for it placed a premium on calloused inhumanity on the part of subordinates.[56] Countless thousands of prisoners were shut in barbed-wire enclosures in the open plains. Food was so insufficient that the captives were rapidly reduced to living skeletons; by fall cannibalism had made its appearance.[57] "Gaunt yellow faces protruding from the collars of greatcoats—unabashed human misery," as a Ukrainian visitor to

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[56] Cf. the views of high Wehrmacht commanders cited in Chapter VI in connection with suppression of partisans.

[57] Report of Armament Inspector for the Ukraine to Armament Division Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Zur Lage im Reichskommissariat Ukraine, November 29, 1941, PS 2174 (hereafter referred to as PS 2174).

one of the camps put it.[58] As colder weather approached, typhus 727●
combined with starvation to bring about hundreds of thousands 697
of deaths.

Since many of these camps were located in the Ukraine the population soon became aware of the conditions in them, even though a substantial portion of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were separated out and released by the Germans.[59] Moreover, the inhabitants could scarcely avoid noticing the corpses of prisoners of war shot (perhaps as "kommissars" or Communists) and left lying in the villages.[60] Consequently, a belief that the Germans intended to destroy the Slavic peoples soon became widespread.

A second German failure was less shocking than the treatment 423
of the prisoners of war, but in the long run it had an even more 727
deleterious effect on relations with the Ukrainian population. This was the policy in relation to agriculture. As was noted previously, the major objective of the Nazi leadership in its occupation of the Ukraine was the acquisition of food and raw materials to increase Germany's war potential. This objective involved the necessity of dealing with the question of the kolkhoz, which was the predominant form of agricultural organization in the Soviet Union.

The problem posed for the German occupiers was not an easy one by any standards. It will be recalled that the chief reason for the introduction of the kolkhoz by Moscow was the prevalence of the "scissors crisis" during the late twenties; this emergency arose fundamentally because the Soviet rulers were unable or unwilling to supply enough consumer goods to induce individual peasants to deliver large quantities of agricultural products. The Germans were faced with the same dilemma, because the needs of their

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[58] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 21, 1942, p. 2.

[59] Interview 51; Directive of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Abteilung Kriegsgefangene, June 16, 1941, PS 888 (hereafter referred to as PS 888); *Nastup*, July 12, 1941, p. 2; Amt Ausland Abwehr to Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Annex, September 15, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 338 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 338).

[60] Memorandum by First Lieutenant Oberländer, Abwehr II, Heeresgruppe Süd, November 28, 1941, USSR Exhibit No. 278 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit No. 278). Oberländer significantly points out that pro-German sentiment in the population had greatly diminished within a few weeks of conquest—*i.e.*, while the Wehrmacht was still the occupying authority.

423 fighting forces required that very little production be diverted to 727 consumer goods. Moreover, their situation was in many respects more difficult than that of the Kremlin in 1929, for the material basis for the reconstruction of individual farms—buildings, equipment, livestock—was often lacking. Under these circumstances, a return to individual operation of agriculture would probably have meant a sharp net decline in productivity and a still greater decline in surpluses available for delivery.

On the other hand, the Germans had strong reasons for favoring the dissolution of the collective-farm system, as a salient feature of the Soviet system which they affected to despise. More than any other aspect of the Soviet system, the kolkhoz appears to have been hated by large numbers of the peasants. While it is questionable whether this hatred was universally felt, it was undoubtedly a very strong sentiment among the older groups of the population, those most ready on other grounds to cooperate with the Germans.[61]

Faced with this dilemma, the German rulers followed a tactic of compromise and deceit. They promised to dissolve the kolkhoz, stipulating reasonably enough, but in opposition to the desire of the peasant for immediate acquisition of land, that the process be gradual. First, the kolkhoz was to be transformed into a *Gemeinwirtschaft* (*hromads'ke hospodarstvo*) or community enterprise; the only signficant immediate effect was the increase in the *dvor* or garden allotment permitted each household. In a second stage, to follow in the near future, the *Gemeinwirtschaft* was to be transformed into a *Landbaugenossenschaft* (*khliborobs'ka spilka*) or agricultural association. At this stage each household was to receive a definite section of land, and be rewarded in proportion to the harvest from this land, although many of the major agricultural operations were to be performed in common to overcome the extreme dearth of draft animals, tractors, tractor fuel, and implements.[62]

Where the program was carried out without proscrastination,

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[61] PS 3876.

[62] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* February 28, 1942, p. 3. A final stage, the *Einzelhof,* or individual farm, was envisaged by the planners, but very rarely, if ever, instituted.

most of the peasantry seem to have responded favorably.[63] Frus- 423
trating delays ensued throughout a large part of the Ukraine, 727
however, especially in the Reichskommissariat. In part they were due to misplaced German thoroughness in requiring exact surveys of the land before proceeding to its division among the households in the *Landbaugenossenschaft*. More serious was the deliberate obstruction of Koch and others who, feeling that the program would leave some small segment of life free of their control, argued that it would result in reduced deliveries. As a result, only 10 percent instead of the planned 20 percent of *Gemeinwirtschaften* were converted to *Landbaugenossenschaften*.[64] In spite of the meager practical results, the de-collectivization program was a favorite theme of Koch's propaganda, doubtless because he
allowed so little else of a positive nature even to be discussed. In [208
the end, however, the constantly broken pledges unquestionably caused a loss of faith in the Germans, even a willingness to return to the known evils of the Soviet system. The peasant's saying, "A bad mother is still better than a step-mother who makes many promises," indicated his judgment of the German agricultural policy.[65]

The problem of securing agricultural supplies was closely con- 737
nected with that of supplying the Ukrainian urban population 262
with food. One way in which the Germans sought to obtain most of the farm products for their own use was to make practically no provision for feeding the city dwellers. This was especially true during the first winter. The concept was simple: the starving urban population would find some means, through barter or otherwise, of inducing the peasants to part with an extra, hidden supply of food beyond that which the Germans had been able to

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[63] Cf. for example Report of Ortskommandantur Melitopol', July 8, 1942, PS 1693 (hereafter referred to as PS 1693); Report No. 7 of Representative of Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete at Heeresgruppe Mitte and Stab des Befehlshabers des ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte Captain Müller, March 24, 1942, to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, PS 1686 (hereafter referred to as PS 1686).

[64] Memorandum by Bräutigam, October 25, 1942, PS 294 (hereafter referred to as PS 294).

[65] Situation report, Wirtschaftinspektorat Süd Ic, April, 1942, NG 1089 (hereafter referred to as NG 1089); Memorandum of Generalkommissar for the Crimea, Alfred Frauenfeld, to Himmler, February 10, 1944, NO 5394 (hereafter referred to as NO 5394).

extract from them.[66] To a certain extent, of course, this was true. Private individuals, as in the days after the Revolution, traveled about the countryside endeavoring to get something to eat in return for whatever they had to give the peasant. The city administrations and welfare committees did what they could to secure food for their clients; indeed this was one reason the Germans allowed these suspect organizations to function at all, for they were thereby relieved of the necessity of attending to such matters. The resources at the hands of these organs were, however, infinitesimal compared to the needs.[67] This was especially true since the most valuable materials left in the cities were requisitioned by the Germans.[68]

The peasants in turn had little to sell. They had lived under the regimented planned economy of the Soviets, which prevented the individual from accumulating a private stock of agricultural products, rather than the loose system of tsarist days, when the more prosperous peasants could usually find a little more to sell if the price was attractive enough. Extremely heavy requisitions by the Wehrmacht, especially in the form of unauthorized seizures, had also depleted the supplies available. The result was a severe shortage of food in the cities, especially in the larger ones such as Kiev and Kharkov, which brought famine and the pestilences associated with it in the winter and spring of 1942.[69]

Like the agricultural policy and the starvation of the cities, the *Ostarbeiter* program was the result of ruthless efforts to increase the German war potential. Unlike the former policies, however, its evils do not even have the excuse of short-run expediency. The concept of bringing foreign workers to the armaments factories was, in itself, reasonable enough. Moreover, properly handled, it might very well have resulted in an increase rather than a decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There 727 is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to 466 the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a 167 large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71]

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[66] PS 2174.

[67] During the terrible winter of 1941–42, the social welfare department of the Kiev municipal administration dispensed only about 100,000 *karbovontsi* (i.e., rubles; nominally the equivalent of 10,000 RM or about $4,000) per month; at the time, milk was 20 *k.* a liter, potatoes about 250 *k.* a hundredweight (*Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1). This monetary outlay may, of course, have been supplemented by food obtained by barter.

[68] For example, a charge brought against the Bahazii administration was that it had used newsprint to barter for food with the small towns (Interview 59). Cf. also p. 116 above.

[69] According to Oberländer (USSR Exhibit No. 278).

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans 727 in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. 466 They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers 167 and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase 523 their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter*, were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73]

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, 727 force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and 466 women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on 167 September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at

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[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutennant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, September 22, 1942, p. 3.

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church services and invitations by German authorities to theatrical performances at which all were arrested—were utilized. Force and brutal retaliation, such as burning of villages from which the potential workers ran away, were frequently applied.[75] The conscripts were sent a thousand miles to Germany in unheated cattle cars, sealed with barbed wire. Still worse, there was no just selection of those most suited for departure, no systematic registration.[76] Mothers of small children were sometimes taken; sons and husbands who were the only support of their families were conscripted without adequate provision for the families' maintenance.[77]

The horror of such treatment was perhaps the single most important cause of popular revulsion against the Germans. In addition to all its material hardships, the mere idea of forced transportation to a distant and unknown land recalled the generations-old terror of banishment to Siberia.[78] The extent of the program was so enormous that every family was touched; it became a universal evil. Of the total population of Kiev, thirty-eight thousand persons (over 10 percent) were delivered to the *Ostarbeiter* program within the first ten months of German occupation.[79] In the southern *Generalbezirke* somewhat smaller numbers appear to have been involved[80] but in the crucial *Bezirk* of Zhitomir, one hundred and seventy thousand (about 6 percent of the population) were taken by mid-1943, and thirty thousand more were to follow.[81] In all, as early as August, 1943, one out of every forty inhabitants of the Ukraine had been deported to Germany as forced laborers,[82] and by the end of the occupation the number of

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[75] Auslandbriefprüfstelle, report for September 11–November 11, 1942, PS 018 (hereafter referred to as PS 018).

[76] Landesbauernführer Körner, Die neue deutsche Ukraine-Politik, PS 1198 (hereafter referred to as PS 1198).

[77] Occ E-4 (1); PS 054.

[78] Oral report of Generalkommissar Leyser (Zhitomir) to Rosenberg, June 17, 1943, PS 265 (hereafter referred to as PS 265).

[79] Commander of the SP and the SS, Kiev, to Commander of the SP and the SS, Ukraine, July 20, 1942, NO 1603 (hereafter referred to as NO 1603).

[80] Only about 1 percent from *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev by mid-1942 (Conference of Sauckel and Reichskommissariat officials in Kiev, August 12, 1942, NO 1606; hereafter referred to as NO 1606).

[81] PS 265.

[82] According to Sauckel, director of the *Ostarbeiter* program, at a Führer Conference, August 20, 1943, NO 1831 (hereafter referred to as NO 1831).

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Ukrainian workers in Germany totaled one and one-half million.[83]

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The suffering caused by the actions of the Germans described above,[1] did not directly affect the activity of the nationalist elements, as did their repressive attitude toward education, religion, culture, and local administration. Indirectly, however, it played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine during the German occupation. One effect was a general subordination of all thought, all activity, to the demands of self-preservation. The constant struggle to keep alive resulted in a reduction of the energy and attention which could be devoted to all political questions, including nationalism. On the other hand, the sheer impossibility of coming to terms with the German authority, regardless of how ready one might be to sacrifice all independence to do so, led many to seek a political movement which promised deliverance. A vast number, of course, turned back to Communism, hoping that the experience of near-defeat would lead to a modification of Moscow's policies. For others, however, the only rational solution appeared to be the nationalist parties.

Weak as they were after the waves of suppressions during the six months from September, 1941, to February, 1942, the two OUN groups endeavored to meet this challenge. Of the two factions, the Bandera group appears to have made the easiest, but not the most thorough-going adjustment. Its ability to adjust at a rather shallow level was due to several factors. The members of the OUN-B were nearly all young, and their movement placed little emphasis on systematic ideology. When they went to the East Ukraine, they carried a large number of slogans and romantic pledges as baggage.[84] These either attracted or antagonized

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[83] PS 1198.

[84] One of these oaths, as discovered by the German police, reads:

"On my honor, for the fame of the fallen heroes, for the holy blood spilled, for my Ukrainian earth and the majesty of my Ukrainian homeland, I swear that I will struggle with all my strength and with my life for a free and Ukrainian state. With my heart, my soul, and my whole being I confess that only the Ukrainian revolution can give power to the Ukrainian state and the people. Unto death I will stand on the battlefield in order to build a national Ukrainian State. No one and nothing at all can hold me back from the path of the Ukrainian national revolution, neither difficulties nor death. I will carry out every command of my leader. I swear on the Ukraine, that I will loyally and honestly carry out

[1] [See category 116, pp. 118-124 -- Analyst]

historic Ukrainian lands of Volhynia, Kiev, and Chernigov. The 133
northern part,[1] appropriately known as Polessia, or the "forest [313]
land," is of little value for crop growing but contains the only timber industry of significance in the Ukraine.

As the German armies rolled into the Ukraine in 1941, they 727 ●
tended to advance along the main lines of communication, avoid- 725
ing the difficult, swampy regions. For weeks, or in some cases 668*
even months, the less accessible areas were not brought under German control. This circumstance made possible the development of partisan bands which carried on resistance to the occupation authority.

Although, since 1945, Soviet writers have maintained that the 725
plans for guerrilla warfare against the conqueror had been 665
secretly prepared before the outbreak of hostilities, they assert 669
that these plans were known only to the top level of Communist Party officials. It is fairly certain that the order to develop a partisan movement came as a surprise even to most devoted Communists.[2] In July, 1941, after the decision to form partisan detachments was announced, preparations were pushed forward at a rapid rate by the local authorities. The rapidity of the German advance to the line of the Dnieper, however, rendered largely ineffective systematic attempts to form a partisan movement in the Ukraine west of that river. Even east of the Dnieper the panic produced by the seemingly irresistible German drive played havoc with the organization of guerrilla warfare. Many of the secretly selected leaders were swept along, willingly or unwillingly, in the retreat of the Red Army, while others were discovered and executed by the Germans. In a few places, however, small groups made good their escape to forest or swamp hide-outs. In the southern Ukraine one such group of about five hundred men, trained and directed by the Red Army, but largely composed of local Communist and NKVD officials, established a center of opposition in the swamps formed by the Dnieper south of Nikopol' (Nikopil').[3] This group was destroyed by the German forces in

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[2] Oleksii Fedorov, *Podpol'nyi obkom deistvuet* (The Underground *Oblast* Committee in Action), literary editor Evg. Bosniatskii (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, 1950), pp. 12-14.

[3] Report of Feldpolizeidirektor at 444. Sicherungsdivision, November 5, 1941, NOKW 1519 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 1519).

[1] [of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine -- Analyst]

This does not, however, imply that in its later stages, after it 725
had been organized and developed by the Party cadres, the parti- 668*
san movement was unable to obtain some support among the Ukrainian people. The partisans were frequently much weaker than the total forces which the Germans could employ against them; consequently, it was essential that they secure the aid of local men for scouting, concealment, and sabotage of German offensives. While some of their arms and ammunition, as well as medical supplies, could be flown in, they had to rely on the inhabitants of the area in which they operated for food and for replacements for men lost in action. Moreover, a primary function of the units was political as well as military: they were intended to maintain a vestige of Soviet authority in areas far away from the direct control of the rulers in the Kremlin.

In order to secure local support both compulsion and persuasion were employed. Compulsion was used to requisition food and equipment needed, to draft men into the guerrilla units, and to inhibit collaboration with the Germans. Methods employed frequently included killing the families of those who entered the German police or administrative organs, as well as the collaborators themselves.[18] The mere fact that the partisans could move about in force induced the cautious peasants to believe that Soviet victory was possible and that, consequently, it would be dangerous to side with the regime's enemies. Persuasion, how- [727]
ever, would probably have been ineffective had it not been for the atrocities practiced by the Germans, especially the *Ostarbeiter* agencies, which led thousands of persons, mostly young and fit for partisan service, to flee to the woods.[19] The German failure to carry out the land reform, by depriving the peasants of a motive for resisting the return of the Soviet forces, was also a major cause of partisan success. The partisans made strong efforts to win over the peasants, in some cases even paying for requisitioned food supplies. According to a German report, one Red

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[18] Report of Gebietskommissar Steudel in Kazatin, November 8–December 28, 1943, PS 1702 (hereafter referred to as PS 1702); PS 3943, February 12, 1943.

[19] Those who obeyed the order to report for the *Ostarbeiter* program were threatened by the partisans, while the order itself often served as a pass to join a partisan unit (Occ E-4 [1]).

725 undertaken is an indication of the uncertainty of the ideology
668* and objectives of the little group. "Bul'ba" Borovets' himself, a man of little schooling, apparently was not sure what direction the movement should take, although he had a deep-rooted love for his native country. He continued to maintain ties with the UNR; there were UNR officers with the group much of the time, advising on military matters on which few of the younger members had had experience. Borovets' kept up a precarious line of communication with Andrew Livyts'kyi himself through an old UNR member, Captain Raievs'kyi, who ostensibly carried on the functions of *raionchef* in the Rovno district.[28]

665 These connections were too discontinuous to provide much
668* guidance, however, even if the enfeebled Warsaw headquarters
● 727 had had a clear line to offer. At the same time, the group under Borovets' was acting as a refuge for extremely diverse elements seeking an escape from German suppression. As was previously described, Borovets' had made an agreement with the OUN-M by which he was to be sent a number of officers. Apparently this help was slow in arriving. By summer, 1942, however, a few men had appeared; one was the Zhitomir journalist Anthony Baranivs'kyi, who became the Mel'nyk representative at the headquarters of Borovets'.[29] He, of course, adhered to the OUN-M line. A quite different group consisted of the former "left wing" of the Bandera party. Its leaders, Mitrynga, Turchmanovych, Ryvak, and Boris Levits'kyi, were with the task forces destined to proclaim the *akt* in Kiev. When these groups were broken up by the Germans before reaching their goal, the young men escaped arrest but were forced to go into hiding. Then, since the whole tendency of the OUN-B indicated to them that they could no longer hope to secure the adoption of their left-wing program, all except Levits'kyi (who went into hiding in Galicia) fled to Volhynia, where they found a protector in the Polis'ka Sich.[30] There, apparently, they attracted to their ideology a young as-

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[28] Oleksander (Alexander) Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy" (An Army without a State), *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, December 28, 1950, p. 2.

[29] Hrytsenko, "Armiia bez derzhavy," *Ukraïns'ki Visti*, January 1, 1951, p. 4; *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 92.

[30] Interview 43.

November the group penetrated southern Polessia near Olevsk, 668*
the former headquarters of the Polis'ka Sich.[37] The greatest 725
single victory of Kovpak's group in this period was the temporary capture of the *Kreisgebiet* capital, Lelchitsi, on November 26.[38] After that, German counterattacks became extremely heavy, and Kovpak's men appear to have spent a miserable two months evading the Germans in the frozen swamps along the middle course of the Pripet River.[39] In February, however, he headed south, cutting across a corner of "Bul'ba's" territory, then striking eastward through *Generalbezirk* Zhitomir.

While Red forces were pushing down from the northeast, the 668*
Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement was beginning to ac- 725
quire real significance, although the nationalists were compelled 727 ●
to give some ground in northeastern Volhynia to the stronger Red partisans.[40] The SS and the Wehrmacht were agreed on the necessity of harsh measures to combat the Communist partisan threat. From the beginning, even those Wehrmacht generals who generally took a reasonable attitude toward the peoples of the east advocated the harshest measures toward partisans. For example, Field-Marshal von Reichenau based his policy on the concept that the Germans must be more feared than the partisans; he ordered that all who did not aid the fight against the latter be regarded as enemies, and that men who did not hinder or report partisan activities be "draconically" treated.[41] This policy was

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 89; this corresponds with reports of a shift of Red partisan activity to the Stolin-Sarny-Olevsk triangle in PS 3943, February 12, 1943.

[38] Reichskommissar Ukraine to Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, December 10, 1942, CXLV 488, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLV 486).

[39] Report of Höherer SS und Polizeiführer Russland-Süd, Ukraine, und Nordost, December 26, 1942, NO 1128 (hereafter referred to as NO 1128); PS 3943, February 12, 1943. According to one of the leaders of the Soviet partisans in Belorussia, Kovpak established an airport on one of the frozen lakes of the region. With the help of the Soviet Belorussian partisans he was able to defend it until German bombing finally broke the ice (Lin'kov, p. 386).

[40] Cf. Lin'kov, p. 375.

[41] Directive Verhalten der Truppe im Ostraum, October 10, 1941, USSR Exhibit 12 (hereafter referred to as USSR Exhibit 12). See also a memorandum by Chef des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Field-Marshal Keitel, which stated that security troops in the rear areas would suffice only if they were allowed to proceed "draconically" without the requirement of juridical process, to convince the population that resistance would have terrible consequences (PS 459, July 23, 1941, hereafter referred to as PS 459).

668* rigorously carried out in the fall of 1942.[42] The drastic reprisals
725 carried out in western Volhynia and Polessia injured the patriotic
Ukrainian peasantry as frequently as they did Communist sym-
● 727 pathizers. Consequently, the Ukrainian police were reluctant to
take part in such suppression of their own compatriots, and
especially in the brutal conscription for the *Ostarbeiter* program.
The only alternative was desertion; in the fall thousands joined
the forest refugees from burned villages and forced labor drives.[43]
Unlike the latter, however, the police deserters were trained and
frequently already organized by nationalists for opposition to the
725 Germans. The command of the OUN-B in Galicia was reluctant
668* to destroy its grip on the legal forces and risk a campaign of
open resistance to the Germans at this time; but when they saw
that the police units they dominated were breaking up anyway,
and were in danger of passing over to the Communist guerrillas,
they decided to begin a large-scale partisan movement. This step
was taken in late November; by the early part of 1943 the activity
of the Bandera groups was already considerable.[44]

There were two major centers of OUN-B activity. The first comprised the western part of the area which had been most ravaged by fighting between Red partisans and Germans, especially after Kovpak's passage to the southeast. Its extent may be defined by the quadrilateral formed by the towns of Kovel', Vladimirets (Volodimirets'), Kostopol', and Lutsk, although the chief operations were evidently carried out in the eastern section of this area.[45] A poor, woodland area, where the peasant popula-

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[42] How drastic these measures could be in practice is shown by the reprisal burning of nine villages in the Petrikov area, leaving the peasants to shift for themselves in the dead of winter, although the *Gebietskommissar* himself asserted they were innocent of aiding the partisans (Occ E-4 [1]). The main "pacifying" campaign was carried out in Volhynia in September and early October, 1942 (NO 1128); cf. Lebed', p. 24, on the slaughter of nationalist adherents due to Communist provocation.

[43] Lebed', p. 26.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 24; the extent of German repression and Communist activity, which threatened to serve as an outlet for popular indignation, led the OUN-B to start operations before it really wished to do so (Interview 76).

[45] Lebed', pp. 24–25; PS 3943, March 19, 1943, ascribes (probably incorrectly, since the Germans were not fully informed of the nature of the nationalist bands) the attacks east of the Rovno-Lutsk road to a "Bul'bist" group. The western section of this area was partly controlled by large Polish police forces recruited to take the deserting Ukrainians' place. A savage struggle between them and the nationalists (especially the Bandera partisans), inflicting fearful hardships on the civilian population, was carried on all through 1943.

661 OUN-M leaders was the discovery of anti-German clandestine publications of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine and in Kandyba's quarters in L'vov.[46] Kandyba and numerous other members were arrested about the same time, and *Nastup* was suppressed. Three members of the Provid had been killed within the preceding fourteen months, so that of the directorate only the aged generals Kapustians'kyi and Kurmanovych were left at large.[47]

●727 Most of the OUN leaders were kept in close confinement throughout the crucial months when the West Ukraine was slipping under Communist domination. By October, when they were released,[48] virtually all of the Ukrainian lands had passed out of German control. There remained, however, some two million persons of Ukrainian origin in the hands of the Germans—thousands of refugees, over a million *Ostarbeiter*, several hundred thousand prisoners of war, and about a quarter of a million auxiliary troops.[49] A few thousand of the last category constituted a remnant of the Galician division, but most of them were scattered throughout various small units of *Osttruppen*, totaling about seven hundred thousand.[50]

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[46] *OUN u Viini*, p. 103.

[47] Kandyba and Chemeryns'kyi had replaced the murdered Senyk and Stsibors'kyi, but Chemeryns'kyi was killed by the Germans in the execution of the *Ukrains'ke Slovo* group in Kiev. Baranovs'kyi had been killed by the OUN-B in Galicia in May, 1943, while Sushko was assassinated, probably by Bandera followers, or possibly by Communists or German police agents who were dissatisfied with his conduct, just thirteen days before the arrest of the other leaders.

[48] Bandera, Mel'nyk, Borovets', and all of their principal adherents were set free, except Kandyba and Gavrusevych, who had died in prison.

[49] Rosenberg wrote Bormann on September 7, 1944 (NO 2997), that there were then one million "legionnaires and volunteers," one million prisoners of war, and two million *Ostarbeiter* drawn from the eastern peoples. It is safe to assume that at least one third of the prisoners of war were Ukrainian (see n. 64, this chapter, below). The figure of two million *Ostarbeiter* appears to be rather low, in view of the total of one and one-half million given for the Ukraine alone (see Chapter V), but it is certain that a considerable majority of the workers from the Soviet Union were drawn from the Ukraine, for it had the bulk of the population which was under German control for a long period, and was, moreover, more completely exploited in this regard than were the army areas and the Reichskommissariat Ostland. Taubert, in a memorandum printed in B. Dvinov, *Vlasovs'koe dvizhenie v svete dokumentov* (The Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents) (New York, 1950), p. 110, estimated the proportion of Ukrainian *Ostarbeiter* as 60 percent. The figure for military personnel appears a bit high, but it is fairly clear that the Ukrainians totaled at least one quarter of this group (Interview 22 referred to a total of 220,000 Ukrainians in the German forces). Refugees not enrolled in any of these categories were not numerous.

[50] NO 1068.

The Nazi leaders wished to use this considerable reserve of 668*
manpower to bolster their collapsing defenses. The major part 727
of their efforts centered around Vlasov, who at last was given a comparatively free hand to organize an anti-Soviet political center and military units of division size. Vlasov was backed by Himmler and a number of the other high officials of the SS, who were by now ready to seize any possibility of staving off defeat. At the same time, other Nazi circles, including SS officers as well as the Ostministerium officials, endeavored to form a central Ukrainian political body. A major motive, after the evacuation of the West Ukraine in the summer of 1944, was to establish liaison with the nationalist partisans.[61] Dr. Fritz Arlt, the Waffen SS officer who had played a prominent part in dealing with the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement in 1939–41, was a central figure in the efforts to form a Ukrainian national committee. Apparently both Mel'nyk and Bandera refused to discuss such proposals while they were in prison.[62] Soon after his release on September 27, 1944, however, Bandera suggested to Arlt that he approach Dr. Horbovyi, an OUN-B member who had played a leading role in organizing the Ukrainian National Committee in Cracow in June, 1941. Arlt could reach no agreement with Horbovyi, however, and turned to Mel'nyk, who had been released on October 17. Mel'nyk was apparently able to secure an agreement among all important nationalist leaders, including Bandera, Livyts'kyi, and Skoropads'kyi, on the stand to be taken in relation to the German proposals, but the demands which the nationalists made could not be accepted by Arlt and his collaborators.[63]

Unable to induce the major Ukrainian nationalist leaders to take the lead in forming a national committee under conditions acceptable to the Nazi rulers, Arlt turned to elements which had

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[61] The intentions of Arlt and the Ostministerium are outlined by Berger in the memorandum in Dvinov (pp. 109–11). Although Dvinov's work is highly tendentious, this document appears to be authentic.

[62] *OUN u Viini*, p. 106; Interview 51. The Mel'nyk and Bandera accounts agree —except that each side says that it persuaded the other not to form a committee to cooperate with the Germans.

[63] Arlt to Rosenberg, November 21, 1944, NO 3039 (hereafter referred to as NO 3039); apparently the demands correspond to those contained in the petition quoted below on p. 182.

668* so far been less active in politics during the war. The first two 727 Ukrainian leaders offered the post of chairman of a national committee, General Petriv and Professor Mazepa, declined, in view of the risks which, with German defeat almost certain, such a position involved. Finally, however, General Paul Shandruk, a UNR officer and a close associate of Andrew Livyts'kyi, accepted, with the blessing of the latter, Bandera, and Mel'nyk.[54] As Shandruk and his associates saw the matter, it was absolutely necessary to have a Ukrainian committee recognized by the Germans, not only to avoid subordination of all Ukrainians in Germany to Vlasov, which would prevent their seizing an opportunity for independent negotiations with the Allies, but because the sheer existence of the *Ostarbeiter* and prisoners required that their compatriots be in a position to exercise influence in their behalf. To them, the loss of prestige involved in collaboration with an infamous and moribund power was not sufficient to outweigh these considerations.[55]

668* At the same time, Vlasov and his associates were busily endeavoring to secure a Ukrainian representation which would accept their claim to leadership and would agree to postpone any decision on independence for the Ukraine until after the Soviet rulers had been overthrown. Most Ukrainians whom they approached refused to cooperate, being convinced that if a predominantly Russian group such as Vlasov's ever succeeded in replacing the Communists in the Kremlin, it would create conditions which would make impossible a free expression of the wishes of the Ukrainian people on the question of union with Russia. Nevertheless, Vlasov succeeded in securing the support of a certain number of prominent Ukrainians for a Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii—KONR), which met in Prague on November 14, 1944. It is remarkable that practically all of these were from the single city of Kiev.[56] In part this appears to be due to the fact that

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[54] Interviews 9, 22. One informant (Interview 24) states that while the Bandera followers would not give their approval officially, they felt that Shandruk performed a highly useful and patriotic function.

[55] Interview 22.

[56] These included Theodore Bohatyrchuk and George Muzichenko, who signed the Manifesto of Prague; Constantine Shtepa and Eugene Arkypenko, chief editor

Za Ukrainu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.[63] 668* 204

Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.[64] Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.[65] 727 ● 704

Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR.[66] On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de-

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[63] For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from *Das Schwartze Korps* (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2.

[64] M. Les', "Chomu ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, and 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (*Nova Doba*) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, *Klich.* The latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to whether they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians and other minorities in the Ukraine (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 5, 1941, p. 2).

[65] Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, January, 1945, NO 5800 (hereafter referred to as NO 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, and MS H, which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first ROA division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on the border of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to Thorwald, p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division.

[66] Interview 45.

704 ●727 moralized and physically worn-out prisoners to accept his invitation as a way out of confinement. They assert that a number of the units formed from prisoners or from the auxiliary units brought back by the Wehrmacht in its retreat abandoned the ROA, even without German permission, to join nationalist Ukrainian forces.[67] To a certain degree, this assertion is supported by one of the German officers most closely associated with the eastern military units, who states that difficulties were experienced in subordinating Ukrainian or mixed Ukrainian-Russian units which had been under German commanders to Russian officers from the ROA, although there was generally no objection to attachment to Vlasov's over-all command.[68]

704 In addition to this struggle for influence within groups which were subordinated to General Vlasov, there was an entirely separate military organization for the Ukrainians. The Galician division was reformed as the First Ukrainian Division, and organization of a second division to be composed of East Ukrainians was begun.[69] These and a number of other units, totaling seventy-five thousand men, were classified as the Ukrainian Liberation Army (Ukraïns'ke Vyzvol'ne Voisko—UVV) under command of General Shandruk, though each unit was actually commanded by a German officer.[70] In contradistinction to the ROA units, which wore the St. Andrew's cross, a centuries-old Russian symbol, the Ukrainian units were permitted the *trizub* [trident] as their national emblem. Borovets', who had been released from prison after a few months, was commissioned to form a parachute detachment to land behind the Soviet lines to aid the partisan struggle.[71]

000 The final days of the war brought no substantial change in

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[67] A. Kovach, *Ukraïns'ka vyzvol'na borot'ba i "Vlasovshchyna"* (The Ukrainian Liberation Struggle and the "Vlasov Affair") ("Germany," 1948), p. 51, states that 65 percent of the trainees in the Dabendorf officers' school of the ROA were of Ukrainian origin.

[68] Interview 15; MS C.

[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 8, 1944, p. 3.

[70] General Shandruk has in his possession a mimeographed copy of an order from the German general, Freitag, turning over command of the First (Galician) Ukrainian Division to him, but only on April 27, 1945. See also Oleh Lysiak, "Volyns'kyi Batalion" (The Volhynian Battalion), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv I. UD UNA* (March, 1951), p. 2.

[71] Borovets', *Zbroina borot'ba,* p. 15; Interview 37.

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While the basic reason for the foundation of a new church, and its rapid growth at the expense of the body under Alexius, was the nationalist feeling of the Ukrainians, which demanded a fully national church divorced from any connection, however theoretical, with Russia, German policy had also played a role in division of the Orthodox communion. Fundamentally, Nazi policy was permeated with violent hatred of all religion. The guiding principle for selection of German officials for the east ensured that this basic theme would persist in the application of policy: "The whole Christian outlook makes one incapable of carrying on work in the east, for the community of the hymnbook is put ahead of the needs of the Reich." [36] Within this blanket opposition to the church, however, even the fanatical anticlericalism of Rosenberg and his staff permitted compromises to secure tactical advantages. In their eyes, Catholic Christianity was the chief religious danger in the east. The leaders of the Catholic Church had long hoped for an opportunity to bring their doctrines to the peoples of the Soviet Union. On the outbreak of war, they attempted to send a number of priests, including several trained in the Ukrainian College in Rome, as missionaries. The Ostministerium rigorously opposed this endeavor, and with the exception of a few clergymen who were able to penetrate the Ukraine as chaplains in the Italian army, the Vatican's efforts were thwarted.[37] Similarly, the efforts of Polish Catholics to conduct activities in the East Ukraine, even among the considerable body of communicants of the Latin rite in Volhynia, were quickly suppressed.[38]

In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church was not to be opposed openly, provided it was not Russian dominated but Ukrainian in character. Moreover, any other purely Ukrainian sects were to be permitted. It was hoped that by allowing a multitude of religious bodies, the Orthodox Church as such would be weakened, for "the corruption and cultural backwardness of the clergy prepared the ground for Bolshevism."[39] When, however, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was founded as a distinctively national church, it appeared to the Ostministerium to be a useful means of furthering its aim of strengthening Ukrainian nationalism and driving a wedge between the Ukrainian and the Russian elements. Consequently, it felt that the Autocephalous Church under the leadership of Polykarp should be recognized and accorded a position of distinct superiority in comparison to the Autonomous Church headed by Alexius.[40] 795 727●

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[36] Memorandum on personnel for the east, from the Rosenberg files, July 9, 1941, PS 1040 (hereafter referred to as PS 1040).

[37] Directive by Alfred Meyer, "Die Frage der konfessionellen Verbände," July 29, 1941, PS 1047 (hereafter referred to as PS 1047). On the training of missionaries of the Greek Catholic rite for missionary work in the USSR after the conquest, see also Aldo Valori, *La Campagna di Russia* (Rome: Grafica Nazionale Editrice, 1951), I, 244.

[38] PS 053.

As was frequently the case, the policy formulated in Rosenberg's ministry failed of all practical results in the Ukraine. The Reichskommissariat decided to pursue a diametrically opposed course. Thus it proclaimed confessional freedom in June, 1942, but ordered all ecclesiastical organization limited to individual *Generalbezirke*.[41] In particular, it decided a little later to order the dissolution of the governing bodies of both the Autonomous and the Autocephalous Churches, the *sobors* headed by Alexius and Polykarp respectively.[42]

795 One reason for this decision to restrict religious organization was undoubtedly the fact that the Autocephalous Church had shown great vigor in organizing a new hierarchy. In May a second *sobor* of Autocephalous bishops had gathered in Kiev and consecrated no less than seven new bishops. The majority had been Volhynian priests, but two were laymen who had played prominent roles in the development of the new church body: Stephen Skrypnyk, who became bishop of Pereiaslav as Mstyslav, and a Kiev professor, Haievs'kyi, who became Bishop Sylvester.[43] Strong

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[39] PS 1047.

[40] Draft of a directive of Rosenberg to the Reichskommissare Ostland and Ukraine, May 13, 1942, CXLVa 15, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 15). I do not know whether the directive was ever actually sent, but it certainly expresses the opinion of the predominant group in the Ostministerium, as opposed to that of Koch's officials.

[41] Report by an unidentified official of the Ostministerium to Rosenberg, June 30, 1944, CXLVa 66, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 66).

[42] Directive of Reichskommissar Ukraine (signed by Dargel, head of the political section) to the Generalkommissare, October 1, 1942, CXLVa 20, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 20).

[43] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 28, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup*, July 12, 1942, p. 2.

795 efforts were made to secure the support of all the surviving Lypkyvites, with great success, apparently because there was no demand for reconsecration, although at first there was friction between the new and the old Autocephalous bodies.[44] The new consecrations raised the total number of the higher clergy to fourteen: two archbishops (Polykarp and Alexander, Hilarion being still a member of the hierarchy of the Polish church, i.e., that in the Generalgouvernement) and twelve bishops, with five hundred parishes and a still greater number of priests under their authority.[45] 727 The vigor and unity of the church alone was sufficient to 795 make it repugnant to those Germans who feared any independent center of Ukrainian life. For example, the Generalkommissar in Nikolaev wrote Erich Koch expressing his fear that the Autocephalous Church, which was strong in the northern part of his area, was becoming a "national church," and said that all priests were being closely watched.[46] Koch himself conceived a violent antipathy for Mstyslav, whom he described as "Skrypnyk, a prominent Ukrainian politician in Kiev," asserting that the bishop was trying to turn the Wehrmacht against the Reichskommissariat officials.[47]

As a result of these feelings of distrust, the Reichskommissariat refused to follow the policy of favoring the Autocephalous Church as against the Autonomous Church. With the desertion of the nationalist Ukrainians, the latter was coming more and more to be the confession of Russophile elements in the Ukraine, or at least of those elements which favored equality between Russians and Ukrainians in cultural and political life. In an effort to build up a counterweight to the nationalist forces, the Reichskommissariat officials began to favor the Autonomous Church. First the Reichskommissar decided that a balance should be maintained between the two churches.[48] Later his henchmen used the Autonomous Church as a means of weakening the Autocephalous Church when the latter threatened to become powerful. The reverse tactic was also used occasionally, but the general tendency appears to be that taken by the Stadtkommissar of Kiev, who openly indicated the preference of the German officials for the Russian-oriented church by transferring to it in a public ceremony the principal cathedral of the city, St. Vladimir's (St. Volodymyr's).[49] 727 795

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[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 3; Dmytro Doroshenko in *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1.

[45] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 1, 1942, p. 4, based on information from Bishop Mstyslav. Apparently in addition to the bishops I have referred to as adhering to the Autocephalous Church, a new member of the hierarchy, Korenistov, was consecrated as bishop of Brest and auxiliary of Alexander of Pinsk. Doroshenko in *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, November 10, 1942, p. 1, also refers to fourteen members of the UAP hierarchy.

[46] April, 1942, CXLVa 474, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 474).

[47] PS 192.

The general policy of the Reichskommissariat toward union of the two Orthodox bodies was governed by the same principle of doing everything which would weaken forces which might slip beyond its control. In May, when it appeared that the nascent strength of the Autocephalous group might be curbed by securing its subordination to Alexius, this line of action was favored, though in a tentative way, because the specter of a single united church, whatever its stand on the national question, was also abhorrent to the autocratic Nazi group.[50] By October, when the Autocephalous Church had become so strong that Alexius was obliged to seek unification on terms favorable to it, the Germans intervened to render abortive all attempts at conciliation.[51] Actually, the negotiations between Alexius on the one side and Polykarp, Mstyslav, and Nikanor on the other, proceeded so far that on October 8, 1942, an act of union was signed. A new synod of bishops, consisting of Polykarp and Alexius as metropolitans, with Alexander, Simon (an Autonomous bishop) and Nikanor as members, and Mstyslav as secretary, was to be formed. Thus the Autocephalous group would have obtained a clear majority in the directing body. The episcopal sees were to be so rearranged as to allow places for all or most of the bishops hitherto consecrated by both groups.[52] The strong German inter-

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[48] CXLVa 20.

[49] *Volyn'*, May 2, 1943, p. 4.

[50] On May 4, 1942, at a conference in Rovno, an official of the Reichskommissariat expressed the wishes of the German authorities that the two churches unite, but declared that the Germans would maintain neutrality and not intervene at that time to secure union (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 14, 1942, p. 3).

[51] The directive of the Reichskommissar Ukraine to the Generalkommissare previously cited (CXLVa 20) provided that all efforts at union should be opposed.

[52] *Nastup*, November 15, 1942, p. 2; *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

727 vention, however, combined with the opposition of a number
795 of Autonomous bishops, headed by Panteleimon, forced Alexius
to retract his signature.[53]

795 From what has just been said, one would assume that there
668* would be a close connection between the Autocephalous Church, which within a few months had come to be the church of most believing Ukrainian nationalists, and the nationalist parties. To a certain extent this is true, for many members of the latter, who were prevented by the danger of violent death from pursuing any national political activities, turned to the cultivation of the church as a means for expressing and propagating their feelings. A number of the leading members of the Autocephalous Church were affiliated with the UNR, and the Het'man group also displayed great interest in religious development, in line with its conservative and traditionalist principles. More particularly, Mstyslav, the member of the UAP hierarchy who was most intimately acquainted with and interested in political affairs, was an old adherent of the UNR.[54]

668* As has been previously indicated, however, the really active parties in the East Ukraine were the two factions of the OUN. Hence the fact that the church leaders tended to associate with other groupings acted as a certain impediment to close collaboration. Moreover, a strong element in both wings of the OUN was opposed to religion in principle. This ideological bias against utilizing the church as a major instrument of national expression was undoubtedly given greatly increased weight by the experience
668* of the nationalists in the East Ukraine. The churches—both Au-
771 tonomous and Autocephalous—had no difficulty in attracting communicants, for there were many millions who had longed for the remembered solace of religion throughout the years of Communist oppression. These adherents of the church were, however, drawn very largely from the lower classes, the less educated elements of the population, especially the peasantry.[55] Since the OUN groups—as will be shown—concentrated their efforts on the intelligentsia, they placed comparatively little emphasis on

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[53] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, December 10, 1942, p. 2.

[54] Interview 69.

[55] See Chapter IX for details and sources on the attitude of the social classes and age groups toward religion.

the two factions of the OUN were unable to penetrate institutional channels, it was sometimes possible for nationalist groups limited to specific localities to do so. No appraisal of the strength of nationalism in the East Ukraine during 1941–43 would be complete without an examination of this penetration of the institutional framework by nationalists. In such an examination it is essential to proceed with great caution, for it is all too easy for adherents of Ukrainian nationalist groups to ascribe in retrospect an exaggerated importance to their influence during the years of occupation. It would be tedious to describe the complicated and frequently unsatisfying ways in which the element of fact in inflated postwar accounts has been sought. Suffice it to say at this point that the basic approach has been the testing of the details of proper names, place names, and dates contained in each narration (whether in the form of printed memoir or oral testimony) against the abundant but superficial material contained in the Ukrainian press during the war years. In addition, the available wartime underground publications and German reports have been utilized. In this fashion, at least the extent of the real acquaintance of the narrator with the area he describes can be estimated, and frequently the validity of his assessment of the role of persons and events can be surmised by reading between the lines of descriptions published legally—but with a trace of "Aesopian" language—during the war.

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Primary targets for the efforts of nationalist elements in their campaign to win access to the East Ukrainian masses were the administrative apparatuses existing at the local level throughout the area of German occupation. The general outline of the machinery of government established by the Nazi regime in the occupied eastern territories has been described, and the policy of the officials in charge traced. The ruthless policy pursued made open activity of the OUN groups impossible, and their failure to understand this fact in time resulted in the slaughter of many of their adherents. The extent to which nationalist administrative officials could survive in the capital has already been indicated, however, and what was true of Kiev was true to a more marked degree of many of the smaller centers of the Ukraine. In spite

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727 of the determined efforts of Erich Koch and his cohorts to bring
634 every aspect of life under their control, the sheer extent of the Ukraine and the size of its population prevented complete success. For example, in the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev, there were only five hundred Germans on the administrative staff, charged with governing a population of 1,920,000, in an area of nearly seventeen thousand square miles.[3]

191 The limitations on control arising from the small number of
634 German personnel available were made yet narrower by the
727 language barrier. The extent to which the Wehrmacht was dependent on nationalists as interpreters has already been described. Since few Reichskommissariat officials knew the Slavic languages and yet in general rejected the use of émigrés or West Ukrainians as aides, they were thrown back on local interpreters and assistants as intermediaries between themselves and the masses. Supposedly
626 reliable persons, often ethnic Germans, were employed. These
634 physical limitations, however, compelled the German officials to
727 concentrate on keeping the "commanding heights" of the administration—economic controls, armed force, and means of communication—in their hands, while turning over most other aspects of public affairs to administrators drawn from the native population. In these fields they could lay down policy and occasionally intervene brutally to punish real or fancied violations of their directives. They could play one group against another and thereby secure a check on the development of movements threatening to pass from German control. They could place all aspects of life under a crushing weight of fear and material deprivation. Lacking a body of supporters extending down to the smallest units of society, however, they could not enforce a positive program of indoctrination and—except in an intermittent and incomplete fashion—they could not prevent those who were in contact with the masses of the population from imparting their own ideological tinge to their activities.

634 The physical limitations of German power meant that the
727 local administrative machinery in the East Ukraine was to a large extent left to the inhabitants. Local men were of course especially predominant in the administration of rural areas, but

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[3] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, December 2, 1942, p. 1; *Volyn'*, February 25, 1943, p. 4.

for reasons which will be discussed in the next chapter, little is 634
known about their activities in connection with nationalism. The 727
city administrations were more closely supervised by the Germans,
but their size prevented them from being completely controlled.
In spite of the fact that the populace soon realized that
only the shadow of power was permitted the local administrations,
the concept of the omnipotence of state control was so well established
that even the outer signs of authority behind the nationalist
cause were of some importance in winning support for it.
Throughout the occupied Ukraine, except for the Donbas, which [191]
was very mixed ethnically, the languages of administration were
German and Ukrainian only. Although it is said that the officials
who carried on the governmental work in the prescribed language
frequently spoke Russian as soon as they had left their desks,
and sometimes even wrote their reports and orders in that language,[4]
having them translated into Ukrainian, the prestige value
of the change was considerable. The same was true of the widespread [186]
use of national symbols, which had been forbidden under
Soviet rule, such as the trident and the blue and yellow colors;
they appeared on the uniforms of the police, as banners decorating
the administrative buildings, even on the streetcars. On the
other hand, the removal of these symbols, when Russophile
elements were introduced into the administration to replace the
nationalists, was equally important as a negative token of loss
of prestige; the official language, however, always remained [191]
Ukrainian.[5]

Some indication of the influence exerted upon the overt attitudes 186
of the inhabitants of the East Ukraine by the apparent
ascendancy of Ukrainian nationalism is furnished by nationalities
statistics obtained from censuses taken by various city administrations
in late 1941 and early 1942,[6] since each citizen was usually

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[4] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3.

[5] When the *Ukrains'ke Slovo* group was arrested, the cultural department of the Kiev city administration was ordered to remove all tridents and Ukrainian flags; see Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukrains'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 11. In Dniepropetrovsk, the Germans followed up the destruction of the Ukrainian *oblast* administration by removing the trident from the masthead of *Vil'na Ukraina* (The Free Ukraine), the city's newspaper, and changing its name to *Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta* (Interview 77).

[6] See Appendix.

employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, 633
as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force [565]
made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, 186
lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. 633
Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol 727 ●
of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for ad- 633
vancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

727 the departments of administration. In such cases the department
633 heads who were on good terms with their German superiors seem to have been able to pursue courses substantially independent of the mayor, and this was also to an extent true of the firmer or more clever of those who wished to exert their own authority even without special German support. Consequently, it sometimes happened that one or more sections of a municipal administration were strongholds of nationalist activity, while the city as a whole was administered by elements opposed to Ukrainian independence.

Under the Soviet system, the municipal administrations had included departments of finance, communal economy, internal trade, health, popular education, social security, and cadres, as well as a general department, a planning commission, and sometimes departments of local manufacturing and agriculture. In the city administrations under German occupation, there was evidently some consolidation of departments, but in general the Soviet division was little changed, except for the elimination of the planning commission. On the other hand, several new departments were added for functions which had been performed by higher Soviet administrative levels but which the Germans wished to allocate, under their own control, to the cities. One was the propaganda department, which will be discussed somewhat later. Another was the juridical department, which operated a system of lower courts.[13] It was, however, of little or no importance as a channel of nationalist activity. Much more significant in this
625 respect were the police departments. Some indications of their
727 activity in nationalist affairs have already been given. The Ger-
633 mans, of course, exerted great efforts to keep this element of authority, the only branch of the local administration which could have offered armed resistance to their rule, under firm control. Since the police power was regularly in the hands of German SP officials, who frequently maintained only a nominal subordination to the *Stadtkommissar,* the Ukrainian chief of this department was correspondingly independent of the mayor.

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[13] On the legal system in the Reichskommissariat, see Nicholas Laskovs'kyi, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI (April, 1952), 124 ff.

Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— 727 ●
ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating 625
in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrain- 633
ian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact 186
that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which 625
he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East 727
Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

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[14] Interview 1.

[15] Interviews 1, 18.

[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukrains'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[17] Interview 59.

[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

Of less obvious importance than the police sections, but nevertheless of great significance were the agencies concerned with health, social security, and welfare. The extreme limitations placed upon the efforts of the local administrations to maintain their starving citizens have already been described. Nevertheless, the fact that they could carry on activity was of some importance, both from the practical standpoint and from that of providing the population with token participation in administration. The Germans were undoubtedly content to leave this arduous and thankless task to the local leaders. Welfare activities were in part the responsibility of municipal departments, in part the function of volunteer organizations. This duplication gave rise to the possibility of conflicting political trends in the same field of operation. In Kiev the head of the welfare department, until his consecration as an Autocephalous bishop, was Professor Haievs'kyi,[19] and even after his resignation the department seems to have been in the hands of nationalist elements. The paucity of the resources available to this section has been indicated in a preceding chapter; nevertheless, it was able to arrange for the provision of buildings for care of the distressed.[20] At the same time, the Ukrainian Red Cross, which had been formed as an organ of the city government and which had carried on extensive operations in relieving the horrible conditions in the prisoner-of-war camps, had been dissolved by the Germans. Apparently this action was due in part to its use by Nationalist elements as a screen for their activities, but more particularly to its humane exertions. Its leader, Professor Theodore Bohatyrchuk, who, after having welcomed collaboration with the OUN-M group, had become disgusted with its excesses in Kiev, now turned to support of the Russophile element.[21] His organization, which was reformed as the All-Ukrainian Aid Committee (Vseukraïns'kyi

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after explosions set off by Communist agents in Kiev in the autumn of 1941, arrested only Russians, scores of whom were then shot (Interviews 19, 59). However, a German order provided that Ukrainians were not to be taken as hostages while Russians were to be arrested for this purpose (Order of Befehlshaber des Ruckwärtigen Heeresgebiet Süd, August 16, 1941, NOKW 1691; hereafter referred to as NOKW 1691).

[19] *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Interviews 19, 71.

Komitet Dopomohy), was able, even on the eve of German evacuation, to provide meals for 36,000 persons (children and others unable to work),[22] one sixth of the city's population; its great popularity[23] was of tremendous importance in enabling Bohatyrchuk to secure support for his stand in favor of coalition with anti-Soviet Russians. On the other hand, in Dniepropetrovsk, where the city administration was largely in the hands of pro-Russian elements, the Ukrainians, inspired by an OUN-M organizer, formed a Red Cross organization which acted as a center for nationalist forces. 747 727 [186]

The nationalist element was more successful in the field of cooperative organization. While each city administration contained a department of trade, the cooperatives, as quasi-public bodies, appear to have been considerably more important as channels of local initiative. Far from being a product of the Communist regime, the cooperative movement was indigenous to both East and West Ukraine, having played an important role before the First World War, when it was already imbued with nationalist overtones.[24] In the NEP period of Soviet rule, and until the late twenties, the cooperatives had been able to maintain a considerable degree of independence and had, at least in the Kharkov region, served as a center for nationalist elements which worked with the Republican government.[25] In the Five Year Plan periods, the urban cooperatives had become adjuncts of the state trading systems, and other cooperatives had been closely integrated into state commercial operations.[26] 474 727

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[22] *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, September 19, 1943, pp. 4–5; see also *Volyn'*, January 28, 1943, p. 3.

[23] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 8, 1942, p. 4.

[24] For abundant details on the complex system of cooperatives developed in the Ukraine prior to 1917, see Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, *The Cooperative Movement in Russia During the War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), a volume in the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, ed. James T. Shotwell, Russian Series, compiled for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Cooperatives were far more developed in the Ukraine than in most other heavily populated areas of the Russian Empire (*ibid.*, pp. 40, 41, 266–69, 357), and served educational as well as economic development. Kharkov was the chief cooperative center in the Ukraine and was largely independent of the Russian centers.

[25] Interview 73.

[26] Alexander Baikov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1946), p. 253; Arthur C. Arnold, *Banks, Credit, and Money in Soviet Russia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), p. 477.

727 474 When the Germans arrived, surviving leaders of the former independent cooperatives were again able to assert themselves. As early as the winter of 1941–42, there was a total of 643 cooperative organizations in the Kiev region, including forty-eight *raion* food societies which bought agricultural produce and carried on economic organization;[27] in the city of Kharkov there were 150 cooperatives, which maintained close contacts with their sources of food stocks in the countryside.[28] There were, in addition to numerous distributing cooperatives, twenty-eight producing cooperatives in Kiev, in such diverse fields as transport, printing, and haberdashery.[29] The Ukraïnbank (All-Ukrainian Cooperative Bank), which had been formed in 1922 for financing all types of cooperatives, but incorporated in the Soviet central Torgbank in 1936, was revived.[30]

727 474 186 Moreover, there were more direct links to the nationalist movements. An effort was made, with German approval, to organize a general center for the food cooperatives, known as the All-Ukrainian Cooperative Society (Vseukraïns'ka Kooperatyvna Spilka), which coordinated local organizations, published a bulletin, and restored the museum of the history of cooperative development, an institution of considerable significance for nationalist sentiment.[31] Under an old officer of the Ukrainian army, Professor Perevertuna, a close collaborator of the OUN-M, it carried out activities on a large scale in the Kiev area, especially training replacements for the diminished ranks of cooperative workers.[32] In addition to more indirect fostering of nationalist sentiment, its aid to the nationalist cause included employing persons whom the Germans had dismissed from the municipal administration.[33] In early 1943, however, such activities resulted in the execution of the director.[34]

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[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.

[28] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 24, 1942, p. 2.

[29] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 5, 1942, p. 2.

[30] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 10, 1942, p. 4. Cf. Baikov, p. 86, and Arnold, p. 477, for the background of this bank.

[31] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 4, 1942, p. 3.

[32] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung*, July 11, 1942, p. 3.

[33] *OUN u Viini* (The OUN in the War), Information Section of the OUN (UNR), April, 1946, p. 75.

[34] *Ibid.*; *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), p. 585.

Like the cooperative movement, popular education had long 727
been a cornerstone of Ukrainian nationalism, more important in 658
many respects than direct political action. In the conflict between 871
the national Communists in the Ukraine and the Stalinist centralists, 626
it was especially the commissars of education, such as Shums'kyi and Skrypnyk, who had led the fight for Ukrainization of cultural life. Consequently it was natural that nationalist Ukrainians were determined to control the municipal departments of education under German occupation.

A major aim of the Reichskommissar and his henchmen, however, was to prevent the development of a cultured Ukrainian class, to convert the people into a race of submissive peasants. Rosenberg's vision of a university in Kiev went by the board, and the standard schooling for every Ukrainian child was set at four years.[35] Few material injuries were as deeply resented as this drastic curb on the opportunities for education. Since there were real shortages of materials, books, and teachers, the Ukrainians held to the hope that the restriction did not represent a permanent policy, even in the face of the closing of *gimnaziias* which had been reopened under the army administration through the efforts of the local population itself.[36]

To a limited extent the ban on secondary and higher education 874
was evaded by the extensive use made of a loophole in the 727
German regulations which allowed the reopening of technical 186
schools. The enormous loss of artisans and professionally trained persons incurred by the annihilation of the Jewish inhabitants compelled even the power-mad Nazis to recognize the need for training Ukrainians in such occupations. A large number of technical secondary schools, agricultural schools, and even institutes of higher education like medical faculties, were permitted. The extent to which these facilities were utilized by the Ukrainian population is indicated by the fact that the enrollment of the Kiev medical institute reached 2,000 in 1943 when the total population of the city was only 300,000, while Kherson, with a fifth

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[35] Report of Rosenberg to Hitler, August 11, 1942, PS 42 (hereafter referred to as PS 42); PS 1198.

[36] E.g., in Berdichev (*Nastup*, September 20, 1941, p. 3, quoting *Nova Doba* [Berdichev] for September 1), Zhitomir (Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941), and Belaia Tserkov' (*Nationalist*, December 20, 1941, p. 2).

874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medical
● 727 school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
[466] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of
an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
872 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation
186 would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

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[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.

[38] See Chapter V.

[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).

[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

It was much more difficult to secure a predominant place for 727
the nationalist ideology in the schools. As is usually the case in 186
nationalist indoctrination in the schools, the efforts were concen- 872
trated upon the teaching of history.[41] This was especially important, since the justification of the Ukrainian independence movement is largely based upon the conception of a proud history distinct from that of the people of Moscow. Naturally enough, no Soviet textbooks were acceptable for the teaching of history from this point of view or from the general standpoint of eradicating Communist indoctrination. To some extent the gap was filled by [314]
books published in the year preceding the Soviet war by the educational press of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow.[42] Some texts were printed by the cultural department of the Kiev city administration. An amateurish effort was made also by certain OUN-B organizers to print locally a new version of Ukrainian history with an introduction of their own composition.[43] In view of the great material shortages and the brief time available, however, the lack of printed materials could not be made good. Consequently, a great deal depended on securing the proper teachers. To what extent the many thousands employed in the schools adhered to the nationalist doctrine is of course impossible to determine, but a number of purely indigenous formulations of nationalist concepts to be inculcated in the schools attest to the strength of nationalist feeling. The head of the Mariupol' school system proposed to stress the native language, love of the fatherland, and respect for elders; the educational ideology advocated by the group of young men who reorganized life in Krivoi Rog was instillation of Cossack ideals, the code of the Zaporozhian Sich, which was to lead to a spiritual, moral, and physical regeneration.[44]

Since the formal school program was largely confined to young 181
children, great efforts were also concentrated on developing a 517
voluntary system of adult education. The Prosvita societies had 575

Visti, June 5, 1942, pp. 3-4; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 27, 1943, p. 4, quoting D. Nitsenko in *Nova Ukraina* (Kharkov).

[41] Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 5, 1942, pp. 3-4.

[42] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 10, 1941, p. 2.

[43] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), p. 28.

[44] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 29, 1942, p. 2; November 15, 1941, p. 2; and November 18, 1941, p. 3 (referring to an article in *Dzvin* [Krivoi Rog], September, 1941).

not find the Prosvita organization well adapted to its tactic of 517
underground work after German suppression.[56] On the other 575
hand, the extremely important Kharkov Prosvita was organized 186
almost entirely by local residents who had in many cases been associated with the Prosvita of pre-Soviet days, and who were unassociated with, or even to some extent hostile to, the OUN-M.[57] Here again there is strong indication of the survival in the East Ukraine of leadership capable of taking direction of important aspects of national life. That this leadership was directed to such a considerable extent to the less aggressive aspects of national development, however, indicates that a certain gap existed during the war years between nationalism in the East and the West Ukraine.

The means employed in the educational systems and in the 186
cultural societies for propagating the national ideology can be 208
classed for the most part under the heading of oral propaganda. The face-to-face type of communication has a long history of effective use in the east Slavic countries and, under the name "oral agitation," has been widely cultivated as a means of strengthening the Communist regime. Hence the population was used to this type of propaganda. Moreover, it was especially suited [727]
to the work of the nationalist groups, which were seeking to spread ideas frowned upon by the German authorities. The latter could suppress a performance or dissolve a society, arrest or execute a leader, but with their small number of personnel, their ignorance of the language, and their lack of sufficiently numerous and reliable local agents, they could not overhear everything and thus prevent the clever teacher or cultural worker from communicating political concepts to his audience. Since nationalist propagandists were so few and ill-equipped by organization and training to cope with the gigantic task of indoctrinating a population of thirty million, however, the problem of securing access to mass communication media under control of the propaganda departments of the municipal administrations was vitally important. Through such media nationalism might reach thousands

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[56] Interview 61.

[57] Interviews 57, 73.

186 where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached
208 scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

The principal activity of the propaganda department of a
204 727 Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation
186 centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous de- 727
serters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, 204
might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered 186
in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna*, and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East 626
Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly 204
nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even 186
the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably ap- 727
proved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

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[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.

[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

204 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy
626 the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only
727 where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate cen-
186 sorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

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[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1098.

204 626 727 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's disposal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 727 626 186 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

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[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, 186
themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate 204
development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of 626
Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Com- 727
munists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts—made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

204 and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the
●727 Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the
186 southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although
626 edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the
727 Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German
186 material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially
204 cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

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[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukrains'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

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ians, when deprived of Nationalist support, made a rather poor showing as journalists. With some notable exceptions,[72] they did not measure up to the standards of the West Ukrainians or of old veterans of the Republican period like Nicholas Stasiuk, the editor of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta.* As will be shown, the administrative officials were also generally drawn from the intelligentsia, especially those of the academic or teaching profession, and had not been trained for the roles they assumed. That they nevertheless made a better showing of independence and devotion to national aims may possibly be explained by the fact that the Soviet regime had encouraged an attitude of limited self-assertion in local administrative bodies, so long as no questions of policy were at stake, while newspaper staffs were much more rigidly confined to transmission of Communist Party-inspired material and even more minutely controlled. Many persons of initiative must have felt it was better to take posts in which real service of a nonpolitical nature could be rendered, rather than assume the unattractive function of mouthpiece for a repressive regime. The question of the characteristics of the East Ukrainian intellectual can be considered in a larger context in the next chapter.

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[72] Among these were Voskobiinyk, Hrynenko (Zhitomir), and a number of editorial writers in Kharkov, as well as those mentioned earlier as founding newspapers, although their careers were generally limited to a few weeks.

led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders 463 had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, 186 however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in 633 the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the 727 activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point 186 of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among 693 almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

793 to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services accord-
578 ing to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of
186 the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

668* It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

● 727 Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor
661 were shot by German police; the city passed under the control
204 of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

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[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.

[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.

[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.

[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.

[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.

[28] Interview 47.

German authorities; in a few other places, including the important 727
towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued 661
their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, 204
the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast.*[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31]

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German 668*
occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism.

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies 133
a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri-

[East of the Dnieper -- Analyst]

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[29] Interviews 47, 50.

[30] Interview 47.

[31] *Ibid.*

Zaporozh'e.[40] Apparently these men were executed by the Germans; 668* no further reports on nationalist activity in Zaporozh'e are available. This obscurity surrounding OUN-B activities makes itself felt especially in any effort to trace the relationships between OUN-B organizers and locally active groups. In Krivoi Rog, the mayor, Sherstiuk, the editors, Pronchenko and Potapenko, and a number of other local figures were strongly nationalist in sentiment, but whether they were ever adherents of the Bandera movement, or were brought into its organization, is a matter of dispute between the survivors of the Krivoi Rog group and OUN-B members familiar with the area.[41] What appears most likely is that an initial "honeymoon" of cooperation was succeeded by strife arising from the uncompromising demands of the OUN-B for adherence to the integral nationalist line.[42]

In the case of Dniepropetrovsk, some corroboration of postwar 668* accounts is furnished by a German police report. An OUN-B 727● group arrived soon after the German army entered the city. Under the Galician organizer Rehei, who was helped by the Wehrmacht commander, a new *oblast* administration was established to offset the locally formed city administration.[43] Apparently the local group was at first neutral on the Russo-Ukrainian question, but the fanatic demands of the OUN-B and its efforts at counterorganization drove the local group completely into the Russian alignment, which was tolerated by the German police authorities after they dispersed the Bandera group. At least one prominent

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[40] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 143, December 8, 1941, p. 5, NO 2827 (hereafter referred to as NO 2827).

[41] Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 29–31; Ievhen (Eugene) Stakhiv ("E. Pavliuk"), "Borot'ba ukraïns'koho narodu na skhidno-ukraïns'kykh zemliakh, 1941–1944: Spomyny ochevydtsia i uchasnyka" (The Struggle of the Ukrainian People in the Eastern Ukrainian Lands, 1941–44: Memories of an Eyewitness and Participant), in *Kalendar Provydinnia na 1947 rik. Stovaryshennia Ukraïns'kikh Katolykiv v Amerytsi* (Calendar for 1947 of the Providence Society of Ukrainian Catholics in America) (Philadelphia: Ameryka, n.d.), pp. 39, 41, 45, 53; MS E; Interviews 7, 66.

[42] That this was the case is indicated by an article in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 15, 1941, p. 2, evidently based on discussions with Pronchenko and Potapenko. It contained the complaint that the newspaper *Dzvin* would have little space left for the news of the day if it was necessary to print "catechisms on the *trizub* or the national name," essays on the development of National Socialism, the New Europe, etc. See also MS E.

[43] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, No. 132, November 12, 1941, pp. 10–11, NO 3830 (hereafter referred to as NO 3830).

668* member actually joined the Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz (NTS—
●727 National Workers' Union), the Russian counterpart to the OUN. When the OUN parties, including a relatively important Mel'nyk group which was especially active in educational circles, continued their work underground, they were able to gain or regain some support, partly as a reaction to the lengths to which the Russophile element, especially the Autonomous Church, went, and partly also because of an increasing moderation in their own ideology.[44]

186 No simple conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of these complex situations. The picture is further complicated by a tendency, illustrated in a number of instances, for Russians living in the Ukraine to accept a moderate Ukrainian nationalist position when not exposed to the pressure of an extreme Nationalist and strongly anti-Russian ideology. One strong adherent of the Ukrainian ethnic nationalist position was much impressed on finding in Novomirgorod (Novomyrhorod), near Kirovograd, a young teacher and his wife who both felt themselves to be Ukrainian, although born in Russia, and who "hated the Bolsheviks just as much as we do."[45] In another small town in the area (Novo Ukrainka) a nationalist organizer found most of the teachers to be "still under the influence of Communist ideology," which probably meant among other things that they did not consider the "purity" of Ukrainian culture of the greatest importance.[46] There seems to have been a fairly widespread tendency on the part of many Ukrainians and of many Russians living in the Ukraine, to reject any ethnic national creed in favor of some ideology based on territorial identity. It would not do to overemphasize this factor, however, for there was considerable support, especially in the northwestern area around the see of Kirovograd, for the Autocephalous Church,[47] which stressed the Ukrainian language, and isolated smaller places like Pavlograd were real centers of devotion to all things Ukrainian. Even such

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[44] Interview 1.

[45] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 2, 1942, p. 3.

[46] Matla, p. 28.

[47] On the question of language to be used in church service, cf. Chapter VIII.

a large center as Dnieprodzerzhinsk had a nationalist mayor and a 186
nationalist editor.[48]

The extreme south, the coastal strip along the Black Sea and 361
the Sea of Azov, from Odessa to Osipenko (Berdianka), had had a still shorter history of settlement than the area immediately to the north. Best suited of all Ukrainian lands to large-scale wheat farming with a small agricultural working force, it had a relatively sparse rural population, very mixed ethnically, with many German villages and some districts of Russian majority. The cities were still more heterogeneous, with Ukrainians forming a small minority in the larger ones, according to the census of 1926.

The study of conditions in this area is seriously hampered by 727
the fact that the western third fell to Rumanian-occupied Trans- 523
nistria. To prepare the way for the annexation of Transnistria, and, in addition, to gratify the desire of high officials for loot and profiteering, the Rumanians sent in a large number of their own administrators.[49] Since the rather backward Moldavians comprised only a small proportion of the total population, one of the Slavic elements had to be tolerated. Believing that German victory would lead eventually to the creation of an independent Ukraine, which would inevitably demand the land west of the Dniester as an irredenta, the Rumanians favored the Russians; the position of Russian nationalist elements in Odessa resembled that of the Mel'nyk group in Kiev and Zhitomir before their suppression by the Germans. Russian was an official language, along with Rumanian and German; a Russian theater was opened; several Russian publications were started.[50] The guiding organization of the Russians was a group called the Union of Russian Officers, which had the St. George cross as its emblem and evidently was strongly tsarist in its ideology.[51] It is said to have maintained contacts with émigré groups in Serbia and elsewhere and to have refused cooperation with the Vlasov movement.[52] At any

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[48] Interview 10; *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk,* June 14, 1942, p. 7.

[49] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk,* February 7, 1943, p. 1, based on a Zentraleuropa agency report.

[50] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 17, 1943, p. 3; Interview 18; Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), p. 122.

[51] Clandestine publication from Odessa region previously cited.

[52] *Ibid.*; Interview 18.

737 rate, with Rumanian encouragement, it was bitterly anti-Ukrainian,
563 adopting the slogan, "The Ukraine never was, is not, and never will be." [53]

668* Since this group and its Rumanian backers controlled all aspects of cultural and public life, any open Ukrainian nationalist activity even of a cultural nature was suppressed. A clandestine publication and a considerable amount of postwar testimony indicate that the OUN-B maintained a strong underground organization, started by a division of the southern task force even before Rumanian occupation began and later reinforced from the headquarters in Dniepropetrovsk.[54] They are said to have been able to operate an illegal printing press in Odessa and to have kept a nucleus group there.[55] A great deal of their attention was directed to the Rumanian-occupied rural areas to the north, and especially to southern Podolia, where they conducted a propaganda effort to induce the Ukrainian villagers to resist colonization by Moldavians.[56]

To the east, the southern part of the *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev was more open to Ukrainian activity. The mayor of Nikolaev was a Mel'nyk adherent.[57] In the second-largest city of the area, Kherson, the Bandera group built a considerable organization, including the assistant mayor and the police chief, but was apparently liquidated by the SP by the end of 1941.[58] Nevertheless, the mayor, apparently an ethnic German, assisted the Ukrainian intellectuals in organizing cultural activity many months after the OUN-B had been suppressed.[59] The newspaper, too, is said to have been edited by a nationalist journalist.[60] In this city and the *Bezirk* capital, the Autonomous Church was active, having formed

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[53] Interview 18.

[54] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45; Mstyslav Z. Chubai, *Reid organizatoriv OUN vid Popradu do Chorne More* (The Raid of the Organizers of the OUN from Poprad to the Black Sea) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 48 ff.; Interview 18; clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[55] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 45.

[56] Clandestine publication from Odessa area previously cited.

[57] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, October 2, 1941, pp. 3-4, NO 3137 (hereafter referred to as NO 3137).

[58] Chief of the SP and the SD, Report on Events in the USSR, January 14, 1942, p. 30, NO 3279 (hereafter referred to as NO 3279).

[59] *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, September 5, 1943, p. 6.

[60] Interview 42.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

an archdiocese of Kherson at an early date.[61] As was related previously, the *Generalkommissar* was suspicious of the Autocephalous Church and urged that steps be taken against it when it grew strong in the north of his area. Later, Michael (Khoroshyi), bishop of Kirovograd, was to come to Nikolaev as archbishop, and was recognized by the *Generalkommissar*,[62] but the pro-Russian ecclesiastical group seems to have maintained a strong position. On the other hand, the extremely large shift in national affiliation in Kherson indicated by the city census suggests that the same factor of adoption of loyalty to the Ukraine as a territorial entity may have been at work here as well as farther north.[63] Farther east along the coast, in the *Generalbezirk* Taurien (Taurida), with its capital in Melitopol' (Melitopil'), there appears to have been little effort at nationalist organization; the newspapers, police, and other agencies were Ukrainian, but seem to have been completely subject to German control.[64] 668* [727]

Beyond the coastal strip just discussed lies the most easterly section of the Ukrainian SSR, the Donbas. This area, in which agriculture takes the form of large-scale wheat farming, as in the far south, is known as the "Ruhr"—or better, one of the "Ruhrs"—of the Soviet Union. Its industry, which grew at a tremendous pace in the interwar period, is based primarily upon rich coal deposits. Its five cities of more than one hundred thousand population in 1939 had nearly tripled their total number of inhabitants since the previous census. It is probable that this increase resulted in a substantial gain for the Ukrainian ethnic component, which previously had been very small, as the surrounding peasantry is largely, though not overwhelmingly, Ukrainian. As far as the technical staffs, which composed the bulk of the educated class, are concerned, however, Ukrainian nationalist observers themselves admit that the great majority was drawn from 668* 369 [241]

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[61] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1942, p. 1. The archbishop was Anthony (Martsenko), who received his appointment in 1941 from the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops. Up to the time of the definite split between the Autonomous and the Autocephalous churches he was apparently still sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalists as his secretary is reported to have been an OUN member (NO 3279).

[62] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, March 6, 1943, p. 5.

[63] See Appendix.

[64] PS 1693.

175 authority of the Ukrainian Government. No local
642 municipal or other organization took the slightest note
668 of its existence. Every department, every district, and
every town governed itself and tried to resist the advance of the Bolsheviks. Not having any military forces or police organizations at their disposal, these local governments were unable to resist the attacks of the Red Guards and the armed soldiers, returned from the front and supported by Moscow. Soon the whole Ukraine elected local Soviet governments and the Rada, which hastened to proclaim, on 22 January 1918, the independence of the Ukraine, was obliged to flee on the 29th of the same month, seeking refuge at Jitomir. One of its most active members, Simon Petlioura, tried to organize anti-Bolshevik troops composed of peasants and prisoners of Galician origin. He succeeded in forming several units which, although unsatisfactory from a military point of view, cut a better figure than the bands of soldiers which were leaving the front. These military units, known under the name of '*haidamaks*,' formed small nuclei of resistance in the towns and villages and halted the Soviet offensive here and there. The more the Bolsheviks advanced towards the west, the more this resistance became effective, especially in Southern Podolia, where the Ukrainian organizations, supported by Galician prisoners, by Polish legionaries, and even by certain circles of purely Russian sympathies but hostile to Bolshevism, still retained some vestiges of power.

648 The insufficiency of technical, administrative, and
727 intellectual personnel did not allow the Ukrainians to
give their civil and military organizations the force necessary for defeating the revolutionary movement directed by the Communist Party. On 9 February the Ukrainian Government, acting as a sovereign government, and despite the firm opposition of a large part of

its members, especially of Petlioura, decided to send its 648
representatives to Brest-Litovsk to conclude a peace 727
with the central empires. This idea met with the sympathy of the Austro-German authorities whose negotiations for a peace with the Soviet Government had already lasted a long time.

The peace which was dictated by the German general staff was signed by the Rada. As compensation for the efforts of the central empires, who promised to protect the Ukraine from Bolshevism, the Rada accepted German occupation and agreed to supply 1,000,000 tons of grain of which Germany and Austria had immediate need. Under the threat of German bayonets the representatives of Lenin also had to recognize the independence of the Ukraine. Already the Austro-German troops were making their entry into Ukrainian territory while meeting with only a feeble resistance of the armed units of the local Soviet governments and the remnants of the fleeing Imperial Army.

The only aim of the Austro-German military command was to obtain the stores of grain and of other food products which they hoped to find in abundance in the
Ukraine. Yet, for political reasons, the Governments 727
of the central empires decided to support the fiction of Ukrainian independence under their protection. The entry of the troops was followed by the proclamation composed more or less in these terms: 'At the request of your Rada we have decided to enter your country in order to protect you from Bolshevik anarchy and to give you the possibility of developing in complete alliance with our two empires.'

One can say that no citizen took this declaration seriously and that the occupation was considered as an
invasion by enemy troops. The Ukrainian Government 642
was established at Kiev[1] and was composed of three 727

[1] [i.e., in 1919 --- Analyst]

642 political groups : the separatists of the right, the national
727 democrats, and the federalist social democrats. Thus, as these names show, the Ukrainian Government formed by the Austro-Germans was not homogeneous in the matter of its partisanship of independence.

727 The Austro-Germans did not take this farce of political independence any more seriously than did the population. Their attitude was simply that of conquerors. 'For every German soldier killed, ten *Russian* soldiers, chosen among the population of the district where the crime has been committed, will be immediately shot,' the terrified inhabitants of Kremenetz (town of Volynia) (Order No. 2, town of Kremenetz, 28 February 1918) read on the posters signed by the commandant of the Austrian division a few days after the proclamation of official friendship. The 'friendly country' closely resembled a colonial conquest. The general staff of the army of General Eichhorn reported to the commander of the eastern front on 4 May 1918: 'The Austro-German troops would have no difficulty in maintaining order and public tranquillity from the moment we renounce the fiction of a friendly country. We are still obliged to obtain the permission of the Ukrainian commissioners, who are confused and irritated, for some of our actions.'

648 Meanwhile two points of view existed in Austro-German circles concerning the subject of the independence of the Ukraine. The army considered the Ukraine a conquered enemy country which had to furnish, with the least possible delay, agricultural produce in accordance with the terms of peace.

On the other hand diplomatic circles saw in the independence, fictitious though it was, the future of German diplomacy, based on the partition of the succession of the dismembered Russian Empire. Parallel to

148 The Minister of the Reich at Kiev, Muhm, a subtler man, expressed himself differently though in the same sense: 'I am convinced that it is necessary to maintain the fiction of a friendly independent country in the Ukraine. . . . We shall completely destroy the little authority which remains with the Ukrainian Government if we were to show too coarsely that it is only a toy in our hands.'

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177 Disarmed, enslaved by the great force of the army of the central empires, the Ukraine[1], was not in the position of an independent State. The Ukrainian language, imported from Galicia, was not spoken in the country. Only official documents and administrative notices were written in Ukrainian. Not a single private business ever used this language either for correspondence or advertising. In the schools and universities Russian continued to be used. The circulation of newspapers in the Ukrainian language was very small, while the Russian papers which agreed not to carry on open propaganda against the troops of occupation appeared everywhere and were actually the only ones read by the population.

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642 The Ukrainian Government, composed of politicians having absolutely no administrative experience, soon proved to be incapable of organizing the supply of grain as promised to the armies of the central empires. The Germans then decided to change the regime. The organizations of landowners, small and big, which supplied corn and other agricultural produce to the forces of occupation, were favoured by the Austro-German authorities. It is unnecessary to point out that no Ukrainian political idea influenced the creation of these organizations. The Germans selected their association, known under the name of '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*,[1]

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[1] '*Khliborobiv*' means farmers in Ukrainian. '*Zyizd Khliborobiv*' means association of farmers.

[1] [i.e. in 1919. --- Analyst]

as a base for the new Government which had to replace 727 the Rada and which, in their opinion, would be better 642 capable of organizing the supply of agricultural produce. On 29 April 1918, on the day after the proclamation of the Constitution of the Ukrainian Republic, the German troops interrupted the session of the Rada in the building which it occupied and forced the deputies to leave the hall. The Rada was dissolved. The landowners, the *khliboroby*, in agreement with the Austro-German general staff, elected the Hetman of the whole Ukraine in the person of General Pavlo Skoropadsky, the leader of the popular Democratic Party and descendant of the genuine Hetman of the Ukraine, but in fact a brilliant officer of the Russian Imperial Guards.

The German authorities thought that the new Govern- 727 ment, from which the politicians were excluded, would 645 be more in tune with their interests. In agreement with the General Hetman they appointed the new Cabinet. This Cabinet was composed of landowners, some experts, and a representative of commercial and industrial circles of the country in the person of a rich Jewish industrialist of Odessa, Goutnik. All the Ministers were people of openly Russian sympathies. Thus the bluff of the independent Ukraine received the approval of the same State which had invented it. The German Minister in Kiev, Muhm, wrote in his report to the chief of the German general staff, Groener: 'I insisted, when speaking to M. Lizogoub, the Premier, on the fact that the German Government wanted to see a Cabinet with a greater *couleur locale*.[1] In another report Muhm says that the greater part of the Ministers of the Hetman are not far removed from russophile ideas. 645 'Nevertheless,' he added, 'one must not take this too much to heart as the Government is continually under

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[1] In French in the original text.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

648 Army which was being organized in the territory of the
642 Don Cossacks and in the Northern Caucasus. They were not far wrong. The Government of the 'Independent Ukraine,' considered to be anti-Russian, supplied the Volunteer Army,[1] on whose standards the device 'the one and indivisible Russia' was inscribed, with arms and ammunition. Entire trains proceeded to Rostov-on-Don, transporting officers, cadets, and civilians wishing to serve in the Volunteer Army. Even at Kiev the White military organization enjoyed a certain amount of liberty. A tacit collaboration developed under the half-sympathetic eyes of the central empires, between the command of the White Army and the Ukrainian Government of Kiev. This tolerance on the part of the Austro-Germans found its explanation in the imminence of their defeat on the western front. Thus Ukrainian politics and especially the support of Bolshevism which they considered an involuntary ally, having ranged Russia among the neutrals, no longer had any sense. The Austro-German authorities began to take an interest in the opponents of Communism and of Ukrainianism and even looked to the Don Cossacks with a view to collaboration, those same Cossacks who, though well organized since the October Revolution as an independent State, had never expressed the desire of separating from the Russian Empire.

642 The internal policy of the new Government, com-
● 727 pletely at the service of the forces of occupation, was
423 characterized by the support of private property and particularly of the landowners. This policy led to the proclamation of new laws regarding the return of estates to the landowners, of which they had been deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles of 1917.

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[1] The name which was officially used by the White Army which, at the beginning, did not resort to any mobilization and only filled its ranks with volunteers.

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

deprived by the peasants during the agrarian troubles 642
of 1917. The application of these laws was followed 727
by violent repressions on the part of the Austro-German Army. Punitive expeditions against the peasants became very frequent and summary executions became general throughout the country. The hate of the peasant population was directed against the Austro-Germans and soon reached its peak. The soldiers of the armies of occupation no longer dared to go out after sunset, except in groups. Knives, directed by mysterious hands, frequently found the backs of Austro-German infantry men. The Civil War was in full blast. The Government, incapable of acting without looking for the support of the military forces of the invader, did not escape either hate or contempt and could only maintain itself until the complete reversal of the situation, which was not slow to come. The defeat of the German forces and the armistice forced the troops of occupation to leave Ukrainian territory. It is unnecessary to say that, hated by the popular masses, deprived of all support, and with a doubtful ideology of Ukrainian independence, the Hetman could not continue to govern. Also, as 668
soon as the Austro-German forces began to retire, revolutionary propaganda began to flood the Ukrainian country-side. The former Ukrainian politicians, dismissed from their posts after the establishment of the Hetmanate, put themselves at the head of this movement and received, at first, the unconditional support of the peasants and even of certain military units of the Austro-Germany Army in which the Galician element predominated. Thus, led by Simon Petlioura, the peasants 669
marched on Kiev in order to depose the Hetman. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, they had no difficulty in precipitating the retreat of the Austro-German troops, and rapidly occupied the greater part

place, which succeeded, towards the end of March of 726 the same year, in clearing the Ukraine of the troops of the Ukrainian Directorate.

Following closely after the routed Ukrainian troops, the Red Army penetrated into Volynia where it met the Polish troops commanded by General Haller. From the month of July the Soviet Army slowly began to retreat from Polish territory. At the same time, encouraged by the retreat of the Soviet forces, the troops of the 'Western Ukrainian Republic' (Galicia), defeated by the Poles and united with Petlioura, made an incursion into Ukrainian territory. Though not friendly to the Poles, these troops had also no great desire to fight against the Russians, Red or otherwise, but the Directorate of Petlioura, which hoped to obtain a foothold in the Ukraine, ended their indifference by promises and threats.

At the same time the great offensive of Denikine was developing with amazing rapidity. In August Kiev was taken by assault, in the east by the Whites and in the south by the troops of Petlioura. The discussion between the two armies led to nothing and finally the Whites displaced the Ukrainians and pursued them towards the south-east. At the beginning of October 1919 the victory of the Whites seemed more and more probable. General Denikine held Kharkov, Odessa, and Kiev, while Petlioura, under pressure of the Whites, was fighting a retreating action in the direction of Galicia. He hoped for the support of Poland, which cost him his popularity in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasants. The struggles which, in 1919, soaked the 727 Ukraine in blood, crealled the Cossack insurrections of the seventeenth century by their atrocities. Thousands of inhabitants, and especially landowners, Jews, and German colonists, were massacred in a frightful manner

7:Bregy & Obolensky H-4, 5 (no date) 1940 RD1 Ukraine RD1

● 727 by the troops of Petlioura. On their part the Soviet authorities took their vengeance in the towns and the country districts on hostages, in proceeding with mass executions of members of the middle classes, intellectuals, rich peasants, and clergy, while the Whites inaugurated the mass hanging of Communist leaders. The interval of the French occupation of Odessa, in April 1919, 669 727 changed nothing in the situation. The second counter-offensive of the Soviets, followed by still more atrocious massacres, ended in putting the whole Ukraine under Soviet domination at the end of the winter of 1920. The Whites, under the command of General Wrangel, entrenched themselves on the Crimean peninsula. The troops of Petlioura were again driven back towards Poland. From this moment a new phase of the Civil War begins in the Ukraine. Guerrilla fighting, led by chiefs of Ukrainian bands such as Makhno, Kosak, and others, known under the name of the *bat'ki* (the fathers), began. They had important forces at their disposal. Under the cover of political ideologies (Makhno was anarchist, the others 'Communists without Jews,' etc.) they devastated the rear of the Soviet front. The personnel of these bands was undoubtedly of peasant extraction. They were mostly the remnants of the Army of Petlioura which had succeeded, after his defeat, in filtering to the rear of the Soviet front. Until a long time after the establishment of the Soviet regime, these bands menaced the communications and disorganized the life of the country. Full-scale military operations would have been required to deal with the *bat'ki*. The Ukraine did not easily submit to Bolshevism.

648 In 1920 a last attempt of foreign intervention in Ukrainian affairs was undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski.

The defeat of the Central Powers led to the unchaining of the eternal struggle between the Ukrainians and the

186 The development of Ukrainian political and cultural life in
665 Austria had a great influence on the Ukrainians condemned to ruthless Russification under Tsarist rule. When the first modern Ukrainian political organisation in Tsarist Russia, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, was founded in 1900 (from 1905 this party was named Ukrainian Social Democratic Labour Party) its first publication ***Independent Ukraine*** was printed in Austria, in Bukovina.

186 The Ukrainian patriots under Tsarist Russian Government,
668 morally and materially supported the fight of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina for their national rights; these territories were a Ukrainian Piedmont. For not even the revolution of 1905 gave the Ukrainians in Russia their national rights. Of course, the Ukrainians had their deputies in the Russian 'Duma' who demanded autonomy for Ukraine. But the Ukrainian language was not admitted in the schools, the rights of the Ukrainian press were restricted, and active Ukrainians were persecuted by the Russian authorities. Among the Ukrainians in Russia the fight of the Austrian Ukrainians for the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lviw roused great interest. The Russian Government regarded the creation of a Ukrainian University in Galicia as a great danger for the 'indivisible Russia' and sought an agreement with the Polish nationalists in Galicia against the Ukrainian movement. The Russian nationalists regarded the opening of a Ukrainian University in Lviw as a 'casus belli' for Russia against Austria.

668 The Russian Government closely watched the Ukrainian move-
661 ment in Austria and was much alarmed by its successes. In consequence, the Petersburg Government prepared to annex Galicia and Bukovina long before the war of 1914, in order to wipe out 'Mazeppism'. When, in 1914, at the beginning of World War I, a Ukrainian delegation visited Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov to protest against the new prohibition of the Ukrainian press in the Russian Empire, the Minister replied cynically:

"Now the time has come to put an end to your Ukrainian movement once for all . . .".

727 The suppression of the Ukrainian movement was one of the main
661 aims of Tsarist Russian policy in World War I. The occupation of
Galicia and Bukovina by the Russian armies in 1914-1917 brought
heavy damage to the Ukrainian movement: the Ukrainian schools,
press, co-operative societies, scientific and educational institutions
727 were destroyed. Thousands of Ukrainians, Austrian citizens, were
659 deported to Siberia. In the occupied territories a ruthless Russifica-
661 tion was started, and in Galicia the forced conversion of the Greek-

Catholic Ukrainians to Greek Orthodoxy was taking place. The 727
Ukrainian Metropolitan of the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia, 661
Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and deported to the interior 657
of Russia, and with him numerous Ukrainian clergymen. This
policy of oppression of the Ukrainians in Galicia and Bukovina was
cynically referred to by the Russian Government as 'liberation of
subjugated Slav brethren'...

resources of Ukraine for themselves. The armies of the Central 728
Powers came into Ukraine.

Under the pressure of the Ukrainian armed forces and the armies 669
of the Central Powers the Soviet 'Red Guards' had to leave Ukrainian 665
territory. The discontent of the masses of the Ukrainian people against the pillage and terror of the Soviet troops was so great that everywhere in Ukraine uprisings against the Russian occupation broke out. This moral and political failure of the Russian Soviet régime was a heavy blow to the Communist movement in Ukraine. For this reason in May 1918, even the 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' was abolished. But for propaganda purposes it was decided to create a 'Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine', formally independent from the Russian party. This party held its congress in July 1918, in Moscow. The congress passed the resolution:

"To fight for the revolutionary union of Ukraine and Russia on the principles of proletarian centralism within the boundaries of the Soviet Russian Republic". Thus the 'Communists of Ukraine' were resolutely against Ukrainian national independence.

9. The Coup d'Etat in Ukraine and the Rule of Skoropadsky (29. 4. 1918 — 14. 11. 1918)

Declaring Ukraine an independent democratic republic by the 185
Act of January 22, 1918, the Ukrainian Central Council passed 423
simultaneously a wide programme of economic reforms in agriculture and industry. By this the Ukrainian Parliament wished to take away the basis for the demagogical propaganda of the Communists against the 'Ukrainian Bourgeois Government'. The Ukrainian Central Council approved in its 'Fourth Universal' a plan of a broad land reform to the benefit of the landless and poor peasantry of Ukraine. It was decided to distribute the big latifundia.

This Bill of the Ukrainian Central Council created great discontent [563]
among the big landowners in Ukraine who belonged almost 727
exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities. The representatives 565
of this group applied directly to the German authorities in Ukraine to abolish the Ukrainian Central Council.

In German military circles this wish was met favourably, for they thought that the big landowners would be able to supply grain for the armies of the Central Powers better than the small peasant husbandry. In German politics the decision lay with persons whose attitude was hostile to Ukrainian state independence, General Ludendorff and others. They thought it might be useful for Germany to afford no possibility for the development of the Ukrainian

727 state. On the contrary, they wished to suppress the Ukrainian move-
565 ment and to make Ukraine a centre for the restoration of 'indivi-
4 sible Russia', of course, headed by a Tsar. About these plans Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs after World War I. He hoped that a restored Russian Empire would be a reliable ally of Germany out of gratitide for the abolition of the Bolshevik régime.

642 On April 28, 1918, a detachment of German troops entered the
727 hall where the sessions of the Ukrainian Central Council took place
565 in order to arrest some Ukrainian Ministers. On the next day, on April 29, under the protection of the German troops, a congress of big landowners was called. At this congress General Paul Skoropadsky was declared Hetman of Ukraine, with the prior consent of the German authorities.

Skoropadsky belonged to the class of the big landowners, and, though he was of Ukrainian descent, had had no connections with the Ukrainian national movement before the revolution of 1917.

In his first order Skoropadsky wrote: "I declare myself Hetman of the whole Ukraine". He announced the abolition of the Ukrainian Central Council and replaced the name 'Ukrainian Democratic Republic' by 'Ukrainian State'. Skoropadsky repealed all laws and orders of the Ukrainian Central Council and the Russian Provisional Government; thus Ukraine had in this respect returned to the conditions before the Revolution.

The reactionary ways of the Skoropadsky Government that favoured the big landowners had disastrous consequences for the Ukrainian people; the masses of peasants and workers that recently had fought with arms the terror of the Russian Communists under the banner of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic, were placed by the policy of the Skoropadsky Government into
[661] a desperate situation. The big landowners who belonged almost exclusively to the Russian and Polish nationalities organised 'punitive expeditions' against the Ukrainian peasantry with their armed gangs having support from German and Austrian army detachments. Heavy contributions, looting, and destruction of the peasants' property, together with mass executions of Ukrainian peasants and workers, caused immense indignation against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austrian occupation forces among the Ukrainian people. Against the reactionary régime which dominated in Ukraine, Communist propaganda met with approbation among the Ukrainian masses, unexpected even by Moscow.

727 The Chief of Staff of the German armies in Ukraine, General
642 Groener, in order to appease Ukrainian public opinion had declared after the putsch of April 29, 1918, that "the Hetman was given in-

structions that the government he formed had to stand entirely by 227
the principle of a Ukrainian state, without any orientation towards 642
Moscow or Poland". Nevertheless, Skoropadsky's Government consisted in its majority of Russians of reactionary trends who distinguished themselves by a hostile attitude towards the Ukrainian national movement.

The Ukrainian political parties had no confidence in the Skoropadsky régime, they considered it to be an outrage upon the Ukrainian national independence.

Against the Skoropadsky régime and the German and Austro- [669]
Hungarian troops which supported it, mass uprisings began in order to restore the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. Of course, the reaction in Ukraine was 'water to the mill' of Communist propaganda. Moscow knew how to use this situation for its advantage.

At the end of the summer of 1918, the members of the Skoropadsky Government prepared to restore 'indivisible Russia'. Skoropadsky issued an order on November 14, 1918, in which he stated that Ukraine "had the duty to fight first for the creation of an All-Russian Federation, the principal aim of which will be the restoration of Great Russia".

10. The Restoration of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic (November 1918) — The Government of the Directory 669

Against the federation of Ukraine with Russia proclaimed by Skoropadsky, and against the reactionary régime in general, the masses of the Ukrainian people arose under the leadership of the Directory, which was elected by the Ukrainian National League (15. 11. 1918). The Ukrainian National League was created by the Ukrainian democratic parties in summer 1918. The principal aim of the League was the struggle against the Russian reaction in Ukraine which prevailed there under Skoropadsky's rule. When the League received news on Skoropadsky's plans for the 'Federation' with the Russia of the White Generals, it began to prepare armed forces in due time. The National League and the Directory had as their members prominent leaders of the Ukrainian Central Council like V. Vynnychenko, S. Petlura, both members of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, M. Shapoval, Socialist-Revolutionary, and others. Summoned by the Directory, hundreds of thousands of the Ukrainian population in cities and villages joined the uprising. Only in Kiev the Skoropadsky Government held out for some time, leaning upon small detachments of Russian Monarchists and the decisive support of the German troops. On

669 Ukraine. The 'Government of Soviet Ukraine' headed by Rakovsky left Ukraine and was abolished by order of Lenin. This was a new proof of the complete failure of the Russian Communist policy in Ukraine.

But at the same time the Ukrainian Republic met a new enemy who had claims on Ukraine. This was the Russian Volunteer Army under Denikin. The leaders of this army regarded the Ukrainian Democratic Republic as more dangerous for themselves than the Soviet dictatorship in Moscow. Therefore, in its struggle against the Russian 'Red Army', the Russian 'White Army' attempted before all to take possession of the Ukrainian territory in order to
[648] prevent the strengthening of 'Ukrainian separatism'. In vain the Ukrainian Government appealed to the Western Great Powers that they should not admit the attack by the Russian Volunteer Forces on the Ukrainian Army and that they recognise the Government of democratic Ukraine. If in 1919 the Government and Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic had been given the least support by the Western Powers, the development of Eastern Europe and even the whole world would have taken another course than happened in fact. In any case, by securing an independent Ukraine, Russian imperialism would not be such a menace to the world as we see it to-day.

[731] When Denikin's troops met the Army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in Kiev they attacked Ukrainian armed forces weakened by the struggle with the Russian Red Army and decimated by a disastrous typhus epidemic. This epidemic had spread principally in consequence of the blockade of the territory of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. The Ukrainian Army had no medicaments, no clothing nor sanitary equipment, the Ukrainian soldiers died in thousands, and there was no help. From the army the epidemic spread among the population of Ukraine.

[727] But even under these incredibly hard conditions the Army of the Ukrainian Republic and the masses of Ukrainian people did not abandon the fight against the new oppressors — the Russian Volunteers — who had abundant support from the Entente Powers. The Russian 'Whites' forbade the Ukrainian language in schools, offices and the press in the Ukrainian territory they had seized. Russian authorities ordered the burning of Ukrainian books. The Denikin Government cruelly persecuted Ukrainian patriots. Even the word 'Ukraine' was forbidden; the expression 'Little Russia' was used instead. The Denikin Government restored the estates of the big landowners in Ukraine.

Against the Denikin régime in Ukraine extensive risings of the

Ukrainians where they died in masses from insufficient food and 563 disease. The Polish Government abolished in Galicia most of the 661 Ukrainian schools which had existed in the times of Austrian rule. [871] In the schools in Galicia, Volhynia and other Ukrainian territories, the Polish authorities conducted a forced Polonisation. The Ukrainian University that had been created in Lviw in 1920 privately was suppressed by the Polish Government. Simultaneously, the admission of Ukrainians to Polish Universities was made extraordinarily diffucult. State officials of Ukrainian nationality were dismissed in masses by the Polish Government, and new applicants were not accepted. Even the national name 'Ukrainian' the Polish Government did not recognise and ordered the use officially only of the archaic name 'Ruthenian'. At the elections to the Polish Diet [665] and Senate in 1928, for the first time under Polish rule, the Ukrainians of Galicia took part. The Ukrainian population gave its voices at the elections for two parties: the party of the democratic centre (UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union — under the leadership of Dmytro Levytsky) and the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party, led by Ivan Makukh.

After the termination of the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1919, on 727 ● the Western Ukrainian territories economic reconstruction by the 474 Ukrainian population themselves began, predominantly in the form of co-operative societies. In 1924 in Lviw the Central Co-operative 563 Bank was founded, and a central institution for all co-operative societies organised *(Centro-Soyuz)*. The Ukrainian co-operative movement in Poland was headed by the Revisional Association of Co-operatives, which had about 500,000 members and had more than 12,000 employees. The Association of Ukrainian Dairy Co-operation *(Maslosoyuz)*, supplied dairy products, not only for the Polish market, but exported many of its products to the countries of Western Europe.

The Polish Government looked on the Ukrainian economic activity with displeasure and tried to hinder the development of Ukrainian co-operative societies and private economic initiative. In 1934, by order of the Polish Government, the operations of the Revisional Association of the Ukrainian Co-operatives were limited only to Galicia. Ukrainian co-operative societies in other Ukrainian territories in Poland, about 450, were forced to be subordinated to Polish co-operative centres.

The Warsaw Government carried on a systematic colonisation in 563 the overpopulated Ukrainian territories. The Ukrainian peasants were excluded from the right of land reform. Having no opport-

727 volunteers. At the end of World War II the Soviet Army occupied Carpatho-Ukraine. In June 1945 the Czechoslovak Government ceded this country to USSR.

4. *The Ukrainians inside the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR)*

563 Inside the administrative boundaries of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic there are not all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian nation. Soviet Russia did not permit the joining of the north-western parts of the Ukrainian ethnographic territory (the southern parts of the Kursk and Voronez districts) with Soviet Ukraine, though the population of these territories wished union with Ukraine. The Crimea had a considerable Ukrainian population. Together with the Tartars they had the majority in the country. Though the Russians were in minority, Crimea became part of RSFSR as an autonomous republic.

In all these provinces the Ukrainians are deprived of all national rights: they are condemned to Russification.

5. *The Ukrainian Movement in the Kuban Region*

175 The Ukrainians began to settle in the Kuban region from the end
of the 18th century. Here the Russian Government allotted land for
the Zaporovian Cossack Army that, after the destruction of the
Cossack Fortress 'Sich' in 1775 had been for a certain time under
162 a Turkish protectorate. Before the revolution of 1917 the polulation
423 of the Kuban region consisted of 42,9% Cossacks who were obliged
to do military service, for their whole life, and of peasants 52,8%.
The rest were Circassians. 78% of all the land of the Kuban Region
belonged to a state fund, and the Cossacks received allotments for
their military service. The peasants took land on lease from the
Cossacks. The Tsarist Government did not admit the Cossacks to
[517] education. Thus, in this country there was a lack of intelligentsia
of local origin. In the towns there was a considerable influx of Rus-
186 sian intellectuals. After the revolution of 1917 a strong autonomist
631 movement arose in the Kuban Region. The Kuban Cossacks created
their Military Council and their Military Government. In October
1917, the Kuban Military Council proclaimed itself 'State Council',
with the participation of all the nationalities of the Kuban Region,
and a Kuban State Government was created, headed by the Social-
Democrat Luka Bych.

669 After the Communist revolt in Russia, the Soviet Russian Government waged war against the region of the Don Cossacks and against the Kuban Region. During the war an alliance was formed between the Kuban State Council and the Russian Volunteer Army

8: Fedenko H-4, 5 (no date) 1951 RD1 Ukraine RD1

CHAPTER V

WORLD WAR II AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

1. Ukraine During World War II.

During World War II, two totalitarian forces contended for 727 domination over Ukrainian territory: Russian Communism and 661 German Nazism. In the first phase of the war the Moscow and Berlin Governments divided Poland between themselves. The USSR occupied the Western Ukrainian territories of Galicia, Volhynia etc., and the Ukrainian territories of Rumania, Bukovina and Bessarabia. By the war with the USSR in 1941, Hitler planned to acquire Ukraine for German colonisation. The German Nazis tried to weaken the Ukrainian population. During the German occupation Galicia was joined with the Polish territories — *Generalgouvernement* — and isolated from the other parts of Ukraine. Hitler gave the territory between the Dniester and the South Bug with Odessa to Rumania. The rest of the Ukrainian territories was put under the rule of Erich Koch as *Reichskommissariat Ukraine.*

The great majority of the population of Ukraine, regardless of their nationality, as well as the population of Russia and the Baltic States hoped that, in consequence of war, the Soviet régime would fall and the time for a free life would come. Completely separated from the outside world, the Soviet citizens did not know anything about Hitler's aims in Eastern Europe, and did not believe the Soviet propaganda. Therefore hundreds of thousands of Jews remained in Ukraine at the beginning of the war, being against the Communist dictatorship and hoping that the German régime would not be worse than the Soviet. The German authorities systematically exstirpated the more active elements among the Ukrainians; especially they terrorised the Ukrainian intelligentsia. A crude description of the rule of the German occupation in Ukraine in 1941—44 we find in the memorandum of A. E. Frauenfeld, the General Commissar of the Crimea, written for Hitler's staff on 10. 2. 1944. Frauenfeld saw the absurdity of the German policy in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine sooner, but dared to write about it only when Hitler's catastrophe became inevitable.

On the policy of Erich Koch in Ukraine Frauenfeld writes in his memorandum:

727 661 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

466 727 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Government took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about this:

661 "There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

727 661 The Germans did not touch the Soviet collective farms, because they regarded them as the best method for exploiting the peasants. On the other hand, the German authorities did not wish to permit the partition of the land, for they prepared Ukraine for German colonisation.

[181] Frauenfeld points out the high physical and moral qualities of the Ukrainians, their highly developed consciousness of personal dignity and their aspiration for education. He witnesses that the closing of schools by the German authorities in Ukraine roused the greatest dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian people:

"The Ukrainians, especially the women, are very desirous of learning, and one could hear from them: 'Under the Bolsheviks we were starving, but we could learn something at least. Under your rule we cannot even learn. This proves that you are our enemies' . .".

The author of the memorandum comes to the conclusion that the Ukrainians should not be exstirpated in the interests of Hitler's 'racial policy'; on the contrary "the often genuine blond and blue-eyed as well as brunette population" should be assimilated for such an assimilation "would be without doubt more desirable and advantageous than many we had absorbed during our history, or are even trying to suck up . . ."*).

725 668 Against pillage, terror, oppression and humiliation the Ukrainian people reacted with great vehemence, in spite of the extraordinary weakening by the previous Soviet terrorism, the famine and the war. In all parts of Ukraine risings broke out. This Ukrainian partisan movement helped to a great extent to defeat the German armies in Ukraine. But this was not a proof of affection of the Ukrainians for Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian partisan movement took place under the banner of an independent Ukraine. The initiative for the creation of the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) came from officers of the army of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic in 1941.

The Ukrainian Partisan Army turned its weapons after the defeat of Germany against the new oppressor — Soviet Russia.

2. Ukraine after the War

727 000 In the course of World War II the entire territory inhabited by Ukrainians from the Caucasus to the Carpathian Mountains came under the rule of Soviet Russia. The Ukrainian nation, from the

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*) Gauleiter A. E. Frauenfeld, *Denkschrift über die Probleme der Verwaltung der besetzten Ostgebiete: 10. 2. 1944* (Document No. 5394, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes).

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Russian armies on the Rumanian and south- 642
western fronts. The Soviet Government therefore 728
began to organize the Red Guards against the Rada, which by that time had completed its negotiations with Germany, and on December 27 had sent the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada to Brest-Litovsk. The delegation was composed of Hrushevski, Holubowich, Vinnitchenko, and Petlura, while the intermediary between them and the Austro-German authorities was Wassilko, a member of the Reichsrat and Count Czernin's adviser on Ukrainian affairs.

On January 11, 1918, the delegates of the Ukrainian Republic were formally recognized at Brest by the Central Powers. This recognition was interpreted by the Rada as meaning the recognition of Ukrainian independence. Vinnitchenko boasted that the French Government had made a gold loan and printed paper money for the Ukraine, and that the Western allies would soon recognize its independence. (The Allied Mission to the Ukraine, sent in December 1917, was interpreted by the Ukrainians as implying such a recognition.) But, while successful at Brest, the Rada's authority in Kiev was shaken by the frequent risings of the Ukrainians of the Soviets (especially at Odessa on January 17 and 28); and the Petrograd Soviets supported the latter, demanding that they should be represented in the Ukrainian delegation. On January 26 the Government at Petrograd broke off relations with the Rada, 'until it is replaced by a Rada of Soviets'. To strengthen its position at Brest, the Rada, on January 28, declared, by 508 votes to 4, for the complete independence of the Ukraine.

(*b*) *German Occupation.*—On February 9 the 'Bread' 727
peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed between Germany, 642
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey on the one hand, and the 'Ukrainian People's Republic' (the Rada) on the other. At the same time, however, the report arrived that the Rada had been suppressed by Soviet troops, who declared it to be 'but a sad memory'. On February 20 the British Chargé-d'affaires in Russia

642 727 denied that Great Britain had recognized the Ukraine as an independent state; while Mr. Balfour gave the same assurance to a member of the Polish National Committee in London, that body having protested against the boundaries of the new state, and against the assigning of Cholm to the Ukraine.

Meanwhile the Russian Soviet army was supporting the Ukrainian Soviets; it forced the Rada to take refuge (March 1) in Jitomir (Volhynia). The Rada now sought protection from the Central Powers. Dr. Seidler made a statement to this effect on March 2 in the Austrian Reichsrat, and soon afterwards the Germans occupied the north-eastern and the Austrians the southern Ukraine. On March 14 the *Vossische Zeitung* declared the Rada to be re-established at Kiev, and ready to ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. But in fact, although the Rada wanted German support in their fight against the Soviets, they could not act against their own people and agree to all the German demands. From the end of March the Germans fought the Soviet troops in the Ukraine, while on the other hand they seized the food supplies of the non-Soviet Ukrainians. The food crisis reached its climax in the middle of April, when the Rada ceased to support the armies of occupation.

Consequently, on April 28, the Ukrainian Rada Government was overthrown by the armies of occupation; and General Skoropadski, a Russian of Ukrainian descent, was placed at the head of affairs, with the title of Hetman. The Rada having refused to abdicate, the Germans on May 7 arrested its members, and attempted to secure the support of the great landowners in their efforts to obtain food. The German Field-Marshal von Eichhorn published a decree re-establishing private ownership of land on a large scale, disarmed the Ukrainian regiments, and organized an army obedient to himself. The opposition to the Germans and to the Hetman Skoropadski, who had dictatorial power and was supported by all who were in favour of the pre-revolutionary regime or were afraid of social

strife, inspired such desperate acts as burning stores of 642
grain, and aroused Socialist protests in the Austrian 727
Reichsrat. Meanwhile the Moscow Soviet Government came to an agreement with the Ukrainian Rada (May 23), and recognized the Ukraine as an independent state. On June 13–14 the Russo-Ukrainian armistice was formally signed.

On May 24 a peasant rising broke out all over the 642
Ukraine owing to the drastic measures of the German 727
military officials, who declared the country in a 669
state of siege; the rising was directed against the Germans and the big landowners, who regarded the German army as militia to be used against social disturbances and anarchy. + The objects of this rising were stated in the manifesto of the Peasants' Congress at Kiev on June 7. The congress demanded (1) that a Hetman chosen by landowners should be deposed; (2) that the Ukraine should be a 'People's Republic'; (3) that no land should be returned to proprietors; and (4) that a Legislative Assembly should be convoked. This assembly the peasants agreed to support, appealing to the Germans not to oppose the People's Republic. However, the German troops in occupation continued to suppress strife among the peasants and to collect food by severe means, the result being that Von Eichhorn was assassinated in Kiev on July 30.

The Ukraine now became the battleground of five propagandist forces—pro-German, pro-Ally, pro-Russian Federalist, Bolshevik, and Separatist-Nationalist. The Austrian authorities arranged for the evacuation of Lvov by the Polish troops, and the Ukrainians (Ruthenians) seized the city (October 31) and held it for about a month, during which they are said to have had the help of the Ukrainians from Volhynia as well as of the Austrian officers. The Ukrainian (Ruthenian) National Council stated that it had taken over the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Polish Galician Liquidation Commission, established after the retirement of the Austrian authorities, opposed the Ukrainian claims.

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(c) *The Ukraine since the Armistice.*—The government of Skoropadski lasted for a short time after the signing of the armistice in Western Europe; and the conservative elements in the Ukraine, whether Ukrainians, Poles, or Russians, wished that the Western Allies should support Skoropadski and send a fresh army of occupation to replace the German army. Hoping for an Allied recognition, and under pressure from the peasants, Skoropadski introduced some democratic reforms, and dissolved the Germanophil cabinet of Lyssogub. The old Rada, however, reorganized itself into a Directory with Vinnitchenko and Petlura at its head, and replaced Skoropadski's government on December 14, 1918.

162 cent. of the total, as compared with 32.8 per cent. for the entire Soviet Union. Next to the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukraine has a higher percentage of urban population than any other Union Republic.

The German-Soviet War

726 On June 22, 1941, the German armies, supported by their satellites, including the Rumanians and the Hungarians, attacked the Soviet Union on a 1,500 mile front from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nearly six weeks later the Germans started their main thrust against Kiev, the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; on September 21, after a fierce struggle, the Soviet troops evacuated the city. It was another two months before the Germans reached Kharkov and Rostov.

727 [725] For the second time in this century the Ukraine was subjected to occupation and devastation by the Germans. However, the Soviet policy of scorching the earth in retreat had aggravated normal military destruction; and in addition, the Ukrainians conducted heroic guerilla warfare against the enemy occupation forces. As a result, the Germans found the fruits of conquest "rather disappointing"[1] For example, in the Ukraine it was possible in the autumn of 1941 to carry out only a small fraction of the average sowing. In the western part of the Ukraine, very few industrial plants remained intact; the Nikolayev naval yards, the Dnieper dam and power station, and the metallurgical plants of the Dniepropetrovsk district were all either crippled or destroyed.

726 The German occupation of the Ukraine lasted nearly three and a half years. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad early in 1943 was the turning point of the war and the beginning of the big Soviet offensives.

In the winter campaign of 1943-44 the Soviet troops won important victories in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper, completed the liberation of the Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie and Zhitomir regions and almost the whole of the Rovno and Kirovograd regions, as well as of a number of districts in other areas.[2] In April and May 1944 they liberated Odessa, and in August, Western Ukraine. The liberation of the whole Ukraine was completed by November 1944.

727 The years of hard fighting took a very heavy toll all along the western front of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainian S.S.R. sustained enormous losses.

War Losses of Population

At the Kiev trial of German war criminals in January 1946 it was disclosed that more than four million Soviet citizens had been murdered

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[1] The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43, W.E.D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Penguin Books, London, 1944.

[2] Soviet War News, London, February 24, 1944.

727 by the German invaders in the Ukraine, and more than two million had been abducted to slavery in Germany. Of these so deported, a considerable number perished in captivity[1].

The figure of four million Soviet citizens murdered in the Ukraine does not clearly indicate whether all of them were Ukrainians or whether a certain percentage came from other parts of the Soviet Union. No figures have been revealed showing the number of the Ukrainians killed at the front against the German armies and their 162-666 satellites. However, a comparison of the pre-war and present electorate figures for the Ukraine gives some indication of the decrease, at least of the adult population. On December 12, 1937, the Ukrainian electorate was about 17,540,000; in 1939 this number was increased by the addition of Western Ukraine, which on March 24, 1940, had more than five million voters. But nearly seven years later, in the elections of February 1947, despite the fact that part of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine also had been added, the total electorate in the Ukrainian S.S.R. was only 21,545,000.

Damages to Industry and Agriculture

727 433 The damage which the Germans inflicted on the industry and farming of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics was tremendous, and far exceeded any comparable destruction in Western Europe.

[362] In the Ukraine the Germans destroyed or burned down 714 towns and more than 28,000 hamlets and villages, destroyed more than two million buildings and 540,000 outbuildings, and rendered about 10 million persons homeless (one-fourth of the Ukrainian population)[2].

Agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry were devastated. The coal mines were flooded. Over 16,150 industrial enterprises employing more than two million workers were stripped of machinery and the buildings heavily damaged or destroyed. The Germans wrecked or took away 127,800 electric motors and 81,600 metal-cutting lathes, destroyed railway lines and stations, and post and telegraph offices[2].

727 433 241 Tremendous damage was done to Ukrainian agriculture. The Germans ruined and plundered collective farms, state farms and machine and tractor stations.

Millions of hectares of planned fields were destroyed and over 56,000 tractors wrecked. Nearly 1,900,000 agricultural machines and 30,000 automobiles and other motor vehicles were destroyed or taken to Germany[3].

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[1] Soviet News, London, June 29, 1946.

[2] Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

[3] Letter to UNRRA from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

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[281] Seven and a half million head of cattle, 3.3 million horses, 9.3 million pigs, 7.3 million sheep and 59.4 million fowls were killed or taken away[1]. The invaders also stole from the collective farms and from private citizens of the Ukrainian S.S.R. over 12 million tons of farm products, including 9½ million tons of grain and flour[2].

The rehabilitation and rebuilding of liberated areas began at once whilst the war was still on; but although the Ukrainian S.S.R. received great assistance from other republics of the Soviet Union, it must be borne in mind that important economic regions of other republics of the Soviet Union were also devastated by the war.

According to the report on material damage issued by the U.S.S.R.'s Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes of the German-Fascist Invaders, the damage caused to the national economy of the U.S.S.R. and to the individual residents of villages and towns is estimated at more than 679,000 million roubles in terms of 1941 prices.

The damage to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic alone is estimated at 285,000 million roubles[3].

Thus according to the statement of the Soviet State Commission, the damages to the Ukrainian S.S.R. are about 40-42 per cent. of the total damages to the Soviet Union.

Damage caused to the Ukraine by the German invasion is estimated by the Ukrainian Paper Suchasne I Maibutne (Present and Future) at 100,000 million dollars[4].

Destruction of Ukrainian Cities

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361 Following are summaries of the destruction which occurred in some of the most important of the Ukraine's cities.

Kiev (Population in 1939: 846,293).

According to the report of the Extraordinary State Commission, the material damage caused by the German invaders in Kiev was as follows:

They destroyed 940 buildings of state and public institutions and

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[1] Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

[2] Letter from Ukrainian Government Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

[3] Soviet News, London, September 18, 1945. (The official exchange value in March 1947 was 5.40 roubles equal one U.S. dollar; 21.36 roubles equal one pound sterling).

[4] Soviet Monitor, TASS (Soviet News Agency) London, July 11, 1946.

727 ,742 municipally owned houses (more than 22 million square feet of
361 housing space) and 3,600 privately owned houses comprising $5\frac{1}{2}$ million
square feet of space.

[361] As a result more than 200,000 inhabitants of Kiev have been made homeless.

The Germans gutted Kiev's industrial plants of their equipment and shipped it to Germany. They destroyed the buildings of industrial enterprises including the machine-building plants "Bolshevik" and "Red Excavator", which had supplied industry, agriculture and transport with machinery, implements, and spare parts.

They blew up the textile mills, a spinning and knitting mill, the Gorky clothing factory, the first, fourth and eighth shoe factories, and other plants; blew up, destroyed or burned down the electric-power stations, the trolley cars and trolley buses, the water supply system and the drainage system. They destroyed mechanized bakeries and other establishments.

[368] The very important railway junction Kiev-Darnitza was destroyed with all its tracks, equipment, and installations as well as all station buildings and the depot at the station Kiev I.

City of Kharkov (Population in 1939: 833,432).

In connection with the third anniversary of the liberation of Kharkov, "the second capital of the Ukraine", the following figures on destruction and the extent of rehabilitation have been made known.

727 Before the war Kharkov had 41 million square feet of housing floor
361 space. The Germans destroyed about half of all the flats. In the three years since liberation, six million square feet of housing floor
362 space have been restored. The people of Kharkov have also restored 293 big plants and factories, including the famous tractor works, an electro-mechanical plant, a turbo-generator works and machine tool, and agricultural implements and other plants[1].

Dniepropetrovsk (Population in 1939: 500,662).

In this city 30 per cent. of the homes, 80 per cent. of the industry, and 70 per cent. of schools and other cultural institutions were destroyed. The UNRRA Mission reports that reconstruction has been very slow, and is hampered by shortages of food, shelter and equipment. In 1946 many of the residents of Dniepropetrovsk were still living in huts contrived of straw and clay, under a tar paper roof.

Kremenchug (Population in 1939: 89,553).

In April 1946, when members of the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine

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[1] Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

727 first visited Kremenchug, they reported it as over 90 per cent.
361 destroyed. "About 50,000 inhabitants have returned and are living
362 in dugouts, cellars, and rubble shacks. Reconstruction is progressing slowly because of the shortage of materials. The only industries operating are a small machine shop for bridge repair parts, a textile factory, and one wing of a cigarette factory which happened to escape destruction. One bakery is being repaired... All grain elevators and flour mills, which constituted the chief pre-war industry, are completely destroyed."

Poltava (Population in 1939: 130,305).

In April 1946 the UNRRA Mission reported Poltava about 80 per cent. destroyed. "About 100,000 of the inhabitants have returned and are living under conditions only slightly better than Kremenchug. On the main street only one building is intact. The Mayor estimated that reconstruction would take at least fifteen years. The locomotive repair shop and a stocking factory are the only industries operating two years after liberation."

Other Cities

In Zaporozhie (population in 1939: 289,188) 75 per cent. of the homes and virtually all industry were destroyed[1]. Stalino, the industrial and mining centre of the Donets Basin, has been described as a shadow of its former self. Its pre-war population was 510,000. During the war about 100,000 of the people were driven into slavery by the Germans. Another 80,000 men, women, and children were thrust into one of the mines to die. Seventy-five per cent. of all the buildings in the city were destroyed; and of these only 30 per cent. were in a condition to be restored. All the mines in the area were flooded; and from one pit alone over 3,300,000 tons of water had been pumped by August 1946[2].

The Ukraine's Application for UNRRA Assistance

727 In the summer of 1945 the government of the U.S.S.R. transmitted
648 to the Director General of UNRRA a request for assistance in rehabilitating
457 those areas of the Soviet Union which had suffered most heavily because of
the war and the German occupation. In August 1945 at the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, the Soviet delegate strongly requested that 700 million U.S. dollars be allocated for relief work in the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics. At the same Council Session the applications of Byelorussia and the Ukraine for membership in UNRRA were unanimously accepted, and the two republics were requested to send delegates to the Third Council meetings.

In December 1945 agreements were signed between UNRRA and the governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics providing for

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[1] UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

[2] Soviet News, London, August 22, 1946.

727 relief and rehabilitation supplies to be delivered until such time as
457 the two republics would be able themselves to pay with suitable means
648 of foreign exchange for their own imports[1].

727 The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement provided for a programme of supplies
439 amounting to 188 million U.S. dollars (approximately five dollars per head
648 of population), to be used for food, clothing, medical, agricultural, and industrial supplies. The agreement stipulated that UNRRA would attempt to deliver the bulk of these supplies to the Ukraine before June 30, 1946; however, because of procurement and transport difficulties, this early completion of the programme proved impossible. On May 30, 1946, therefore, the UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was extended to the end of 1946.

The schedule of supplies to be shipped has changed somewhat since the original programme was decided. As it now exists, about 53 per cent. (by value) of the total supplies are foodstuffs; 27 per cent. industrial supplies, and nearly 9 per cent. clothing. Supplies for the rehabilitation of agriculture will amount to 17,088,000 dollars, the greater part of which has been allocated for seeds. The following table shows by value the UNRRA programme of supplies for the Ukraine, as at March 21, 1947. A more detailed summary will follow in later sections of this report.

TABLE - - III

UNRRA Programme of Supplies to the Ukrainian S.S.R.
(thousand U.S. dollars)

Food, feed, soap	100,189
Clothing, textiles, footwear	16,856
Medical and sanitation supplies	2,326
Agricultural rehabilitation	17,088
Industrial rehabilitation	51,591
Total	188,050

Source : UNRRA Headquarters, Washington.

In March 1946 a small UNRRA Mission arrived in the Ukraine and established headquarters at Kiev. In subsequent months, some of the mission members have made many visits to various parts of the republic in order to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies. They report that gigantic efforts are being made to restore the economy, but emphasize the discouraging fact that UNRRA assistance with machinery and other rehabilitation supplies is small in comparison with the tremendous destruction everywhere. The main UNRRA contribution has

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[1] UNRRA aid to Byelorussia will be dealt with in a future paper.

727 439 648 been food supplies, which in many Ukrainian towns constituted the only food to be seen in shops in 1946. For fats and oils particularly the Ukrainian population has been entirely dependent on UNRRA aid.

The U.S.S.R.'s Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

727 648 UNRRA assistance to the Ukraine has been of necessity limited in scope and short-term in nature. Long after relief shipments are ended - and they are now all but complete - the Ukraine will still be working to rebuild its factories, cities, and farms. The main task of rehabilitation is therefore a long-term one, and depends upon long-range measures.

727 185 On March 18, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted a Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, for the rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the Soviet Union. This plan is the fourth of a series of Five-Year Plans[1] designed to increase the productivity of Soviet farming and industry, and in general to raise the standard of living of the whole population. As stated by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the principal aims of the Five-Year Plan in 1946-50 are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of the country, to recover the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and then considerably to surpass that level.

[652] The new Five-Year Plan provides that nearly one-third of the capital investments for the entire Soviet Union in 1946-50 (49,500 million roubles out of a total of 250,300)[2] are to be spent on the restoration of the Ukraine. Of this 49,500 million, 5,469 million will be used for works under the Ukrainian Republic's jurisdiction.

361 727 362 In the next five years all the destroyed cities of the Ukraine - particularly Kiev, Kharkov, Chernigov, Odessa, Dniepropetrovsk, Stalino, and Zaporozhie - are to be rebuilt and their municipal services restored. Housing is to be replaced as speedily as possible; in 1946-50, 175,120,000 square feet of state-owned housing are to be built, of which 12.65 million square feet are to be made available by local Soviets. The amount of privately owned housing to be built before 1950 is fixed at 36.3 million square feet.

241 185 Also under the Five-Year Plan Ukrainian agriculture is to be rehabilitated; the crop area for 1950 is planned at 30.5 million hectares. By 1950 the Ukraine is scheduled to be producing about 20 per cent. of the grain harvested in the U.S.S.R. (approximately the same tonnage as in pre-war years); 60 per cent. of the sugar beet (about 6 per cent. more than pre-war); and the potato harvest is fixed for 23 million tons, 1½ millions more than in 1940.

000 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport

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[1] First Five-Year Plan, 1929-32; second, 1933-37; third, 1938-42.

[2] Estimated at 1945 prices.

727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of transport
433 are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial cooperatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial
361 centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming, particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture,
[652] as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

241 In comparing these figures with 1937 production the increases in the area
433 of the Republic must be borne in mind.

Effects of the War on Ukrainian Farming

727 When the German armies were finally driven out of the Ukraine in
241 1944 they left most of the Republic's farmsteads completely in ruins.
474 So great was the devastation which they wrecked that even today the full extent of it is not definitely known. It has been estimated by Ukrainian officials, however, that the invaders ruined and plundered 27,110[1] of the Ukraine's collective farms and 872[1] of the state farms, burning the buildings and wrecking or stealing the machinery. The Germans also wrecked over 422,000 collective farm buildings and 423,000 privately owned farm buildings[2], scorched and laid waste millions of hectares of farm land, and destroyed 1,300[1] machine and tractor stations. The consequent losses of machinery were enormous. Fifty-six thousand tractors, 24,000 harvester combines, 30,200 trucks and automobiles used in farming and 1,892,000 other agricultural machines were destroyed or stolen by the Germans. The ~~next~~ table shows the losses compared with pre-war numbers.

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[1] Statement by Mr. I.S. Senin, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian S.S.R. at a meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers on February 7, 1947, published in Soviet News, London, February 8, 1947.

[2] Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

TABLE XI

Ukraine: War Losses of Farm Machinery

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	Number before the war	Destroyed or wrecked by the Germans
Tractors	over 90,000[1]	56,000[2]
Harvester combines	" 31,000[1]	24,000[2]
Trucks and cars used in agriculture	" 50,000[1]	30,200[3]
Other farm machines	n.a.	1,892,000[3]

1 **Source:** Mr. Baranovsky, Member of the UNRRA Council for the Ukrainian S.S.R. Speech at the Fourth Session of the UNRRA Council on March 20, 1946, Atlantic City, UNRRA Journal, Volume IV, No.6.

2 **Source:** Statement of the Soviet Commission on Material Damage Caused by the German-Fascist Invaders, Soviet News, September 18, 1945.

3 **Source:** Letter to the UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine from Mr. V.V. Khomyak, Chief, Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, April 6, 1946.

In addition to the spoilage of buildings, machinery and land, the Germans seized, slaughtered, or drove away millions of farm animals, and stole from the collective farms or from private citizens of the Ukraine over 12 million tons of farm produce, including 9.5 million tons of grain and flour[1].

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In the period immediately after liberation agriculture was slowly restarted, almost entirely by hand and in the most adverse conditions. Transport was highly disorganized and at the same time had to carry military traffic. On the heels of the victorious Soviet army the evacuated collective farmers were returning with their few animals to their wrecked farms. The flocks and herds were decimated or non-existent. Everywhere there were tremendous shortages of seeds, fertilizers, implements, machinery and manpower to do the work. In most districts in 1945 only 50 to 60 per cent. of the pre-war area could be sown. Many of the crops were sown late because of difficulty in cultivating the land; and when harvesting time came, much of the reaping and threshing had to be done by hand. Average yields of all crops were very low.

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[1] Department of UNRRA Supplies of the Ukrainian Government, Kiev, April 6, 1946.

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241 Nevertheless, the 1945 harvest - assisted by lend-lease supplies
433 which were still then available, and (beginning in December 1945) by
UNRRA relief deliveries - was furnishing the population a fair amount
648 of cereals and bread. There was, however, very little meat from
domestic sources, and only a small amount of fats and oils, as the
following table shows.

TABLE XII

Ukraine: Production and Utilization of Fats and Oils, 1945.
(thousand metric tons)

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	Oilseeds	
258 Production		
262 Total production of oilseeds		496.4
Deduction for seed		53.6
Available for processing		442.8
Utilization		
[388] Total production of oil		105.8
Deduction for industrial use (soap manufacture, etc.)		26.7
Available for human consumption		
by urban population	29.0	
by rural population	50.0	
Total		79.1
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
urban population		2.41
rural population		1.86
Average		1.98

TABLE XII (Continued)

Animal fat

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Production		74.7
Imports		12.5[1]
Available for consumption		
by urban population	32.7	
by rural population	54.5	
Total		87.2
Average consumption		Kilograms per person per year
by urban population		2.73
by rural population		2.0
Average		2.19

Summary (Oils and Fats)

All fat and oil resources			
Vegetable oils		105.8	
Animal fats		74.7	
Total production		180.5	
Imports		12.5[1]	
Available for distribution		193.0	
Consumption			
Technical purposes		26.7	
Food			
Urban	61.7		
Rural	104.6		
Total food		166.3	
Total consumption		193.0	
Average consumption			Kilograms per person per year
by urban population			5.14
by rural population			3.86
Average			4.17

[1] Available from Lend-lease

Source: Ukrainian Department of UNRRA Supplies, Kiev, May 15, 1946.

231 During the war these numbers were greatly reduced: the Germans killed, stole, or drove away 3.311 million horses, 7.594 million head of cattle, 9.333 million pigs, 7.317 million sheep, and over 59.379 million fowl of all kinds.[1]

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474 The collective farms of the Republic suffered most heavily. After the German occupation the collective farms of the Ukraine were left with only 6.3 per cent. of their 1940 herds of cattle, 1.9 per cent. of their pigs, and 3.4 per cent. of their sheep. In practical terms, the Germans had almost completely wiped out collectively-owned livestock.

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727 In rehabilitating their herds the collective farms have received much assistance from, the Soviet Government and the fraternal Republics - Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia and others - which have supplied **hundreds** of thousands of animals. However, the number of livestock in the kolkhozes are still far below pre-war. Most rapid steps were made in the re-stocking of cattle herds, which by early 1946 had reached 66 per cent. of the pre-war number of Ukrainian collective farms; pigs were 23 per cent. of pre-war and sheep and goats, 29 per cent. (Note: the figures in the two preceding paragraphs relate to collective farms alone.)[2]

The following table shows the pre-war numbers of livestock in the Ukraine (pre-1940 boundaries) and in the Soviet Union as a whole.

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[1] Soviet Monitor, London, February 8, 1947.

[2] Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946.

III INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT

135 311 433 Ukrainian industry is based chiefly on rich deposits of coal in the Donets Basin, iron ore in the Krivoi Rog district (where the ore contains 60 per cent. metal), and manganese ore in the Nikopol area. To utilize this great natural wealth a very large metallurgical and machine-building industry has been bult up in the Ukraine. At the same time, many food factories including sugar refineries, have been created to process the food so abundantly produced by Ukrainian farms. In the period between wars, the share of the Ukraine in the country's industrial output declined somewhat, not because of slackened activity - on the contrary, Ukrainian industry continued to be even more intensively developed - but because the policy of the U.S.S.R. was to decentralize, and to expand and develop those areas, particularly the eastern ones which previously had no industry. This lengthening of the industrial pace naturally brought about a certain change in emphasis, so that whereas by 1938 the productivity of Soviet industry as a whole had increased to about eight times the output of Tsarist Russia in 1913; the proportion of Ukrainian output in the total was lessened. For example, in 1928 the Krivoi Rog district of the Ukraine produced 78 per cent. of all the iron ore in the U.S.S.R.; but in 1937, although this district was producing more, its share in the total was only 47 per cent.

War Damage to Industry

727 433 Before they were finally driven from the Ukraine the Germans furiously set about wrecking those Ukrainian industries which still survived. They stripped the plants of equipment and destroyed the buildings; they flooded the coal mines; they completed the destruction of the famous Lenin Hydro-Electric Power Station and the Dnieper Dam - both of which had been partially disabled by the retreating Soviet Army troops on August 28, 1941.

The damage to all branches of industry was tremendous and will take many years to repair, particularly since the shortages of labour and equipment, as well as the scarcity of food have been a hindrance at every step. Some of the difficulties were destribed in a report of the UNRRA Mission after visits to several of the larger Ukrainian cities in May 1946.

"In our cable...we outlined the condition and needs of industrial plants in six principal Ukrainian cities visited by members of the Mission during May. The pattern is fairly uniform. Many plants were completely destroyed and those which still stood were usually heavily damaged and almost universally gutted of all modern equipment. Included among those industries hardest hit are the heavy capital goods industries, machine tool manufacturing industries, and power stations, as well as the rolling and stationary stock of all forms of transportation, and equipment for processing building materials. So great is

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the destruction that there are competing calls upon the limited supplies of manpower, equipment and materials. We observed many instances of ingenious adaptation and salvaging of old and antiquated machinery; yet restoration was everywhere slow and complicated by lack of equipment to move away the rubble, transport the materials, produce the electric energy, and repair the streets, sewers, and gas and electric lines. There is a vicious circle. Iron and steel, for example, are needed to repair electric power stations and rebuild houses; efforts to restore these basic industries and facilities are constantly delayed because there is not enough shelter; and neither shelter nor the industries and community facilities can be replaced until there are more cranes, tractors and trucks. Low-calorie diets, induced by lack of foodstuffs, cause low efficiency and slow production. The food UNRRA is shipping has sustained the people, though, to be sure, it has not been sufficient to compensate for local shortages; the country may somewhat accelerate its industrial rehabilitation - especially of shelter and water supplies - when the equipment items on the UNRRA programme arrive. Meanwhile it is slowly restoring those parts of its economy which will respond to manpower aided by a minimum amount of mechanical equipment."

Industrial Aims of the Five-Year Plan

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The great importance of rehabilitating Ukrainian industry and the share which Ukrainian industry has to take in the entire Soviet Union economy are shown by the new Five-Year Plan.

By comparing the aims for 1950 with pre-war production figures, it is possible to have some impression of the destruction which occurred in the Ukraine during the war.

The table which follows shows the planned ratio of Ukrainian output in 1950 to the output of the entire Soviet Union. Where possible, pre-war figures have been included.

17: UNRRA G-4 (no date) 1947 RD1 Ukraine RD1
Soviet Union R1

TABLE XVIII

Share of Ukrainian Industry in Total Soviet Production

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1940

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,200	14,900	61
Steel	8,600	18,400	47
Coal	83,800	164,600	51
Tractors (units)	n.a.	176,000[1]	n.a.
Locomotives (units)	880[2]	1,214[2]	72[2]
Sugar	1,790[2]	2,378[2]	75[2]

1950 (planned)

	Ukrainian S.S.R.	U.S.S.R. total	Ukraine (per cent. of total)
	(thousand metric tons)		
Pig iron	9,700	19,500	49.7
Steel	8,800	25,400	34.6
Coal	86,100	250,000	34.4
Tractors (units)	25,000	112,000	22.3
Locomotives (units)	1,000	2,720	40.0
Sugar	1,637	2,400	68.2
Metallurgical equipment	n.a.	n.a.	33.9

1 1938 figure
2 1937 figures

Note: n.a. means not available.

Source: Pravda Ukrainy, Kiev, September 1, 1946; The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50; Russia's Economic Front for War and Peace, A. Yugov, C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., London, 1941.

Progress in 1946

At the beginning of 1947 the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. issued a statement describing the progress in rehabilitation and development made during 1946. According to this statement the gross output of industry in the entire U.S.S.R. increased by 20 per cent. in 1946 as compared with 1945. About 800 government enterprises had been built, restored, or launched during the year. Navigation was opened on restored canals. A series of steps were also taken in 1946 to expand Soviet trade and consolidate the currency. Wages and salaries of low and medium-paid workers were raised.

SU
464 The number of workers and employees in the national economy of the
874 U.S.S.R. increased by 3 million. Vocational schools and factory training centres graduated thousands of skilled workers, and improved the skill of several millions already employed.

SU
727 Of the districts which suffered occupation, economic rehabilitation
433 as well as capital construction amounting to 17,500 million roubles in
652 1946 made it possible to increase their industrial output by 28 per cent. as compared with 1945. Pravda writes - "the factories, mills, pits, power stations, towns and villages which were destroyed by the enemy are being revived one by one...."[1]

In the Ukraine

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●727 The Ukraine has been likened to one big building site, where more
433 than 500,000 workers are engaged in restoring industrial plants and
327 municipal buildings.[2] In the Donets Basin, the coal output of 1946 was 30 per cent. higher than that of 1945. In the Ukrainian iron and steel industry, 21 blast furnaces, 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries were at work by January 1947. Of 104 machine-building factories to be restored, 102 were already producing goods, and mastering the production of improved types of machinery. The Kharkov transport machine-building works was preparing to build long-distance steam engines; and the tractor works was increasing its production, as were many other factories.

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727 In 1946 the Kharkov turbo-generator works made a 100,000 kilowatt
433 turbine and one of 50,000 kilowatts. At Dniepropetrovsk, a lorry
393 factory was being built; and in Odessa and Lvov, automobile assembly
398 works were under construction. Great work was also being done in the development of light industry, food processing, chemical works, and other branches of industry.

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727 After three years' work of restoration the Dnieper Dam had been
433 rebuilt in the main, and the housing for the power station erected.
377 By the end of 1946 the capacity of Ukrainian power stations had reached 70 per cent. of pre-war.

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362 Since the liberation over 104.5 million square feet of floor space
368 had been restored in the Ukraine. Over half a million of the 590,000 houses destroyed by the Germans were restored or built anew in Ukrainian villages; and more than 13,000 cultural institutions in the villages and 118,000 auxiliary buildings on the farms.[2]

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[1] Pravda, quoted by Soviet News, London, January 22, 1946

[2] Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

Coal

316 433 The coal centre of the Ukraine is the basin of the Donets River, a tributary of the Don. In 1913 the Donets region was producing 80 per cent. of all the coal turned out in the entire Russian Empire. (23 million tons of the 29.2 million total); and even in 1940, when the production of other coal areas in the U.S.S.R. had been greatly expanded, and many new areas explored and put into operation, Donets mines still accounted for more than half the total output (83.8 million tons of the entire Soviet Union production of 164.6 million).

Since about 70 per cent. of all the fuel consumed in the U.S.S.R. is supplied by coal,[1] the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian coal industry is of tremendous importance to the economy of the Soviet Union.

727 316 It is now over three years since the Soviet Army drove the Germans out of the Donets Basin. Before their rout, the enemy flooded the mines and burned engineering plants, miners' settlements, and cities. Restoration work was started soon after the liberation of the Basin, but it was estimated that to restore coal output to the pre-war level it would be necessary to pump 650 million cubic metres of water out of the mines and to restore 1,565 miles of mine galleries.[2] Today, the towns of the Donets Basin are a mass of scaffolding, as war-devastated houses, buildings, and roads continue to be repaired. Mine derricks dot the landscape; and water is being pumped in a steady stream from the mine pits. At the Chelyuskin Mine which before the war was one of the biggest and best eqipped in the Donets, over nine million cubic metres of water had been pumped by the middle of December 1946; and about 20 miles of galleries had been restored. Coal output averaged a thousand tons a day.

By January 1947 about 142 major coal mines of the 279 operating prior to the war had been restored, and 430 smaller ones, rehabilitated or built anew, were in operation. Production was nearly half of pre-war.[3]

[362] As regards housing for Donets workers, it is planned within the next five years not only to restore the houses demolished by the Germans, but also to build another 20 million square feet of housing space in the Donets Basin; in 1946 alone over four million square feet of floor [464] space had been reconstructed. Thousands of miners are being helped to build their own homes; and measures are being taken to increase their food supplies.

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[1] Moscow Radio feature, "Sidelights on Soviet Life," cited in Soviet Monitor, London, January 29, 1947.

[2] Soviet Monitor, London, September 12, 1946

[3] Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947

727 377 In August 1941 the retreating Soviet army troops partially disabled the Dnieper Dam and power station to prevent its falling into enemy hands. This destruction was later completed by the Germans. When the Soviet Army recaptured the region, they found that 35 of the dam's 48 piers had been blown up, and all the generators destroyed. Damage to the power house alone was estimated at 500,000,000 roubles.

Reconstruction work began in February 1944, when the war was still on. Three years later the assembly of the first power unit of 72,000 kilowatt capacity was completed; and on March 3, 1947, the Lenin Hydro-electric Station supplied its first post-war currency to the industry of the Dnieper Valley.

There are over 11,000 men and women engaged on the restoration job, which has involved repairing the dam and the underwater structures, building the housing for the power station, and mounting the machines. Another two power units are to be assembled later this year.

After the expulsion of the Germans from the Ukraine, the capacity of the Republic's power stations was only 0.4 per cent. of pre-war. By the end of August 1946 restored capacity had reached 47 per cent. In the Donets Basin 70 per cent. had been restored, and in the Stalino area, 79 per cent. In the city of Lvov (Western Ukraine) the pre-war capacity of its electric power stations had been surpassed by 18 per cent. In the first seven months of 1946 much had been accomplished: some 400 power stations, including 215 hydro-electric plants, had been launched in the Ukraine; and it was expected that 750 more power stations would be completed by the end of the year.

The Five-Year Plan fixes the 1950 output of electric power in the Ukraine at 13,690 million kilowatt hours. The total capcity of Ukrainian power stations is to be increased in 1946-50 by 2,57[illegible],000 kilowatts. The Five-Year Plan directs that:-

"The Lenin Hydro-electric Station on the Dnieper shall be rebuilt. Small hydro-electric power plants with a total capacity of 203,000 kilowatts shall be built to meet the requirements of agriculture and local consumers. Plant aggregating 95,000 kilowatts shall be put into operation at municipal electric power stations."

The restoration of electric power facilities will assist greatly in rehabilitating other sections of the Soviet economy

Iron and Steel

185 327 The Five-Year Plan for the Ukrainian S.S.R. envisages an output in 1950 of 9.7 million tons of pig iron, and 8.8 million tons of steel.

433 In order to accomplish this, the iron and steel plants of the Donets Basin and the Dnieper region are to be rehabilitated; and there are to be put into operation 30 blast furnaces with an aggregate annual capacity of 9 million tons of pig-iron, steel smelting units with a

Progress in Rebuilding

327 727 In 1946, nearly all of the ferrous metal plants in the Donets were put into working order once more. The biggest blast furnace in the Ukraine started operating again in the Azovstal works; two other blast furnaces were put into operation, one in the Dzerzhinsky works at Dnieprodzerzhinsk and the other in the Makeyevka iron and steel works, where the mounting of a great blooming mill was also completed. The open hearth furnace at the Petrovsky works, two coke batteries of the Dzerzhinsky works, coke battery No.2 at the Mariupol coke and chemical works, the rolling mills at Yenakievo and Kramatorsk, and a number of other units of the iron and steel industry started operations.[1]

Altogether by the end of 1946 there were 21 blast furnaces,[2] 58 steel-smelting furnaces, 60 metal and pipe-rolling mills, and 71 coke batteries at work in the Ukrainian S.S.R.[3]

The iron mines in the Krivoi Rog basin (Ukraine) had been 85 per cent. restored. Another five big iron mines are to be put into operation this year, and by 1950 ore extraction in the Krivoi Rog area is expected to surpass the pre-war output.[4]

However, the task of reconstruction is still immense. Many of the large plants are still greatly disabled. The largest iron and steel plant in the Ukraine (at Zaporozhie) was systematically destroyed by the Germans.

This factory, with its three blast furnaces, ten open-hearth furnaces, strip and rolling mills, and 25,000 kilowatt generator, was still expanding when the war broke out. A small amount of light equipment was evacuated, but the bulk of equipment and all of the structures housing it were damaged or destroyed. Soviet engineers estimate that 65 per cent. of the value of the equipment was destroyed. Total restoration costing seven hundred million roubles will take from three to four years. Full restoration will require vast amounts of iron and steel for repairing the plant, of mechanical equipment for operating the plant; and of materials to rebuild the houses of the workers.[5]

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[1] Soviet News, London, January 23, 1947.

[2] On January 1, 1935, there were 55 blast furnaces in the Ukraine (55 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity) and 117 open-hearth furnaces (40 per cent. of total U.S.S.R. capacity).

[3] Soviet Monitor, London, January 23, 1947.

[4] Soviet Monitor, London, January 28, 1947.

[5] UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, Kiev.

Heavy Industry Building in 1947.[1]

327 Reconstruction and building will be on a wider scale in 1947, as
727 many improvements are introduced. Mechanization is being extended in
blast furnaces, open-hearths, and metal-rolling shops; and ore and
coal stores are being equipped with modern cranes.

In the Donets Basin in 1947 the Stalino Metal Works are to put into operation another blast furnace, marten oven and rolling mill.[2] At the Azovstal works the two blast furnaces of 1,000 cubic metres each will be enlarged to 1,300 cubic metres. Also at the Azovstal works, which in the past did not produce any rolled metal, are being built a blooming mill, which will be the largest in the south, and a rolling mill. New blooming mills and rail rolling mills are also to start at the Petrovsky works in Dniepropetrovsk, and at the Dzerzhinsky works in Dnieprodzerzhinsk. New pipe-rolling workshops will be added at the Nikopol Yuzhno-Trubny and the Dniepropetrovsk works.

At the Zaporozhstal works in 1947 several workshops will be added; and a power station and a 1,300 cubic metre blast furnace will begin working in the first half of the year. Among the most urgent tasks at this plant is the reconstruction of machines producing sheet metal for automobile production.

Equipment for Iron and Steel Mills

According to the new Five-Year Plan, the Ukrainian output of equipment for iron and steel mills in 1950 has been fixed at 35,000 tons; the total production of the entire Soviet Union has been fixed at 102,900 tons (of which 66,700 are to be produced by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic).

Production of Tractors

727 Before the war there were about 90,000 tractors in operation on
407 Ukrainian farms. During the occupation, 56,000 of these were wrecked
433 or stolen by the Germans, who also completely destroyed the well-known
tractor factory at Kharkov. Because of the particularly great need
of tractors in the Ukraine, this factory was rebuilt with great vigour;
and production resumed. By February 1947 the Kharkov Tractor Works
had produced 3,000 tractors since the restoration of the plant.

The 1950 output of tractors in the Ukraine is expected to be 25,000; for the entire Soviet Union, production has been fixed at 112,000 tractors.

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[1] See U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises, Radio Moscow, February 3, 1947, B.B.C. Digest of World Broadcasts No. 2714, London, February 5, 1947.

[2] Soviet Monitor, London, January 2, 1947.

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Chemical Industry

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315 The chemical industry of the Ukraine is based chiefly on coal deposits, but also on a number of other raw materials to be found there, including lacustrine deposits of sodium chloride (Artemovsk area) and phosphatic rocks (Konstantinovka area).

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The Five-Year Plan fixes that:

[185] "The chemical plants of the Ukraine, including soda, nitrate, and superphosphate plants, shall be rebuilt, and the potash mines in the regions of Stanislav and Drogobych, and a new superphosphate plant, a paint and varnish plant and a plastics factory built.

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[654] "In 1946-50 geological surveys shall be conducted with a view to locating commercial deposits of potassium salts to a total of 80 million tons, graphite to a total of 7.7 million tons, and gypsum to a total of 7 million tons."

Output in 1950 is fixed by the Plan as follows:

for the Ukrainian S.S.R.

Calcined soda	448,000 tons
Superphosphates	860,000 tons, and
Salt,	1,930,000 tons;

and for the entire Soviet Union:

Calcined soda	800,000 tons, and
Mineral fertilizers, superphosphates, nitrates and potash	5,100,000 tons.

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Light Industry[1]

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433 By the end of 1946 the production of consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. had already revived considerably; output in the different branches ranged from 20 to 50 per cent. above 1945. Reconversion of the factories to peacetime production was largely completed; however, three big tasks remained: to complete the rehabilitation of all light industry enterprises wrecked by the Nazis; to replace the old or worn-out machinery; and to obtain an adequate supply of labour and materials.

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[1] Soviet News, London, December 30, 1946, and February 6, 1947.

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Food Industries

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The damage suffered by the Soviet food industry during the German occupation - not counting the destruction of livestock and crops - has been estimated at 17,000 million roubles. Restoration work was begun while the war was still on, and by May 1947, 3,200 food factories had been rebuilt. A fairly large proportion of these restored factories must have been in the Ukraine, where, according to the Soviet Monitor[1] 1,600 out of 1,822 pre-war food factories had been restored by November 6, 1946. The rehabilitated factories had exceeded their 11 months' food output programme by production valued at 12 million roubles (146 million roubles over the corresponding period of 1945).

Sugar

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Before the war the output of sugar in the Ukraine was as follows.

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TABLE XX

Pre-War Sugar Production: Ukraine and U.S.S.R.
(metric tons)

Year	Soviet Union total	Ukrainian S.S.R.
1928	1,221,200	1,086,400
1932	826,800	559,700
1937	2,377,500	1,789,800

Sources: Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1939; and Statistical Yearbooks of the League of Nations, Geneva, 1936 and 1939.

The Five-Year Plan establishes that in 1946-50 sugar refineries in the Ukraine shall be restored or built capable of handling upwards of 67,000 tons of sugar beet per day. By 1950, according to plan, the output of granulated sugar in the Ukraine will reach 1,637,000 tons, (in the entire Soviet Union, 2.4 million tons).

Forestry

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In January 1935 the forest area of the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 3,845,000 hectares - about 0.5 per cent. of the forest area of the entire U.S.S.R.[2] The number of sawing frames in the Republic was 703 out of the Soviet Union total of 6,500 (total capacity, 18.4 million cubic metres).[3] Considering the relatively small forest

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[1] November 11, 1946

[2] Socialist Construction, Moscow, 1936.

[3] Planned Economy, Moscow, 1940, II.

Production of Building Materials

339 In connection with the reconstruction work being carried out in
185 the Ukraine, the production of building materials is extremely important. The Five-Year Plan lays down that the pre-war production of bricks is to be increased by 50 per cent. of tiles, by 170 per cent. of lime, by 120 per cent., and of gypsum by 190 per cent. The Plan also states that

> "Plants for the production of building materials - including cement, glass, brick, lime, and tile works, plants producing metal fixtures, prefabricated houses, building sections, plumbing fixtures, roofing materials and high tensile gypsum - shall be restored or built and stable local fuel and power supplies created for the building material plants."

The Ukrainian output of cement in 1950 is expected to be 2,055,000 tons as compared with 10,500,000 tons for the entire U.S.S.R.

[323] Under the jurisdiction of the Republic and local authorities there are to be put into operation in the years 1946-50 glass works with a capacity of 11-33 million square feet of glass, brick kilns with a capacity of 9 million bricks, and rolling mills and other building material plants.

Transport

727 The war and the occupation brought great devastation to the
489 transport system of the Ukraine. The greater part of the railroads were partially or completely destroyed, and many hundreds of railway bridges demolished. The port of Odessa on the Black Sea was systematically destroyed - piers, warehouses, elevators, floating cranes, and power supply. The Dnieper-Bug Canal, the only water outlet towards the west, was made impassable by the Germans, who destroyed the sluices, wrecked bridges, sank boats in midstream, and choked the canal with mud.

185 The Five-Year Plan, 1946-50, provides for the complete rehabili-
489 tation of Ukrainian transport. Railway lines and junctions, and locomotive and car repair works are to be fully restored. A number of railway lines are to be electrified; and west of the Dnieper several narrow gauge lines are to be constructed for closer connection of sugar beet growing areas with sugar refineries.

185 To alleviate the difficult situation in rail transport, motor
489 roads are to be rebuilt and extended. The Moscow-Kharkov highway is
494 to be rehabilitated and improved, and additional motor roads are to be built to connect towns of the Ukrainian S.S.R. with the towns of the North Caucasus and the Crimea. By 1950 the tonnage of freight transported by road should be 16 times the pre-war volume. The number

U 185 489 494 of road passengers should increase 7½ times; and the number of buses, by 3,000.

U 185 489 503 The Five-Year Plan also provides for the expansion of river and sea traffic. Small rivers are to be extensively adapted for navigation, and will also be utilized for local hydro-electric power supplies. Shipbuilding yards are to be rebuilt, and the tonnage of river and sea traffic is to be considerably increased. The freight turnover on small rivers of the Ukraine in 1950 is fixed by the Five-Year Plan at 450,000 metric tons.

Pre-War Traffic

U 489 In 1937 the Ukrainian railways handled 313.1 million metric tons of loads, as compared with 165.7 million in 1932. The river transport carried 7.7 million tons (4.7 million in 1932), while in the same year Ukrainian seaports handled 8.6 million tons as against 6.5 million tons in 1932.

SU 497 U 497 The U.S.S.R.'s system of rail transport is perhaps the weakest link in the Soviet economy. In 1937 the railway network of the entire Soviet Union amounted to only 86,400 kilometres (83,400 kilometres in 1933). The construction of additional lines had by no means kept pace with the expansion of industry and agriculture. The Ukraine in 1937 had some 14,400 kilometres of railway lines; and traffic loads in that year amounted to some 313.1 million metric tons. The inadequacy of the system if compared with other European countries is marked. For example, in France (the area of which was approximately equal to that of pre-war Ukraine) the length of the principal lines open for traffic on January 1, 1938, was 42,000 kilometres.

● U 727 497 The war has greatly disrupted Ukrainian rail transport. Locomotives, rolling stock and tracks were heavily damaged or destroyed. The problem of rehabilitation is especially serious, because the lack of adequate transport facilities hinders other rebuilding projects. The locomotives and cars taken as reparations from Germany, being chiefly of narrow gauge, are consequently of no use on most existing Soviet tracks.

Production of Long Distance Locomotives

U 397 Before the war the output of long distance locomotives in the Ukraine was as follows.

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The canal was reconstructed just before the German invasion. In record time, eight months, ten large sluices were built in two stairways of five locks each; and in August 1940 the first river vessels passed through from the Black Sea to the Vistula.

The Germans destroyed these sluices and choked the canal so that all the hydro-technical structures had to be rebuilt anew. The speed of reconstruction was such that by the middle of 1946 vessels and barges were passing freely from the Vistula along the Dnieper with cargoes of timber for the Ukraine.

At present the western Bug is navigable only in April and May. When it has been converted into a normal waterway, effective communication will be established between the Ukrainian and Byelorussian river basins and the Vistula, Oder, Elbe, and Rhine.

652 under their jurisdiction. For example, capital works, repairs,
657 and equipment for livestock raising centres, piggeries, cattle
sheds, slaughterhouses and refrigerators (under the Ministry of
Cattle Breeding); vineyards, orchards, repairs of irrigation
facilities (under the Ministry of Technical Agricultural Production);
repairs to barns and agricultural implements (under the Ministry of
Agriculture); and rehabilitation of the brick and ceramic industry
(under the Ministry of Home Construction).

Health Services. These expenditures are administered by the Ministry of Health, and include the feeding of patients, and repairs and equipment for hospitals and health service agencies.

[658] Children's Institutions (over four years) and Schools. These expenditures are handled by the Ministry of Education, and include the feeding of children; and capital works, repairs and equipment for schools and children's homes.

Social Welfare Services Directed towards the Betterment of General Well-being. These expenditures are administed by the Ministry of Social Welfare and include such services as repairs and maintenance of social welfare agencies, and assistance to invalids.

Local Rehabilitation

648 As at March 1, 1947, about 41 per cent. of the gross proceeds of
727 UNRRA sales had been transferred to regional executive committees of
the government for use in the local and district economy. The local
185 projects - which are undertaken after approval by the state authorities
731 and are subject to regular reporting and inspection - are similar in
character to those carried out by the Republican Government Ministries.
However, there is a considerable shift in emphasis. For example, at
the regional level, nearly 57 per cent. of the total proceeds at their
disposal was utilized for health services (hospitals, nurseries), 35
per cent. for children's institutions, 5 per cent. for repairs of public
and industrial institutions, and 2 per cent. for the building of schools
and repair of clubs.

Deliveries of UNRRA Supplies

648 In the original agreement between UNRRA and the Ukrainian Govern-
731 ment was a provision that the Administration would "strive within the
limits of its resources" to procure and deliver the Ukraine's share of
relief and rehabilitation supplies before July 1, 1946. In the early
months of 1946, however, it became clear that procurement difficulties
and transport hold-ups would prevent a great part of the supplies from
being delivered in time. The UNRRA-Ukrainian Agreement was therefore
extended to the end of 1946.

From December 1945 (when UNRRA deliveries to the Ukraine began) up to June 30, 1946, (the time at which they were originally scheduled

645 744 262 (a) In the districts most affected by the poor crops of 1946, all children are to be fed by state feeding centres under the control of the Ministry of Health. (Normally, the Ministry of Education is in charge of feeding some of the school children; and other groups are fed in varying degrees by the Ministry of Health and trade union organizations.) However, it is hoped that now by establishing all child feeding arrangements under one Ministry, children of all ages and population groups will be fed as well as is possible. Transport is one of the limiting factors of this programme.

(b) Measures are being taken to recruit and equip special medical teams for use in areas where any widespread symptoms of starvation appear. These teams will attempt to ensure that the best possible use is made of such palliative measures (for example, special protein foods) as are available.

Summary

241 727 The Ukraine has often been called the granary of the Soviet Union. Before the war it produced all the food required for its own population; it helped to feed other regions of the U.S.S.R.; and it produced nine-tenths of the grain exported from the Soviet Union.

This favourable position was abruptly reversed by the war, which left the Ukraine, after Byelorussia, the most devastated section of Europe. In August 1945 when this Republic applied to UNRRA for relief assistance, the most urgently needed supplies were food.

731 649 262 UNRRA's major contribution to recovery in the Ukrainian Republic has been in furnishing 100 million dollars' worth of food - a considerable amount, but very small in relation to the need. Distributed among the urban population of about 27 million, the per capita proportion is almost insignificant. However, the foods delivered by UNRRA were those in shortest supply and those most necessary to sustain the people

Since the disastrous drought, the amount of food available from domestic production is exceedingly small. Not even the very low bread ration is assured. Moreover, UNRRA relief is drawing to a close; and food shipments since January 1 have been negligible. The mission in Kiev reports: "The cessation of relief supplies of meats, fish, milk, and fats at this time is nothing less than a tragedy."

There is no immediate prospect of improvement in the Ukrainian food situation. Other areas of the Soviet Union, having been similarly affected by the drought, are not in a position to give assistance.